

IAR

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WINTER 2021 / XXIX / 1

- Economic Recovery from Coronavirus as a Response to the Climate Change Crisis
- Frontier Urbanization: Potential for Development or Violence on the Periphery?
- The Tale of Two Countries: Parallel Societies, the Clash of Civilizations, and Jihad in France
- The Indo-Pacific Stability-Instability Paradox
- A Changing Security Landscape: NATO and Russia in the Arctic
- Why Allies Rebel: Defiant Local Partners in Counter-insurgency Wars



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EDITORS' NOTE

2020 has been a year of tremendous challenges and volatility. COVID-19 has tested the strengths of communities and challenged us all to adopt a new way of life. Under the “new normal,” tragedies were amplified, and triumphs were dampened. Across the nation and throughout the world, waves of political, emotional, and economic unrest have washed over each of our communities. There are few of us who have lived through a time wherein our political and economic systems across the world were challenged to the extent that they are today.

The events of this year underscore the importance and relevance of the field of international affairs. As the challenges of the 21st century continue to make themselves known, it becomes clearer that expertise housed in silos will not be sufficient to overcome them. Certainly, a strength of the field of international affairs is its ability to encompass most issues, topics, and events. At International Affairs Review (IAR), we are proud to work towards the advancement of international affairs by spotlighting members of the Elliott Community and drawing attention to some of the most pressing issues of our time.

The contents of our Winter 2021 issue reflect the inclusive nature and utility of international affairs and the complexity of the issues of our time. The authors published in this issue went to great lengths to make sense of these issues and to put forward policy solutions to them. Such work is no simple task and we thank them for their contributions. With that in mind, we ask that you read this journal with a sense of curiosity and openness.

Alex and I extend our gratitude to our tremendous editorial staff. Each member of our team demonstrated a commendable degree of diligence, intellect, and adaptability. On account of COVID-19, this issue was brought together entirely remotely—which was no small feat. Finally, we thank our faculty advisors, professors, and the entire Elliott School of International Affairs community for fostering an environment of intellectual growth and professional development.

Dayne Feehan, *Editor-in-Chief*
Alexander Morales, *Managing Editor*

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Economic Recovery from Coronavirus

as a Response to the Climate Change Crisis

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ABSTRACT

The climate change crisis is earth's most pressing long-term threat. It will have far reaching and disastrous effects on our environment and tangential effects throughout society for decades to come. Simultaneously, the COVID-19 (or Coronavirus) pandemic is the most urgent threat, one that has put much of the world effectively under quarantine. In addition to the significant health risk to U.S. citizens across the country, it threatens to send a U.S. economy that had seen record highs earlier this year into a recession. Congress has passed short-term stimulus measures, and continues to debate future legislation to further support America as it battles the Coronavirus. However, these efforts will not be enough to fully restart the economy – and they do nothing to minimize the dangers of the long-term changes to earth's climate. Instead, I propose a stimulus package dedicated to incentivizing research and production of renewable energy sources, as well as continuing efforts to encourage consumers to transition to renewable energies. These proposals would encourage investment in the nascent energy sector, mitigate our reliance on fossil fuels and their effects on climate change, and kickstart the economy in the wake of Coronavirus.

INTRODUCTION

The climate change crisis is earth's most urgent long-term threat. It will have far reaching and disastrous effects on our environment and tangential effects throughout society for decades to come. Simultaneously, the COVID-19 pandemic has become the most immediate threat, one that has put much of the world effectively under quarantine. In addition, it threatens to send the U.S. economy, which only two months ago had reached record highs, into a recession.

There has been much debate in the U.S. about the best ways to stimulate the stalled economy. We have already seen efforts such as The Coronavirus Aid, Relief, and Economic Security (CARES) Act, which among other things established refundable tax credits to much of the population and grants to small businesses to keep the lights on and employees paid.

These efforts will not be enough to fully restart the economy – and they do nothing to minimize the economic dangers resulting from the long-term changes to earth’s climate. For instance, the National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration has tracked more than 275 climate-related disasters that have each exceeded \$1 billion (inflation adjusted) in damage costs.¹ That same analysis has found that in the last five years the average annual number of Billion dollar climate-disaster events has nearly doubled from the average of 6.6/year from 1980-2019 to 13.8 over the most recent five years. Already in 2020, we have seen 16 such climate-related disaster events through October 2020. These staggering costs are expected to rise as natural disasters continue to become both more severe and more frequent. To combat this, Congress should prioritize a stimulus package dedicated to incentivizing the research and production of renewable energy sources, as well as continuing efforts to encourage consumers to transition to renewable energies. This would encourage investment in the nascent energy sector, mitigate our reliance on fossil fuels and their effects on climate change, and kickstart the economy in the wake of COVID-19.

CLIMATE CHANGE

In 1988, concerns about man-made climate change made front page news following congressional testimony made by NASA scientist Dr. James Hansen making the connection – with 99 percent certainty - between global warming and pollutants in the atmosphere. Over the last several decades, there has been little legislative or regulatory action despite numerous scientific studies that illustrate the consequences of fossil fuel emissions on nearly every aspect of life. Fossil fuels still remain the primary source of energy in the United States, responsible for more than 60 percent of all U.S. electricity generation in 2019.²

RENEWABLE ENERGY

A fundamental change to energy production is necessary to stymie the continued effects of climate change. The International Renewable Energy Agency, for example, predicts that in order to have a two-thirds likelihood of keeping global temperature rise below an annual rate of 2 degrees Celsius by 2050, CO₂ emissions would need to fall by more than 70 percent from today’s levels. To accomplish this, they suggest among other things that nearly 95

percent of electricity generation would need to be low-carbon. Another study, which analyzed the necessary steps to meet Paris Agreement temperate targets, found that “avoiding 1.5 degrees of warming altogether, even with immediate action, would require considerably greater effort—at least a 25 percent cut in effective global CO₂ emissions from present-day levels by 2030.”³ In short, drastic and immediate action should be undertaken to mitigate the effects of climate change.

Though costs vary due to regional differences (such as ease of harnessing solar energy in the Southwest as opposed to other regions of the country) and incentive structures (such as tax credits), a leading reason for the lack of adoption is the current renewable energy costs on the whole being higher than fossil fuel costs. However, renewable energy offers a number of benefits in addition to a decreased reliance on fossil fuels and thus cleaner emissions.

Renewable energy can contribute to “social and economic development, energy access, [and] a secure energy supply,” if implemented properly.⁴ Proper implementation in essence necessitates buy-in from relevant state and local governments (and in some cases regional coordination) in both investment in R&D and construction of the energy generation facilities, and proper policies to ensure successful deployment and conversion to use the energy. Renewable energies can have a positive impact on job creation and can also provide energy to rural areas of the country where adequate access to non-renewable energies may not be readily available. For instance, both climate and geography may create barriers to safe, efficient, and sufficient transport of certain energies to certain remote areas, while renewable energy generation techniques (such as wind turbines or solar panels) may not have those barriers. Crucially, it should also be noted that costs in recent years have declined and are expected to continue to do so with innovations in the renewable energy sector. Barring significant setbacks, the reductions in cost may help propel renewable energy forward in the coming years. However, depending on how the global economy reacts to the pandemic, COVID-19 may significantly impact continued investment in and adoption of these energies which may impede continued reductions in cost.

POTENTIAL IMPACTS OF COVID-19

The COVID-19 pandemic is likely to have a significant and damaging impact on the adoption of renewable energy. Initial reports of the pandemic trickled out of China in late 2019, and just a few short months later the disease had impacted much of the world. Since the end of March, the United States has effectively been under various degrees of quarantine due to strict stay-at-home orders issued by many states. In response, Congress has taken unprecedented steps such as the \$2 trillion CARES Act to protect the country against the

potential of an economic recession.

Peer-reviewed academic studies have not yet been done on the economic ramifications associated with COVID-19. However, available literature on predicted 2020 market trends, energy sector analyses, and previous economic recessions can help us recognize the negative impacts to adoption of clean energy stemming from the pandemic.

In October 2019, the International Energy Agency (IEA) predicted a “rapid rise in the ability of consumers to generate their own electricity” due to a predicted growth of distributed solar energy systems in homes, commercial buildings, and industry.⁵ In early April, Heymi Bahar, a Senior Analyst of Renewable Energy Markets and Policy at IEA, expressed serious concerns for the renewable energy sector in the wake of the pandemic. A number of factors play a role in the concerns.

One such factor includes the effects of reduced production of solar panels in China – which manufactures nearly three-quarters of the total global supply – in early 2020.⁶ While the wind energy supply chain is not as dependent on China for manufacturing as solar due to Europe’s role as a major hub for wind energy manufacturing (Behar, April 2020), Europe similarly suffered manufacturing shutdowns and delays due to the pandemic.⁷ Manufacturing in Spain and Italy – two primary countries in the manufacturing supply chain – shut down for a period of time along with the countries as they battled rising COVID-19 cases, though as of October 2020 all of Europe’s wind turbine and component factories are now open again.⁸

Compounding the issues due to delays in manufacturing and construction, the IEA notes that solar and wind energy production in the United States have additional concerns to grapple with moving forward as a result of the pandemic. In the U.S., “wind developers...are required to ensure projects are operational by 2020 to receive production tax credits. Any delay in components or construction puts companies at risk of missing these deadlines and thus important financial incentives.”⁹

Concerns over decreased adoption rates have been echoed by renewable energy advocates across the country in response to the pandemic. The American Wind Energy Association (AWEA) released a report in mid-March detailing the industry’s outlook in the wake of COVID-19. “According to AWEA analysis, COVID-19 is putting an estimated 25 gigawatts (GW) of wind projects at risk, representing \$35 billion in investment. More than \$8 billion in wind energy projects in rural communities and over 35,000 jobs, including wind turbine technicians, construction workers, and factory workers.”¹⁰

The solar industry is also preparing for significant impact due to COVID-19. Prior to the pandemic, an annual report on the industry was released in mid-March by the Solar Energy Industries Association, which projected 47 percent annual growth and nearly 20 GW of installation expected

in 2020. The report included an addendum, however, that these projections did not take into account the effects of COVID-19 and they would likely be reduced following a full assessment of the effects at a later time.¹¹

Taking a look at investment trends, investment in the renewable energy sector is lagging by a significant amount compared to previous years, a trend many analysts believe to be a result of COVID-19. For example, per a Q1 report on solar industry financing, “funding levels dropped in Q1 as the pandemic brought the global economy to a halt. Most large economies are shut down and there is minimal activity in solar markets...The worst maybe yet to come, but hope is that activity picks up in the second half of the year.”¹² The actual numbers included a decline of nearly 1 billion dollars in venture capital, public market, and debt financing for the solar industry – more than 30 percent lower than Q1 2019. To date, the hope for an increase in activity has not come to fruition. Most recent analysis reports just 3 GW of solar installations capacity in Q2 2020 and a loss of nearly 40 percent of related jobs.¹³

Statements from concerned solar and wind energy industry representatives and a measured decrease in investment imply more than just a temporary impact, but rather an industry-wide slump that may last well after 2020. To combat this however, we can study past financial crises to gain a better understanding of how the renewable energy industry fared and develop policy options that may better protect the industry moving forward.

PAST FINANCIAL CRISES

The 2007-2008 global financial crisis that began with the subprime mortgage markets in the United States had far reaching effects, including in the renewable energy sector.

The National Renewable Energy Laboratory, under the U.S. Department of Energy, issued a report in 2009 which studied the effects of the financial crisis on renewable energy projects.¹⁴ Their analysis found that “The pace and structure of renewable energy project finance has been reshaped by a combination of forces, including the financial crisis, global economic recession, and major changes in federal legislation affecting renewable energy finance.”¹⁵ Another study, by the Paris Innovation Review, found that “total global annual investment in clean energy dropped by 6 percent in 2009 compared to 2008.”¹⁶

Following the economic downturn a decade ago, scholars have conducted studies to analyze the impacts of the recession. For example, in 2012 Dan Hofman and Ronald Huisman re-examined the work of a study done a few years prior which looked at the policy preferences of more than fifty venture capital and private equity investors.¹⁷ The original study, which was conducted in 2007, offered an opportunity for Hofman and Huisman to compare investors’ appetites for renewable energy investment in a pre-recession and post-recession

economy. The investors were asked to rate twelve separate policy mechanisms on a scale of 1 (least preferred) to 5 (most preferred). The policy mechanisms included: (1) Feed-in tariffs (e.g. subsidies in the form of long-term energy contracts paid to renewable energy market producers); (2) Reduction of fossil fuel subsidies; (3) CO₂ emissions trading; (4) Renewable portfolio standards; (5) Renewable fuel standards or targets; (6) Green (renewable energy) quotas and certificate trading; (7) General CO₂ tax or energy tax; (8) Residential and commercial tax credits for renewable energy; (9) Kyoto mechanisms; (10) Government procurement of renewable energy; (11) Production tax credits; and (12) Technology performance standards.

The results of Hofman and Huisman's study found that all policies scored lower overall in their study than in 2007, except for technology performance standards which saw a modest increase from a 3.5 rating in 2007 to a 3.66 rating in 2011. Little discussion was made by the authors for why this was the case, though part of it may be due to a reduced risk of investment. Governments setting strict pollution regulations (such as vehicle emission standards) would ensure guaranteed market-wide purchases and would be among the "safest" bets of the twelve policy mechanisms discussed. The National Emissions Standards Act, which established pollution reduction standards in personal automobiles, showcases this; the automobile industry may incrementally move to cleaner standards with advances in technology, but the timeline can speed up when it is compelled to do so. Conversely, CO₂ trading, green quotas, and Kyoto mechanisms all scored among the lowest, which the authors explained may be due to "these policies imply[ing] more risk for investors since market prices for CO₂ and green certificates fluctuate."¹⁸ Feed-in tariffs, which was the highest rated policy mechanism in 2007, saw declines in preference in 2011 but still remained as the highest rated mechanism.

Interestingly, more than twice as many survey respondents focused their renewable energy investments in Europe than North America. This suggests that clean-energy investment has a stronger focus in Europe. This provides a potential impetus to enact policies to spur investment in the United States. Doing so would attract domestic investment in adoption of renewable energy. With that in mind, it is worthwhile to take a deeper look at the North American investment preferences for policies.

In both 2007 and 2011, feed-in tariffs ranked the highest among North American investors. Technology performance standards unsurprisingly saw a boost in popularity in 2011 considering the discussion above. CO₂ taxation was the only other policy mechanism to rise in popularity in 2011. In comparison to Europe in 2011, North American investors showed a greater preference for production tax credits. These four preferences (feed-in tariffs, technology performance standards, CO₂ taxation, and production tax credits) may serve to provide a starting point for United States policies to combat the economic

impact of COVID-19.

Additionally, the United Nations' Environment Program's Division of Technology, Industry and Economics conducted a similar study in 2009 on the impact of the financial crisis on renewable energy finance.¹⁹ Their findings suggested that small-scale project developers found it more difficult to find appropriate amounts of financing throughout the financial crisis, leading to a strong trend of mergers and acquisitions as the smaller companies are bought out by the larger, more established firms. Economist Joseph Schumpeter famously hypothesized that large firms are more than proportionately more innovative than small firms. Economists who follow this position may argue that this is a positive – large firms buying up small firms (and their associated IP, technologies, and workforce) should ultimately lead to more innovation.

Economists in recent years, however, have suggested that there may actually be a disadvantage in the correlation between firm size and innovation – that is to say, that large firms may actually be no more innovative than small firms.²⁰ The reasons for this argument are numerous, but primarily rest in the diversion of focus on a specific project or goal into many, which leads to wastes in resources, talent, and ultimately innovation. Some studies have also come to this conclusion, including one conducted by the Information Technology & Innovation Foundation (ITIF) in 2017, which found a proportionally outsized impact from smaller high-tech companies in comparison to large companies in terms of patents filed, employment, and wages due in part to their “seeking to develop innovations that have a clear competitive advantage in the global market.”²¹

POLICY OPTIONS

In addition to the environmental concerns posed by declines in clean energy adoption, there may also be a significant economic impact. A 2013 study, for example, found that while investment in fossil fuel-based energy had no impact on employment, there was demonstrated proof of increased output (GDP) and employment growth stemming from renewable energy investment.²² Policymakers should recognize the impact of legislation to combat past financial crises, as well as concerns expressed in the early stages of the COVID-19 financial crisis, in order to develop successful policies moving forward.

As discussed above, feed-in tariffs are popular in Europe though widespread adoption of the incentive has not quite taken off in the U.S. to date, with just four states (New York, Indiana, Hawaii, and California) and the Virgin Islands offering the program as of October 2020.²³ Despite that, investors still prefer them over other surveyed incentives primarily because of the long-term stability they bring via the guaranteed rates over a long-term contract. That being said, there is uncertainty regarding the economic impact feed-in tariffs

may have, especially in times of recession. For example, a 2017 study found that “the recession shows that traditional renewable energy support schemes such as feed-in tariffs are ineffective in the long-term.”²⁴ However, other studies have concluded that when included among other incentives in a market reform package, feed-in tariffs may actually be a viable option.²⁵ Therefore, while the feed-in tariff option may be tempting to legislators looking to spur investment in future stimulus package, it should be regarded as just one tool of many in a toolbox of policy options.

Providing an extension of the Production Tax Credit, for example, should be a priority for legislators moving forward. In particular the wind energy industry would stand to benefit most, as the industry is suffering from unprecedented manufacturing and construction delays and may not be fully able to take advantage of the current Production Tax Credit by the time it expires at the end of 2020. In addition, renewing the credit would also recognize the preferences of investors, who scored production tax credits as one of the most preferred policies in Hofman et al’s 2012 study.²⁶ Further, renewing the credit would mirror actions taken by Congress in 2009. The American Recovery and Reinvestment Act of 2009 extended the Production Tax Credit for 3 years part of the largest single investment in clean energy in history.²⁷

In addition, the Solar Investment Tax Credit, which incentivizes residential consumers as well as small- and medium-sized businesses to transition to solar, should be increased to its previous level of 30 percent of the cost of the system, and the sunset provision for residents, which was set to take place in 2022, should be removed. Doing so would again ensure stability and encourage further solar energy adoption in the burgeoning market.

Policymakers should also recognize the vital role the Federal Government plays in energy research and development (R&D). A recent analysis of the Federal Fiscal Year 2021 budget, for example, recognized the relationship between federal government and private sector in the transition between basic and applied research. The federal government is better equipped to finance fundamental research, while the private sector can apply that research into the development of marketable products.²⁸ However, the FY 2021 budget request would cut wind energy R&D within the Department of Energy by 74 percent and solar energy R&D by 76 percent. These drastic cuts amount to more than \$300 million lost in clean energy R&D, and could lead to a long-lasting drought in innovation, not to mention the environmental impact that it may cause.

Finally, no matter what efforts Congress undertakes, it is imperative that the incentives offer stability over a multi-year period and are not beholden to annual reauthorizations. Doing so would encourage long-term investments and adoption of renewable energy, and provide investors and the market with much needed certainty. As discussed above, uncertainty is among the single most important factors for why investments slow down in times of economic stress.

CONCLUSION

Climate change has steadily grown as the foremost global threat as a result of the continued reliance on fossil fuels. The pandemic may pose a risk to clean energy adoption due to fears of an economic slowdown leading to decreases in investment and decisions to continue to rely on fossil fuels due to their low current costs.

This decline may actually pose additional economic troubles for the United States as it battles a potential recession in the coming months and potentially years. It is therefore of paramount importance to implement policies that can encourage growth and adoption of renewable energy sources to mitigate further damage to the environment and protect the economy.

The policy options discussed above provide a broad suite of options policymakers can enact that would lead to immediate economic stimulus to protect against the economic effects of COVID-19. The options would further support an innovative, high-tech industry that provides high wages and employment opportunities across the country. They would also offer protection against future environmental harm caused by climate change. The options build on the lessons learned from past financial crises and recognize the concerns of the renewable energy industry in the early stages of the current pandemic.

As Ragnheiður Elín Árnadóttir, senior fellow of the Atlantic Council Global Energy Center said, "...as history demonstrates, innovation will thrive at this time of crisis, and this time may provide an opportunity to explore the use of renewable energy and take the leap into the next generation of technologies."²⁹ America, and the world, are in the grips of multiple crises at the same time – environmental, health, and economic. It is vital that policymakers let innovation thrive in order to navigate us through them.

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Frontier Urbanization:

Potential for Development or Violence on the Periphery?

Nora Wheelehan

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ABSTRACT

Sub Saharan Africa faces a multitude of security issues, and frontier urbanization is the latest emerging threat. Frontier urbanization is the rapid development of rural environments into densely populated areas due to the resource extraction in the region. This phenomenon is creating several security threats such as environmental degradation, human rights violations, private security forces, public protests, and negligent government intervention. There is little being done to address these many security threats at the moment, leaving much room for improvement. The best policy options to pursue would be ones that regulate foreign control, rebuild government institutions, and facilitate dialogue between the local communities and the governments, as these will address several of the problems that arise from frontier urbanization.

INTRODUCTION

The world is rapidly urbanizing and creating many new benefits, but it is also creating just as many threats. Urbanization can provide greater economic opportunities for individuals, as well as national economic growth, greater access to medical care, lower child mortality rates, and greater educational opportunities.¹ But urbanization is not necessarily a tide that raises all boats, as it leads to greater inequality within the population, leaving many out on the periphery. This is without mentioning the harmful environmental impacts of urbanization.² Moreover, rapid urbanization poses additional threats by

straining a locality's resources, infrastructure, and health services, hence creating a hotspot for social instability.³ Frontier urbanization in Sub-Saharan Africa encapsulates these issues as the rapid urbanization of certain regions for resource extraction leads to environmental degradation and human rights abuses, which can exacerbate three types of violence, described as protection and predation; poverty and protest; and boom after bust. This paper aims to explain this urbanization trend, analyze how this contributes to additional violence and threats, identify what is being done to combat these issues, and develop suggestions for what policies and actions can be implemented to address these shortcomings.

WHAT IS THE PROBLEM?

In Sub-Saharan Africa, the number of people living in urban areas, currently at 472 million, is expected to double in the next 35 years, with larger cities growing up to 4 percent annually. As one of the least developed and urbanized regions in the world, rapid urbanization raises concerns for stability and security.⁴ Frontier urbanization is "the rapid growth of previously marginalized, underdeveloped regions and hinterlands into urban areas that service resource extraction, particularly of oil, gas, and minerals."⁵ Sub-Saharan Africa is ripe with these valuable natural resources like oil, diamonds, and copper, yet the exploitative practices of extractive industries and poor governance have plagued it since colonialism. The result is the following process: when a new resource is found in an area, workers will flock to the new region, searching for the economic opportunities afforded by multinational corporations (MNCs). The MNCs will extract this valuable resource until it can no longer derive any value and then leave in search of another resource or location.⁶ The timelines of these boom and bust cycles vary depending on the resource and its quantity; however, the migration of laborers creates a demand for services needed to live in this new area, such as lodging and dining establishments.

The scarcity of economic opportunities throughout Africa is well documented, and the discovery of natural resources leads to the migration of workers to the region with limited prospects elsewhere.⁷ These resource discoveries are usually outside of already established urbanized cities with distinct cultures; thus, the term 'frontier' is used to denote both its distance from the urban areas and as a point of convergence for other cultures and societies, which has potential for future conflict among new and existing workers.⁸ Cultural contestation takes place between these migrants and the people who are living here, which leads to the bust after the boom conflict discussed later. Another major issue is the fact that the wealth from resource extraction is rarely invested back into the community from which it was extracted. Amin Kamete studied Zimbabwe's mining economy and found that much of the mines' wealth is

transferred to other parts of the country, thus adding wealth elsewhere, either in already established cities or exported out of the country altogether.⁹ The mining communities themselves do not receive the full extent of the benefits of the mining revenues, which deprives local governments of the funding to provide adequate services for its residents; essentially, this structure allows MNCs to thrive but discards the lives of the public. These services include welfare and medical care, but also the most basic function of the state: providing security. Max Weber's famous assessment of the state as a "human community that successfully claims the monopoly of the legitimate use of physical force within a given territory"¹⁰ means that the state is the only source of lawful violence because it is responsible for protecting its citizens and providing security. Yet, in these frontier settlements, the government cannot ensure security, leading to a dependence on alternative security options, like private security companies (PSCs). The rapid urbanization of a previously scarcely populated area strains a government's ability to support new inhabitants; therefore, MNCs outsource the security of the resources and property to PSCs.

ENVIRONMENTAL DEGRADATION

Frontier urbanization also entails environmental degradation due to both the nature of the extractive industry and of the urbanization process itself. The extractive industry practices are centered around extracting and processing the resource as quickly and as economically efficiently as possible, often disregarding the environmental impact it causes unless governments ensure compliance with environmental laws. The practices through which these resources are harvested can be extremely damaging to the earth, like deforestation; land, air, and water pollution; acid drainage from mines; and the loss of biodiversity.¹¹ The United Nations Environmental Program's 2011 report on Ogoniland, located at the Niger Delta and the epicenter of petroleum extraction in Nigeria, outlines the contamination of the region's air, land, soil, and water; as well as public health issues that were a result of the decades of irresponsible extraction practices.¹² The region's urbanization was centered around oil extraction, had minimal governance and left out any consideration of the workers. Therefore, the poor extraction practices of the petroleum industry led to major environmental destruction. Additionally, these damages further exacerbated the abysmal situation of the workers in the region as they were made to bear the environmental costs while being left out of the economic benefits of this process.¹³ This same situation is found across Sub-Saharan Africa and worldwide, where rapid urbanization under poor governance worsens the damage of the extractive industry on the natural environment in poor societies.

HUMAN RIGHTS VIOLATIONS

Another problem that arises from frontier urbanization is the violation of human rights. The working conditions of the extractive industry are not only poor for the environment but are also harmful to the people. The major potential for human rights abuses in the extractive industry stems from hazardous working conditions, limits on workers' unionization, and mistreatment at the hands of the PSCs hired.¹⁴ In 2016, Amnesty International investigated the claims of child laborers working in cobalt mines in the Democratic Republic of Congo. Not only did they find that there were around 40,000 children employed, but that there were also major health risks from inhaling cobalt dust and very little protective equipment such as gloves, boots, masks, or helmets for the employees.¹⁵ The employment of children violates the International Covenant on Economic, Social, and Cultural Article 10.3 and the hazardous working conditions and health risks are in violation of "just and favorable conditions of work" outlined in the United Nations Universal Declaration of Human Rights Article 23.1.¹⁶ These flagrant human rights violations are common practices at the mines and are part of the supply chain of products from major companies such as Apple, Samsung, and Sony—most of whom deny this connection.¹⁷

Like the abuse of the Pinkerton detective agency in the United States, PSCs are a major front for human rights violations on workers in the global south. The United Nations Working Group on 'the use of mercenaries as a means of violating human rights and impeding the exercise of the right of peoples to self-determination' examined the human rights abuses by PSCs in the extractive industry. They found that, in some cases, extractive companies are more likely to rely on their PSC rather than state security forces because it allows the companies to maintain greater control over workers' contracts and the company's policies and regulations.¹⁸ Additionally, PSCs "have been known to directly commit human rights abuses, as well as to facilitate abuses and violations committed by others, working under contract from extractive companies, and sometimes alongside state security forces."¹⁹

The Barrick Gold Corporation has been embroiled in numerous private security abuses around the world. At the North Mara mines in Tanzania, security forces captured local women, locked them in holding cells, and if they refused to have sex with the guards, they were threatened with imprisonment.²⁰ Women were also brutally beaten and disposed of at the hospital; if they were raped, later some found they were infected with HIV.²¹ In another instance at the North Mara mines, private security ran over and killed a nine-year-old girl on July 19, 2018, and when her family tried to recover the body, private security forces "fired on them without warning."²² This is a global problem for the Barrick Gold Corp. specifically because, at one of their mines in Papua New Guinea, the private security guards for the Canadian company raped, gang-

raped, and violently molested over 200 local women and children.²³ Nevsun Resources is still facing a complicated set of lawsuits in which forced labor, of both not consenting Eritrean soldiers and locals, was used for the construction of their Bisha mines in Eritrea.²⁴

Workers being mistreated by the PSCs can potentially lead to workers uprisings, which contributes to the poverty and protest violence discussed later. Environmental degradation and human rights abuses contribute to destabilizing urbanization and security issues, further worsening the situation in the frontier. The convergence of PSCs, MNCs, migrant workers, and the local population in a remote area produces a powder-keg of instability. This instability will be focused on in the next section by discussing the typologies of violence that arise, outlined in the 2015 Small Arms Survey: protection and predation, poverty and protest, and bust after the boom.²⁵

PROTECTION AND PREDATION

The first type of violence is created from MNCs' desire to protect resources and to maintain their predatory practices. The allure of these resources' profits attracts a wide variety of actors, such as MNCs, rebel groups, armed thieves, and non-state militias who hope to profit from this extraction. This leads to an extremely volatile security arena, as explained by Michael Ross, a professor of political science at the University of California, Los Angeles best known for his research on the ways resource wealth impacts individuals' security and freedom. He has explained the paradoxical conclusion that resources are a curse instead of a blessing for development by studying many different types of resources like oil, timber, and minerals.²⁶ Moreover, Ross found that "resource wealth has made conflict more likely to occur, last longer, and produce more casualties when it does occur."²⁷ MNCs are in competition with other non-state actors and must defend what they deem is their resources.

The introduction of PSCs to the area is due to MNCs avoiding the use of governments' limited security forces. These security guards are supposed to play a passive role by guarding MNCs' personnel and infrastructure against theft or violence. However, problems arise "when PSCs pre-emptively use an armed response or act as force multipliers providing security training."²⁸ These instances are similar to the cases investigated by the UN Human Rights Council, where PSCs abused workers, as mentioned earlier. In the case of Zimbabwe Consolidated Diamond Company, seven security guards killed a man who entered the premises on December, 29th 2017,²⁹ using excessive force, just as in 2019, when other security guards allowed dogs to maul illegal miners.³⁰ The PSCs act with relative impunity because governments fail to implement transparency policies or monitoring systems to check for abuses by the PSCs.³¹ The MNCs are able to continue their predatory practices and extraction of

resources for as long as necessary because of the lack of government oversight and the PSC presence.

PSCs are hired to reduce interruptions by other actors to the MNCs' resource extraction processes since MNCs derive the most profit from efficiently extracting the resource using whatever means necessary practices. Therefore, the PSCs extend MNCs' lifetimes by granting them a monopoly over the resource. PSCs' vast influence and power in these frontier settlements are apparent in their ability to completely close off an area, creating a secure enclave. One such example is the Botswana mining towns owned by DeBeers, who provide security to the entire town by simply closing it off from outsiders.³² This preserves MNCs' predatory business and leads to violence when others try to challenge the PSCs. Moreover, these PSC arrivals contribute to the urbanization of the area demonstrated by the conversion of South Lokichar, Kenya, "from a remote, dusty community into a buzzing oil town, with new bars and guesthouses."³³

The influx of poor laborers and better paid PSCs contributes to the rapid urbanization to accommodate their needs. The previously sparsely populated area is now flooded by new inhabitants, so the community constructs new infrastructure, such as lodging and dining establishments. However, this infrastructure is often unstable, and the constructions for the poor laborers are often makeshift and informal housing structures with poor living conditions.³⁴ While the economic disparity between the workers leads to the second typology of violence discussed next, poverty and protest, this component highlights the rapid urbanization is unsustainable and poorly done, leading to future infrastructural issues. The violence here is composed of the competition for the newfound natural resources, the MNCs' use of security to monopolize the resource, the aforementioned abuses by the private security forces, and the unstable urbanization to service the variety of new actors.

The lack of opportunities for individual economic stability in Sub-Saharan Africa is a significant problem in the region that impacts both security and development. Therefore, it could be argued that MNCs are beneficial to the region because they provide employment and a livelihood when there are no other options. However, these benefits are often unrealized and undermined by the costs that come from MNC participation. The extraordinary wealth from the extractive industry is not adequately distributed throughout the extraction process. The workers receive low wages while the MNCs export the profits out of the area and often the country. Not only does this rob the individual workers of proper livelihoods with meager wages compared to the profit they produce, but it also robs the governments of these resource-rich nations of proper revenue to implement necessary development policies and programs.³⁵

Moreover, there are high costs to individual human security through various human rights violations that are created by the MNCs extraction process, as

previously discussed.³⁶ Economic prosperity or stability is meaningless to an individual if they do not also have other measures of stability, demonstrated in the creation of the UN's Human Development Index, which focuses on the growth of people's capabilities, not just economic growth.³⁷ While these economic opportunities had the potential to improve health, living standards, and education of the people involved, ultimately MNCs brought additional violence and hardships.

POVERTY AND PROTEST

The second type of violence that occurs from frontier urbanization is when the poor protest the presence of the MNCs in the area but are squashed by PSCs and state forces. The mass arrival of the MNCs, PSCs, and workers to the region displaces the preexisting local communities and creates conflict between the newcomers and the natives. Additionally, the rapid urbanization paired with the limited government resources leads to the construction of informal settlements and shanty towns that are security risks on their own with theft, poor sanitation, and organized crime.³⁸ These towns clearly demonstrate how the wealth of the natural resources is being exported elsewhere and not being reinvested into the communities, thus intensifying tensions between the poor and the MNCs. The hired hands of the MNCs, the laborers at the extraction sites, are being paid low wages, and they are not getting rich by any means. Instead, MNCs and the local elite are retaining the wealth, and contrary to the MNCs' claims of improving local living standards, they are simply not, as demonstrated in a recent study of the Congolese mining industry.³⁹ As discussed previously, the workers are also subjected to poor working conditions and wages, which leads to an increased desire for change and revolt. PSCs' orders to disrupt the protests and calm the social tensions sometimes entail violent measures to complete the job.⁴⁰

Even more concerning is the close relationship between the state security forces and the PSCs. In Kenya, partnerships between the PSCs and the Kenyan police forces are commonplace due to its mutually beneficial nature by sharing resources, intelligence, payments, and creating a more efficient community policing system,⁴¹ but this causes problems in worker protest suppression when government police forces produce bloodshed. Kanga and Ajoku studied the instances of public uprisings in response to Nigerian oil companies. They observed that the workers and indigenous host communities' protests "leads to torture, cruel and inhumane treatment by the Nigerian police and military under the pretense of protecting the oil facilities from the protesters."⁴² The workers' inadequate living standards and the MNC's invasion of native communities' property contributes to social unrest. While security forces', both private and government/police, orders to disrupt the protests and calm the social tensions

entails additional violence. The issue of state-level suppression and violence is critical here. One of the worst cases was the Marikana, South Africa uprising in August 2012, in which 34 protesters were killed and 78 injured by the South African Police Services.⁴³ Miners held a week-long strike to address their poor living and work conditions as well as a pay raise, and on the 7th day, a militant group of strikers and the police began shooting at each other.⁴⁴ This is not unique to this one incident as this has occurred worldwide, at the Rio Tinto Mine in South Africa in 2019,⁴⁵ Colombian oil facilities in 2011,⁴⁶ and in the Niger Delta in the 1990s.⁴⁷ Social unrest was built up between the workers and the MNCs over the poor socio-economic conditions. Poor government oversight of the actions of the security forces and the lack of worker agency in employment negotiations escalated the unrest and led to the violent standoff between state security forces and the public.

THE BUST AFTER THE BOOM

The final type of violence occurs from a bust after the boom when there are no more extractable resources and minimal economic opportunities. Nevertheless, ethnic tensions still exist between the original inhabitants of the area and the migrant workers who have now relocated there. Violence erupts when governments facilitate clean-up and rejuvenation plans. As mentioned earlier, the position of the frontier means that it allows for a convergence of different cultures and ethnicities and the possibility of contestation over the rights of the land. Büscher argues that East Congo's mining boomtowns engage a variety of stakeholders whose struggles for power and control are determined along ethnic lines: "in ethnic struggles for access to political and economic resources, these political and military alliances are easily mobilized."⁴⁸ The unstable urbanization process is partially due to the history of ethnic territorial protection as well as the actors' violent capabilities. The limited resources governments provide to local municipalities to erect sustainable urban centers paired with the dwindling or nonexistent revenues from the extractable resource intensifies social tensions and ethnic conflict. These conflicts arise because the migrant workers bring from their home region/state their own cultural and ethnic traditions, which can often cause community tensions between various ethnicities. These tensions are then further exacerbated by resource competition within a poor community. Xenophobia has been rising throughout South Africa, as Black South Africans violently attack migrants and refugees, who are seen as taking away South African livelihoods in already poor economic and living conditions.⁴⁹ Specific xenophobic attacks targeted at Nigerian businesses in Johannesburg have led to retaliatory attacks in Nigeria where Nigerians are attacking South African-owned brands.⁵⁰ This is an example of an international problem as it impacts the security and safety of the individuals within the local

communities and those thousands of miles away.

Another situation of violence after the boom is centered around government intervention in urban renewal programs. As governments aim to revive and spruce up the major cities, they often violently displace a large portion of their urban population who have nowhere else to go except to return to the informal accommodations of the mining towns that were previously deserted. As demonstrated in Zimbabwe's Operation Murambatsvina/Restore Order, governments incite violence when they mishandle these situations. Amin Kamete outlines the national clean-up campaign during May to July 2005 in which the Zimbabwean army, police, and youth militia demolished many of the informal settlements and low-income residential areas and violently arrested, detained, or forcibly relocated poor urban residents. As a result, 700,000 urban dwellers lost their homes and livelihoods.⁵¹ These residents had to return to the mining towns and reconstruct informal settlements that "became one large informal cesspool of everything."⁵² The violence of the slums returned once again, but this time it also includes state violence on the people. The three typologies of violence discussed are interconnected and reliant upon each other, leading to a complicated and intricate problem rife with security threats.

Although this article focused on the Sub-Saharan region, specifically, frontier urbanization and the typologies of violence it entails are found throughout the world. One example is in Colombian mining towns of Segovia and Remedios; natural resource attraction drew guerilla, paramilitary, and armed criminal groups who were anticipating far greater profits from gold than from narcotrafficking.⁵³ As expected, this collection of dangerous actors brought with them a constant state of unrest and security threats for the local inhabitants, and the introduction of MNCs and foreign investments such as the Gran Colombia Gold Company did not enhance the security. Instead, they made it worse by settling legal disputes over land titles with gun violence, resulting in numerous massacres.⁵⁴ The violence, destabilization, and security risks associated with frontier urbanization can be found at oil refineries in Syria,⁵⁵ sand mines in India,⁵⁶ and in the Brazilian Amazon.⁵⁷ This article aimed to outline the central themes of violence associated with frontier urbanization that can then be applied to other international situations.

WHAT IS BEING DONE?

So far, not much has been accomplished or initiated to combat the many security threats of frontier urbanization. When governments try to get involved, like in Zimbabwe's Operation Murambatsvina, their efforts are counterproductive, simply relocating the poor from one community to the next. Another instance of poor government intervention is in Port Harcourt in southern Nigeria when the government tried to use state police to improve the security in the city

and reduce gang violence; however, the police's violent measures against the residents undermined the public's trust in the government. Port Harcourt is in the heart of the oil-rich Niger Delta and arose in response to the oil industry growth, yet around 600,000 inhabitants live in slums, primarily along the waterfront. When the Nigerian authorities tried to revitalize the city through urban development plans centered on luxury real estate, they forcibly evicted and displaced thousands.⁵⁸ More distressing are the events of October 6, 2009, at the Bundu Waterfront in Port Harcourt: in response to the current residents' protests against the forced evictions, the Nigerian Army dispatched 300 soldiers who shot and killed five people, leaving nine people critically wounded including a thirteen-year-old schoolgirl.⁵⁹ The government was not properly informed as to what was needed to enhance the city, and the community members were denied a voice in policy options, which could have prevented these deaths. In failed resettlement plans, one key issue is the lack of communication between the government and the local communities that leads to lethal standoffs, as demonstrated in the miscommunication issues in the Port Harcourt example.

The extractive industry has received greater attention for its human rights violations and uses of PSCs and has led to initiatives and programs by the United Nations, European Commission, African Union Commission, and other international organizations to regulate their practices and require greater transparency.⁶⁰ One such example when in 2010 the U.S. Congress introduced the Dodd-Frank Act with Section 1502, which requires American businesses to disclose if their supply chains use minerals from the Democratic Republic of the Congo and exercise due diligence to not contribute to human rights abuses or armed groups that stems from this mineral sourcing.⁶¹ Nevertheless, there is little desire for the extractive industries to change their practices because of the freedom they experience and the profit schedules which provide them with substantial revenues.⁶² More importantly, the governments of these nations must change, shift their priorities, and refocus on helping all of their constituents by addressing the problems of frontier urbanization. These issues receive little attention in the international arena because they are on society's frontier, which does not directly involve the Global North. The limited political power of those subjected to frontier urbanization means that there is little momentum to enact change.

WHAT CAN BE DONE?

The end goal for ameliorating frontier urbanization is ensuring sustainable and secure development through the expansion of policies that address the various actors' roles in natural resource extraction. The United States, European Union, African Union, and United Nations, as well as other international

organizations, should work with the targeted nations to encourage, develop, and implement these policy options through legislation at home or through multilateral agreements. Achieving this goal would also include other benefits such as reduced violence, adequate working conditions for laborers in the extractive industries, environmentally sustainable extractive practices, protection of indigenous property rights, housing infrastructure, and frequent communication between the government and local communities.

One suggested policy option would be to devise greater regulations for MNCs in the extractives industry. An example of this would be the expansion of the Dodd-Frank Act in the U.S. and the creation of similar legislation in other UN member nations' home legislatures. The dearth of government regulation and enforcement of such policies provides MNCs with the opportunity to exploit these situations of resource extraction. Moreover, individual states may not have enough power themselves to institute these regulations, as MNCs have threatened to relocate their operations to other nations with looser regulations and less government interference.⁶³ Thus, regional coalitions of states can provide greater collective bargaining power for these governments. Internationally binding commitments between the MNCs and regional coalitions can address the role of MNCs in nations by outlining environmental standards and acceptable working conditions. Regulations on PSCs, while clearly defining their roles when hired by MNCs and the permissible extent of their use of force, would also address the additional security problems that they cause.

Another policy option to address the lack of proper governance, which allows these MNCs to undermine the government's authority, is to facilitate institution-building through international organizations. Rooting out corruption in African governments has been a key issue in the development field, and a primary concern of several international organizations like the UN and the World Bank.⁶⁴ Corruption erodes not only public trust in government but also economic growth, which scares away sustainable local businesses that would reinvest in the communities instead of MNCs. The combination of top-down and bottom-up accountability systems could be an effective mechanism to counter this, as it would involve official auditing and the local community reporting that aims to rebuild government trust.⁶⁵ Developing strong institutions are essential for governments to be able to provide the necessary services to its citizenry, a key missing factor in frontier urbanization.

Further, addressing the absence of constituent and government communications is crucial to ensuring that the government knows what is needed in these communities, even if they do not have all of the resources to provide them. Preventing ill-informed government decisions on urban renewal programs could diminish violence between government security forces and the local communities. Local communities are often denied agency in

these situations, which contributes to social unrest that can erupt in violence. International institutions should work within these communities to build the infrastructure and networks that are needed to allow proper policy-making. By facilitating these communication networks, it can reduce community tensions between the government and the public, bolster public trust in the government, and allow individuals to take a greater role in addressing their community's needs. Strengthening the civil society of these nations will facilitate better long-term and sustainable growth through public-government partnerships that are crucial to the development and improvement of these nations' current socio-economic status. Support by international organizations and nation-states can encourage the multilateral cooperation of all parties to generate the best solutions for local problems.

Moreover, a framework for urbanization and the role that governments can play in creating and providing the necessary infrastructure for sustainable urbanization would be extremely helpful in avoiding the construction of informal housing and slums. It is not possible to completely avoid informal settlements, as construction does not happen overnight, but having the right tools available to quickly provide physical infrastructure and social services will alleviate the massive strains on governments that create issues. If a nation is able to eradicate, or at least minimize, corruption in governance, enforce regulations on MNCs so that the resource wealth is redistributed to the workers who are generating this wealth, and build infrastructure to generate the resources for government usage in providing essential services to frontier settlements, then many of the problems can be resolved or reduced. The issue here is not that these nations are poor; the issue is that their wealth is exported out of the areas that need the resources the most. This is not to say that simply providing cash infusions will solve the issue. Still, these resources are necessary to rebuild the crucial infrastructure, both physical and institutional, that can address frontier urbanization problems.

CONCLUSION

Frontier urbanization is a major emerging threat in Sub-Saharan Africa. The rapidly urbanizing environment creates security risks for workers in extractive industries and for native inhabitants of newly urbanized areas. This process of resource extraction with MNC stakeholders engenders environmental destruction and human rights violations. Furthermore, the involvement of PSCs exacerbates the violence in these territories and contributes to social unrest. When state security forces become involved, either to quell worker protestation or to rejuvenate informal shantytowns created during frontier urbanization, they further contribute to the violence of the area. The best policy options to pursue would be those that regulate foreign control, rebuild

government institutions, and facilitate dialogue between the local communities and their governments, as these will address several of the problems that arise from frontier urbanization.

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The Tale of Two Countries:

Parallel Societies, the Clash of Civilizations, and Jihad in France

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ABSTRACT

Islamist terrorism in France has been especially pernicious, with several high-profile attacks over the past decade earning France the dubious distinction of being ranked #1 worldwide for the impact of terrorism among countries that are not currently experiencing severe internal conflict. Existing research has discovered that the single greatest determinant of a country's Sunni radicalization rate is whether it currently or previously listed French as a national language. This paper seeks to explain how the intricacies of contemporary French culture have generated a widespread and unrivaled sense of alienation among the nation's Muslim population, which creates a fertile recruiting ground for extremists. It argues that three primary factors are driving jihadism: militant secularism under *laïcité*, widespread poverty and discrimination in the Muslim-dominated banlieues, and an increasingly vocal and prevalent Islamic fundamentalism, exacerbated by the first two factors, that targets angry and disaffected young Muslims in France. Finally, it is proposed that, to decrease the appeal of Jihadism, the French government take steps to address these three factors by liberalizing *laïcité*, pursuing increasingly targeted research programs to understand and eventually alleviate the widespread poverty and economic desperation, and by creating a more moderate brand of Islam compatible with French values.

"It was the best of times, it was the worst of times, it was the age of wisdom, it was the age of foolishness, it was the epoch of belief, it was the epoch of incredulity, it was the season of Light, it was the season of Darkness, it was the spring of hope, it was the winter of despair, we had everything before us, we had nothing before us, we were all going direct to Heaven, we were all going direct the other way."

-Charles Dickens, A Tale of Two Cities

"France and those who follow its path must know that they remain the principle targets of the Islamic State and they will continue to smell the odor of death for having taken the leadership of the Crusade, having dared to insult our Prophet, having boasted that they were fighting Islam in France . . . The attack is only the beginning of the storm."

-ISIS Claim of Responsibility following November 2015 Paris Attacks

INTRODUCTION: JIHAD IN FRANCE

While the specter of jihad has haunted the entire Western World for decades, Islamist terrorism has been an especially pernicious threat to France. According to the 2019 Global Terrorism Index (GTI), France is ranked 2nd in Western Europe (as well as 3rd on the entire continent, and 30th worldwide) in terms of the impact of terrorism.¹ Although this is a marked improvement from the 2017 GTI, when France was ranked 23rd worldwide and the 1st country on the list not simultaneously experiencing severe internal conflict, it still signifies a severe terrorist menace.² While this index does not focus solely on jihadism (terrorist incidents from across the spectrum of motivations are recorded), the past decade has seen many incidents of grievous jihadist violence across France.

In January 2015, gunmen killed 12 people at the Paris office of the satirical magazine *Charlie Hebdo* in the worst terrorist attack in France since the Algerian War (1954-1962). 11 months later, 130 people were killed when an ISIS cell simultaneously committed suicide bombings outside the Stade de France, shootings in cafes around the 10th and 11th Arrondissements, and a mass shooting and hostage-taking at the Bataclan Theater during a concert. It was the deadliest act of violence on French soil since the Second World War (1939-1945). Since then, there have been attacks on French soldiers and police, the murder of a priest, and a truck barreling into a crowd at a Bastille Day celebration in Nice.³ And most recently: in September 2020, two people were non-fatally stabbed outside Charlie Hebdo's new offices; in October, a French

teacher was beheaded after showing cartoons of Muhammad during a lesson.⁴ All were committed by jihadis, many of whom were inspired by or connected to ISIS or Al Qaeda.

William McCants and Christopher Meserole, scholars of radical Islam from the Brookings Institution, discovered that the single biggest predictor of Sunni Islamist radicalization is whether a country currently or previously lists French as a national language. When radicalization is viewed as a function of the total number of Muslims in a country (i.e. x number of radicalized/ y number of Muslims in country z), France has the highest rate of Islamist radicalization in Europe.⁵ Something integral to France is driving radicalization.

This paper argues that radicalization is so prevalent in France because of three deep fissures in French society: 1) aggressive secularism under the policy of *laïcité*, 2) social and economic inequalities between Muslims and non-Muslims, and 3) fundamental cultural differences between Muslims and non-Muslims regarding social issues. These three conditions have formed of parallel societies – “traditional” France and “Islamic” France – thus creating prime conditions for jihadi recruiters to lure disaffected Muslims to join their movements with Manichaeic “clash of civilizations” rhetoric.

THE MEANING OF *LIBERTÉ* – IS *LAÏCITÉ* FREEDOM OF RELIGION, OR FREEDOM FROM RELIGION?

Public religion has been integral to the development of modern France. Nowhere was this more apparent than with the Revolutionary (1789-1799) Jacobins, who sought to extinguish Catholicism and replace it with new cults.⁶ The next century of French history can largely be understood as a reaction either against or in favor of the historical role played by the Catholic Church. An uneasy truce between the liberal secularists and the conservative Catholics was reached in 1905, with the enactment of the *laïcité* (secularism) law. The compromise guarantees freedom of religion in France, so long as religious practices do not infringe on “public order.”⁷ A century later, it is this caveat which has spurred so much animosity.

Under this policy of *laïcité*, the Islamic hijab (headscarf) was banned in French public schools in 2004 (alongside all other religious apparel), and the niqab (face-covering) was banned in all public spaces in 2010.⁸ These actions were taken under the guise of protecting secular society from the perceived pernicious influence of public displays of religiosity. It is the wording of the laws, however, that proves especially controversial in Muslim communities. Specifically, the laws ban religious signs that are “ostentatious” in schools and ban all religious face coverings, without mentioning specific religions.⁹ For many Muslims, this is perceived as a backhanded attack on Islam under the guise of equal treatment. This tension between secularism and Islam was further

exacerbated following the 2015 terror attacks, as many towns across France banned the controversial “burkini” swimsuit, modest swimming attire designed to respect Islam’s mandate on female modesty. In August of 2016, Nice made worldwide news as images spread of police forcing a woman to remove her burkini on a public beach.¹⁰ Around the same time, police in Cannes fined a Muslim female beachgoer for not dressing in “an outfit respecting good morals and secularism.”¹¹

Support for laws targeting Islamic clothing reveal the deep fissure in French society regarding Islam. On both the left and right, French politicians see secularism, and particularly secular laws that target Islam, as an important bulwark against the “Islamization of France.” Former center-right President Nicolas Sarkozy stated during his campaign that “there needs to be a law to keep these Islamic bathing suits out of our swimming pools and off our beaches,” and went so far as to suggest changing the constitution to make this happen. On the left, Socialist former Prime Minister Manuel Valls described the ideal French woman as Marianne, the historic female embodiment of the French nation, who “is not veiled because she is free!”¹² Likewise, the Socialist Minister Laurence Rossignol stated that Burkini manufacturers had been irresponsible by creating oppressive clothing, and compared Muslim women who freely choose the garment to “American negroes who favored slavery.”¹³ This rhetoric reinforces the perception of a bipartisan French government that uses the law as a bludgeon against (particularly Muslim) communities of faith, under the guise on defending secular society.

These policies are exacerbating, rather than ameliorating, tensions between Muslims and non-Muslims. The 2004 law, which banned religious symbols in public schools, did not force Muslim girls to abandon their head-coverings, as intended. Instead, the demand for private Islamic schools skyrocketed, further separating many Muslims from the mainstream.¹⁴ The perception of *laïcité* in the Muslim community is “unintelligible and even shocking . . . an assault, an injunction to give up their religion.”¹⁵ The burkini, viewed as a symbol of oppression by much of France, was envisioned by its creator as a tool of liberation for women, who would be free to exercise and relax on beaches while retaining their modesty.¹⁶ This perceptual cleavage exposes the innate tension between *laïcité* and multicultural liberalism, especially in the face of the increasing threat of terrorism.

Laïcité, insofar as it is meant to ensure a liberal, secular France that is immune from the pernicious influence of competing factions, has failed with regards to Islam. By aggressively enforcing secularism that targets Muslim religious expression, the French state has fomented the exact outcome they sought to avoid: a parallel society, a “nation within a nation,” a distinct minority identity within a state that claims as a fundamental value drawing no distinctions between citizens of the French Republic.¹⁷ This feeling of

alienation, driven by the perception of religious discrimination, is one major factor in the exacerbation of militant Islam in France.

Laïcité must be reformed. Ironically, the French principle of secularism has become fundamentalist itself – in the face of increasing diversity in France, the government has redoubled its efforts while forgetting its aims. Instead of compelling Muslims to integrate, it simply drives them away from mainstream society. Secularism is an admirable goal – the separation of church and state is a bedrock principle of both France and Western Civilization. The French government must, however, shift their view of secularism away from the dogmatism of *laïcité*, and closer to the models of the United States and United Kingdom, in which religious freedom is largely celebrated and embraced, so long as it does not hinder the rights of others. In other words, laws against religious expression in public places should be revoked and the concept of a *citoyen de la république* (citizen of the republic) should be one in which religion is not hidden, but in which citizens of different religions come together for the common good of France.¹⁸

(IN)ÉGALITÉ– INTER-GENERATIONAL POVERTY IN THE BANLIEUES DE L’ISLAM

Further creating prime conditions for radicalization is the rampant poverty in France’s Muslim communities. Neighborhoods that are largely composed of ethnic and religious minorities and immigrants dot the outskirts of major cities. The French word for these communities is *banlieues*, which although literally translates as *suburbs*, holds almost the opposite connotation as in English. It is here, in what the French press has deemed “zones of banishment” and “the lost territories of France,” that the hopes and dreams of Middle Eastern and North African immigrants, and those of their descendants, live and die in endemic, crushing poverty.¹⁹

The most infamous of the *banlieues* is undoubtedly Saint-Denis, one of the poorest areas in the country. Less than 10 kilometers separates the Champs-Élysées, the heart of Paris, from the center of Saint-Denis, yet the difference is stark. The majority of residents are believed to be ethnically African or Arab, and largely Muslim.²⁰ One-third of residents live below the poverty line. Nearly 40% of Saint-Denis’ citizens are below the age of 25, and youth unemployment is over 40%, compared to the national average of 22%.²¹ A 2015 study found that otherwise qualified candidates with Arab- or African-sounding names were four times less likely to be hired. A 2016 study found that a candidate’s *banlieue* address alone makes him or her 22% less likely to be hired than a resident of Paris proper.²²

In attempting to address the economic and cultural rot that has decayed the *banlieues*, the French government has directly intervened to improve

development, housing, public safety, and education.²³ Since the 1980s, the government has taken steps to fix the problem by first declaring the poor areas “sensitive urban zones” and then “priority neighborhoods of the city.” These designations were meant to facilitate expanded government intervention in housing, public safety, economic development, and education. After 40 years, the widely held consensus among residents and experts alike is that this effort has been a dismal failure – a “solution-façade, rather than an actual solution.”²⁴ The poverty, especially for young people, appears inescapable.

Arguably even more damaging to the citizens of the *banlieues* than the abject poverty is the widespread perception of the suburbs as breeding grounds for criminals, drug dealers, and jihadis. Despite the common belief that the *banlieues* are *zones de non-droites* (no-go or lawless areas), there is actually a disproportionately large police presence in the regions. Allegations of racial profiling, harassment, and outright physical abuse by law enforcement are well-documented and widely accepted.²⁵

Two major events in the 21st century sent the message to the world that the *banlieues* are lawless regions mired in subversive and antisocial behavior. In fall of 2005, two Muslims youths were accidentally electrocuted while fleeing from police. Ensuing riots lasted for weeks, beginning in the *banlieue* of Clichy-sous-Bois before spreading across France. The world watched in horror as a protest over police profiling spiraled into a national emergency, with nearly 10,000 cars, and dozens of public and private buildings torched.²⁶ The second event was the pre-dawn National Police raid on the safehouse of Paris attack ringleader Abdelhamid Abaaoud in Saint-Denis, just blocks from the Stade de France. The six-hour shootout, in which police and jihadis exchanged nearly 5,000 rounds, resulted in the deaths of two terrorists. Witnesses described the scene as comparable to a “warzone” and news footage broadcast around the world showed heavily armed police, dressed in all-black combat fatigues and helmets prepared for an all-out assault.²⁷ The footage sent the message that a hotbed of jihadism lies with commuting distance from the heart of Paris.

While increased government funding is beneficial, it has little to no impact on two major problems: the widespread perception among white French that the *banlieues* are crime- and jihad-ridden ghettos, and the actual discrimination faced by *banlieue* residents who try to escape their humble surroundings. The two are intimately intertwined, with poverty breeding crime and alienation, which in turn breeds the fearsome reputation, further driving away opportunity in a ceaseless cycle.

A key problem that needs correction is France’s stubborn refusal to officially acknowledge race or religion in censuses or official surveys, (affirmative action is obviously out of the question) based on the reasoning that there should be no subdivision between one citizen of the Republic and another.²⁸ In a perfect world, it is undoubtedly an admirable policy. However, the past few decades

have revealed France to be a less than perfect republic than that envisioned by her founders. A key first step in resolving the *banlieues* situation is to lift the ban on government censuses and researchers from measuring populations by race and religion; if concrete, reliable statistics were available about who exactly is impoverished in the *banlieues*, their ages, races, and religions, then anti-poverty measures could more precisely target the groups in need. Likewise, it would be a major step towards addressing the discrimination that *banlieue* residents are believed to face regarding employment (again, it is impossible currently to say for sure, because official records are not collected).

Previous government attempts at resolving *banlieue* poverty failed because they focused their efforts based on common perceptions, stereotypes, and hearsay (i.e. certain cities need x amount of aid, and those same cities appear to be heavily Muslim and North African) – concrete facts supplied by government efforts simply did not exist.²⁹ Affirmative action in employment, education, and housing, is deeply antithetical to French values and is almost certainly a non-starter. However, a gradual acceptance of official data collection of citizens' races and religions is an essential first step in addressing the pervasive poverty and hopelessness that often breeds radicalization among Muslims in the *banlieues*.

THE FAILURE OF FRATERNITÉ – INTEGRATION, FUNDAMENTAL ISLAM, AND THE PRISON-JIHAD PIPELINE

Islam within France has grown more fundamentalist compared to French society writ large. A 2009 Gallup poll provides stark insight into the divide: 58% of French Muslims “very” or “extremely” strongly identify with their religion, as opposed to less than 25% of the public at large.³⁰ On the issue of homosexuality, which France prides itself on embracing with liberal progressivism, 78% of the French population views it as morally acceptable. For Muslims, it is 35%.³¹ Similarly, Muslims are much more likely than non-Muslims to believe that blasphemy should not be protected speech and that written or verbal criticism of Muhammad, Islam, or the Quran should be punished criminally under hate speech laws.³² This difference in perception is a major indicator of the fundamental differences in the ways that French Muslims and non-Muslims see the world.

The January 2015 *Charlie Hebdo* attack, in which jihadis gunned down 12 people at the Paris office of the irreverent, often controversial publication, has been a flashpoint in this culture war. Across France, and across the free world, “*Je Suis Charlie*” (I am Charlie) became a rallying cry to defend free speech, regardless of its unpopular or offensive nature. In the *banlieues*, however, the support was muted at best. Some Muslim schoolchildren believed that the attack was staged by the government or the far-right to blame Muslims. Many ignored the moment of silence in schools, while others vandalized signs

mourning the victims or pretended to reenact the shooting in hallways and schoolyards. The boldest students publicly voiced what many of their peers and relatives believed about the journalists: “They got what was coming to them. You do not mock the prophet.”³³

French society sends the contradictory message – intentionally or not – that Muslim minorities are not French, but that they should be; that French society is blind with regards to religion, but that, at the same time, Islam is anti-French. This message of alienation has been reciprocated in many Muslim *banlieues* – women have voluntarily veiled themselves, men have abandoned the perceived meaninglessness of French society and turned to Islam for meaning, and children have been enrolled in Islamic schools.³⁴ What has developed is a culture on the periphery – not fully French, yet not fully Arab either – that feeds on the resentment of social exclusion and seeks to give meaning to life when the future appears hopeless. This was exemplified by the incident at the France–Algeria soccer match in October 2001. It was the first time the two countries – former colonizer and former colony – had met for a match since the end of the Algerian War in 1962. Thousands of young Arab–French spectators booed the *Marseillaise*, repeatedly shouted “Bin Laden” and mobbed the field, canceling the game.³⁵ In essence, the youths were unifying around a country – Algeria – the vast majority knew nothing about, by insulting the only country – France – that they had ever known.

This is emblematic of deep alienation – and a perfect recruitment base for jihadi ideologues. While most young residents of the *banlieues* are looking for jobs, for money, and for social success, what they are looking for most of all is meaning. When mainstream society refuses to provide a meaning for French natives who also happen to be brown, poor, and Muslim, the extremists are all too willing to provide one. This is evidenced in the strikingly similar backgrounds of a great number French jihadis – both those who committed attacks in France and those who traveled to the Caliphate for jihad. Many begin as petty criminals involved in drugs, theft, and prostitution, with little to no interest in serious religious study or proselytization, before making a rapid shift to Salafism.³⁶ For the radicalized, Islamism becomes more about brotherhood, greater meaning in life, and a nihilistic rejection of French society through the use of violence.³⁷ Islam is a foundation upon which drifting and marginalized young men can find purpose, and radical Islam is a foundation upon which that purpose can be coupled with violent revenge against the society that is perceived to have wronged them.

The mechanism by which the actual recruitment occurs is often prison. Although prison radicalization is by no means exclusive to France or to jihadism, it is especially pronounced in the land of the Bastille because approximately 70% of prison inmates are Muslim (compared to less than 10% of the French population).³⁸ Most eventual jihadi converts enter prison on

petty crime charges, often totally ignorant of religion. What these prisoners do have is an abundance of anger and alienation – the consequences of a life in the banlieues – and often come from broken homes.³⁹ It is here that the ideologues – the true, diehard Islamists – pounce on the new inmates.⁴⁰ French secularism has, until recently, prevented the prison system from applying the lessons repeatedly learned in contemporary history – that it is extremely dangerous to mix extremists in with the general population.⁴¹ The recruiters witness the anger, resentment, and psychological vulnerability of prisoners, and indoctrinate them into jihadism.⁴²

Extremism gives these angry young men (not all, but most – 80%, according to one study – are men⁴³) a purpose, a cosmic meaning that explains everything – the poverty, the discrimination, the decadent societal embrace of homosexuality, secularism and women’s liberation, the individual misery they are experiencing. They are reborn in the image of the Prophet and his earliest followers (the *salaf*) – dedicated Salafi-jihadists eager to commit violence in Allah’s name.⁴⁴ After release, many travel to the Middle East and become willing soldiers of the Caliphate.⁴⁵ The most dangerous ones return, battle-hardened, skilled at violence, and entirely committed to the jihad.

These experienced jihadis pose a serious threat to France and the rest of Europe. Estimates predict that, since its foundation in June 2014, 1,300 French citizens traveled to Syria and Iraq to join the Islamic State. As of February 2020, roughly 270 have since returned home, and many more likely will attempt the journey as ISIS continues to be dismantled.⁴⁶ Whether or not returning fighters are imprisoned, it is likely that many will continue to radicalize others and plan attacks.⁴⁷ According to Thomas Hegghammer’s research on jihadi returnees between 1990-2010, the likelihood of a terrorist attack being successful increased by over 50%, and its lethality increased by 100%, if a veteran of foreign jihad joined the plot.⁴⁸ For the period of 2011-2015, while the likelihood of success for returned fighter attacks dropped by 10% (likely due to increased tracking by security services), the lethality increased by a staggering 600%.⁴⁹ At least seven of the perpetrators of the November 2015 Paris attacks – most notably, mastermind Abdelhamid Abaaoud – spent time in Syria.⁵⁰ As France in particular, and Europe at large, struggles with how to handle foreign fighters, leaders must remember the horrific violence of which jihadis are capable.

A perfectly tragic example of these factors converging is the case of Mohamed Merah’s killing spree in southwestern France. Over twelve days (March 11-22, 2012), the 23-year-old jihadist shot and killed three French soldiers, a rabbi, and three Jewish children, before being killed in a standoff with police.⁵¹ A native Frenchman from an Algerian family, Merah was raised in a *banlieue* of Toulouse by a neglectful mother and an abusive and absentee father.⁵² From a young age, he was exposed to violent Salafism – his environment

consisted of explicit sympathy for the Armed Islamic Group of Algeria (GIA), exposure to violent images celebrating jihad, and normalized anti-Semitism and racism.⁵³ In his teenage years, Merah was a petty criminal, before a prison sentence radicalized him by providing “a support network, a moral code, a new language of resistance and an identity.”⁵⁴

After his release, Merah traveled the Muslim world, eventually ending up in Afghanistan, where he was captured by US forces and subsequently deported to France.⁵⁵ At the time of his killing spree, Merah was a member of the extremist group *Forsane Alizza* (Knights of Pride).⁵⁶ The group, whose name is a reference to the manifesto of Al Qaeda leader Ayman al-Zawahiri, leveraged popular Muslim anger over the perception of “Islamophobic aggression” with traditional Salafi tenets, such as the establishment of a caliphate and imposition of Sharia law.⁵⁷ In Mohamed Merah, many elements – social decay in the banlieues, anger over secularism, broken homes, normalized Islamic fundamentalism, prison radicalization, and travel abroad for jihadi – combined to turn a 23-year-old native French Muslim into a mass murderer.

France has already taken steps to address both Islamic fundamentalism and the prison-jihad pipeline. President Macron announced the end of a program, in place since 1977, that allowed Muslim countries to send imams and teachers to France to teach Middle Eastern languages and culture – all without French government oversight. In its place, the government created programs that allows France oversight over the teachings of foreign imams, and encouraged the French Muslim Council to train imams in France, rather than send them to Muslim countries.⁵⁸ The intention is to build a brand of moderate Islam that is compatible with French liberalism, and is an important step towards both breaking the influence of radical religious figures, and the integration of Islam as an important part of French culture. Ideally, in coordination with the easing of aggressive *laïcité*, this will begin a gradual process of ending the perceived mutual exclusivity of “Muslim” and “French.”

Similarly, France has taken steps to address prison radicalization, a major pipeline for Islamists who both commit terror in Europe and become foreign fighters in the Middle East. In early 2018, France created 1,500 prison cells specifically for radicals, with the intention of quarantining Islamists from “normal” – non-politically-motivated – criminals.⁵⁹ While there is no ideal way to imprison extremists (mixing them with the general population risks their ideology spreading to common criminals, while segregating them risks creating “Jihadi University” in which they share ideas and plan future attacks), the most practical and effective policy is to isolate extremists from general population to prevent ordinary criminals from becoming radicalized. This is a good policy that France should continue expanding.

CONCLUSION

Islamist terrorism has been an especially potent threat to France over the past decade. Deadly attacks, such as those committed at Charlie Hebdo, the Bataclan, and Nice, have earned France the dubious distinction of being one of the most targeted nations in Europe. Key to the worldview of the jihadis is the concept of a “clash of civilizations” – the idea that the secular west and Islam cannot coexist and are destined to fight until one has extinguished the other.

There are three main elements in French society that have created a breeding ground for this rhetoric. The first is France’s aggressive approach to secularism, *laïcité*, which is perceived by many Muslims to unfairly target Islamic religious practices. Second is the economic and cultural situation in many of the Muslim-majority *banlieues* – poverty traps that are filled with failing schools, crime, and drugs. Third, and partly stemming from the first two factors, is that Islam has grown more fundamental and separatist, creating a profound disconnect between mainstream France and its “enclaves of Islam.”

As dire as the situation in France appears, there is hope. Smart and forward-thinking policies on the part of the French government have the potential to greatly ease the tensions between Muslims and non-Muslims in France, denying the Islamists the “clash of civilizations” worldview on which they require to survive and propagate. France and Islam are not incompatible. Although at times they may seem so, the guiding principles of liberty, equality, and fraternity on which the French Republic was founded offer a vision of a future in which a united France stands triumphant against the forces of extremism and terror.

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The Indo-Pacific Stability-Instability Paradox

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ABSTRACT

The nuclear revolution grounded the geopolitical competition of the Cold War. Likewise, there are risks and opportunities present in U.S.-China relations owing to their mutual possession of survivable nuclear arsenals. As geopolitical competition evolves between the two powers, the role each arsenal plays will be fundamental to their grand strategies in the Indo-Pacific. Chinese revisionism presents the United States with a threat to its preferred global order, while China seeks its own preferences in its neighborhood over those of U.S. allies. Exactly how mutual vulnerability to each other's nuclear arsenals affects the initiation of or entrance to a regional conflict requires understanding the radically different perspectives each power holds of nuclear weapons in military strategy. Fortunately, the Cold War rivalry offers helpful contrasts and similarities to the current arrangement. Specifically, Glenn Snyder's classic "stability-instability paradox" holds insight for analyzing strategic stability in the region, pertaining to the likelihood and management of non-nuclear limited war. This paper holistically considers the nuclear strategies of China and the United States, their geopolitical interests, and threats to strategic stability in order to determine the relationship between the United States' commitment to strategic stability and a nuclear policy that can safeguard its geopolitical interests. This paper concludes with recommendations that the United States should both avoid a no-first-use pledge and formally acknowledge mutual vulnerability with China. These are designed to exploit the United States' advantages in nuclear weapons to secure both peace and its allies' sovereignty.

INTRODUCTION

The advent of greater Chinese national strength, complementary military capabilities, and uncertainty over its intentions towards standing international order merit careful American policy, not least in nuclear doctrine and posture

towards the Indo-Pacific region. U.S. thinking about a regional nuclear posture has balanced between how to successfully address the rogue state of North Korea, shoring up strategic stability in case greater Chinese assertiveness imperils it and also maintaining and strengthening its alliances in the region to prevent Chinese revisionism. Existing analysis establishes Chinese and U.S. views about their respective arsenals and strategies, including comparisons between U.S.-China relations and older U.S. attitudes about Soviet nuclear strategy. Absent among much of the literature is a complementary analysis of Chinese conventional military capabilities and doctrine and the continued relevance of geopolitical competition.

A refined acknowledgment of Cold War-era thinking about nuclear balance should complement this. This includes the stability-instability paradox concept of the Cold War, which refers to a situation where nuclear powers vulnerable to the other's arsenal might find themselves at war due to the canceled out deterrence, often dismissed as inapplicable between the United States and China. This paper argues that a cross-domain assessment of the two states' nuclear postures reveals that U.S. policymakers should maintain long-standing U.S. approaches to nuclear strategy to reassure allies and discourage Chinese revisionism. Considering Chinese and U.S. objectives and thinking, the strategic stability concerns of both, and the U.S. need to fulfill grand strategic imperatives in the region are used to reach these answers.

CHINESE STRATEGIC THOUGHT AND NUCLEAR WEAPONS

Chinese strategic thought concerning nuclear weapons and China's strategic ends in its near abroad both create prospects for crisis instability for the United States and thus necessitate a U.S. nuclear strategy that can safeguard its geostrategic interests. For its part, Chinese thinking about nuclear weapons bears several unique qualities. Unlike China, the United States crafted a role for nuclear weapons in a gradual fashion, first merely to deter conventional aggression and later into a complex logic once nuclear parity with the Soviet Union dawned. China's experience coalesced around facing down superior nuclear capabilities of both great powers. After decades of discomfort for the term given the history of nuclear threats against China, the taboo on the term of deterrence (*wēishè* in Chinese, a word also meaning 'intimidation') ceased after academic debate through the 1980s and -90s.¹ Representing predominant Chinese views, the People's Liberation Army (PLA) textbooks combine traditional U.S. distinctions between deterrence and compellence into the term *wēishè*.² Usefully, the Chinese idea is comparable to Thomas Schelling's concept of 'coercion', which has been noted by some Chinese scholars.³

Additionally, so much resistance was expressed about the role of nuclear weapons. Mao Zedong referred to them merely as "paper tigers," intimidating

but useless for war-fighting. Of course, this did not mean that Chinese possession of nuclear weapons could not neutralize another power's intimidation. This background continues to bear great relevance in Chinese thinking.⁴ China evaluates its security as rooted in stable and calm international relationships and measured domestic priorities. Coupled with underlying modes of strategic thinking, this results in several formulations of Chinese nuclear strategy.

CHINA'S NO-FIRST-USE POLICY

A defining characteristic of Chinese nuclear doctrine is its no-first-use (NFU) policy. Such a policy predicates any use of Chinese nuclear weapons to respond to an adversary's nuclear attack. Necessarily, this would mean that Chinese nuclear use is explicitly and solely a deterrent to any nuclear attack. Such an offensive would incite a Chinese counterattack, rendering any gains from the nuclear use inadequate to justify their original use. The NFU policy also necessarily means that China will not use its arsenal coercively.⁵ Despite doubts about the doctrine from outside observers, the wealth of evidence that Chinese strategists consider the principle implicit in all strategic planning should frame U.S. nuclear strategy.

RETALIATORY AND MINIMALIST ASPECTS OF CHINESE NUCLEAR STRATEGY

The history of Chinese nuclear developments tracks its doctrine of maintaining an arsenal no broader than necessary to assure a retaliatory strike against an adversary and large enough to prevent the hamstringing of Chinese policy. China's nuclear strategy's precise terminology varies, with numerous different Chinese translations further complicating things. However, the most common overarching term for Chinese nuclear strategy is minimal deterrence. The goal is to have the means to retaliate against an attack, irrespective of exact, comparative arsenal sizes, thus freeing China from 'coercion,' meaning any attempt to unduly influence its behavior. Often described as pursuing a basis of "assured retaliation," the strategy can also be thought of as a holistic assessment of its adversaries' nuclear and conventional capabilities and a corresponding nuclear arsenal that can sufficiently surmount potential enemy capabilities.⁶ A secure second-strike capability (SSC) is generally regarded as sufficient to deter even limited nuclear war.⁷ Specific to China, there is little evidence that leadership cares about numerical parity.⁸

The relationship between U.S. and Chinese intentions behind their nuclear strategies is often unclear. Usefully, discussions between Chinese and U.S. officials have created a common, if incomplete, vocabulary. This glossary defines minimum deterrence as "threatening the lowest level of damage

necessary to prevent an attack, with the fewest number of nuclear weapons possible.⁹ Chinese officials embrace this conception of their arsenal, alongside the traditional Chinese description of it as *jǐnggànyú yóuxiào*, usually translated as "lean and effective." The arsenal must be survivable, meaning it needs to withstand a nuclear assault and still be capable of response. As the force stands, there are an estimated 290 Chinese warheads due to extensive and deliberate modernization efforts. Approximately 150 of these are capable of reaching the continental United States.¹⁰ The principles responsible for calibrating the arsenal have remained consistent as the force structure has shifted.

CHINESE THOUGHT REGARDING ESCALATION IN THE NUCLEAR DOMAIN

Escalation dynamics ground nearly all nuclear strategies. However, the Chinese perspective lacks a concurrent one-to-one match with U.S. military thinking. For Chinese strategists, "war control" is the usual term used to refer to the use of national instruments of power to shape how conducive the external environment is to possible conflict and how well-positioned China can be if such an eventuality occurs. War control is a far more expansive concept than de-escalation. It is not specific to minimizing but could also increase the intensity of a conflict if that is deemed more conducive to achieving objectives.¹¹ Little material exists outside of military sources, and nearly all of it is about shaping a war's specifics before it begins.¹²

Several fundamental strategic concepts likely ground the Chinese understanding of nuclear escalation. First, Chinese thinkers identify China's overall national strength as the most critical deterrent in avoiding conflict. Further, China's stated willingness to fight over its core interests is designed to serve as a deterrent, dissuading adversaries that presumably possess less commitment in regional disputes.¹³ However, there is a critical lack of understanding about PLA thinking on the subject of escalation, given the limits of credible, if not authoritative, military, and available academic sources. It is known that higher guidance was given to the PLA to think about the issue, as Chinese leadership has identified escalation dynamics as being of increasing importance. Of the available information, PLA texts often recommend conducting actions that read as quite escalatory but are not described as such.¹⁴ In Lonnie Henley's summation, Chinese strategists conclude that thanks to the nuclear revolution and economic interdependence, the world has been made "safe for war."¹⁵

CHINESE REVISIONISM IN THE INDO-PACIFIC

American worries about Chinese strategic intentions towards the near Indo-

Pacific are often described as 'revisionist,' meaning China could revise the landscape of the region's security ties or other aspects through some illegitimate means of force or coercion.¹⁶ In nuclear relations, Chinese revisionism plays the agent's role that could fatally harm crisis stability. Within China, top-level documents, in the form of defense white papers, reiterate that Beijing's increased ability to deter is understood as necessary to defend itself.¹⁷ Chinese perspectives emphasize that it views itself as defending its sovereignty, unlike the United States or its allies' position. Therefore, it would consider itself to have higher stakes and threats to use force to be more credible.¹⁸ Perhaps alarmingly, this coexists along with an apparent lack of belief that the United States would attempt to manipulate the risk of nuclear escalation. The Chinese view sees the U.S. conception of nuclear weapons as a war-fighting method as being unlikely to be practiced. The expectation tends to be that the United States would seek to defuse the crisis, to avoid crossing a nuclear threshold or abandoning an ally. Moreover, in the latter case, Chinese strategists are far from seeing such abandonment as impossible.¹⁹ The potential for opportunistic activities to China's advantage is present. Manipulation and gradualistic tactics would be the natural path to revise the region. Faced with the reality of U.S. conventional superiority, coercive escalation is the most plausible method for adversaries to do so.

For the same reason that China has steadfastly resisted an arms race, it seeks to avoid a war.²⁰ Its rise of national strength and fundamental security depends upon a favorable international environment for its economic growth. A conflict with the United States would risk obliteration of this favorability. China, however, has been proactive in asserting its claims of sovereignty. Beijing has sought to do this throughout its maritime neighborhood using highly customized and generally sub-lethal capabilities. U.S. strategists usually describe these efforts as a 'gray zone' tactic, meaning operating between war and peace.²¹ In practice, such tactics would manifest as military or quasi-military actions. In contrast to U.S. views, the Chinese see these methods positively, as a low-level, peaceful means of achieving desired ends.

While the Chinese appreciation of gray zone tactics in conventional military action accepts the difficulty of successful control over conventional escalation, there is a different understanding of the nuclear domain.²² Most Chinese experts are confident that nuclear escalation would not occur under conditions of conventional war. For them, it is fear that drives restraint, given the risk of further nuclear escalation in the event of initial use.²³ U.S. strategists usually view further escalation as a coercive tool that can end a conflict. Most scenarios Chinese strategists construct about the failure of crisis stability concern uncontrolled escalation resulting from a U.S. attack against Chinese conventional missiles that could degrade nuclear capability.²⁴ According to Tong Zhao and Li Bin's analysis, China is more prone to interpret ambiguous

circumstances as an attack on its nuclear forces. This follows from concerns about a U.S. capability to disarm their own arsenal.²⁵ Coupled together, Chinese studies of escalation and the nuclear domain and a political commitment to revise its neighborhood in accordance with its core interests provide Chinese leadership a basis to deem their current or near-future capabilities commensurate with the risks involved in both. Chinese forces have advanced precisely the capabilities necessary to challenge its neighbors and the United States credibly.

CURRENT AND FUTURE CHINESE CONVENTIONAL CAPABILITIES

China is creating a military that can contest, and if necessary, fight and win, a war against the United States and its allies, even if this is done under circumstances of having achieved existential security with a nuclear arsenal and with no desire to initiate war. The conventional superiority of the United States is being degraded and at a severe disadvantage in-theater due to China's military advances and geographic proximity. A comprehensive RAND report that sought to understand the balance of U.S.-China conventional capabilities, specifically in the context of a Taiwan conflict, found a mixed picture for the United States as of 2017 in being able to successfully roll-back or prevent a Chinese invasion. Improvements in Chinese missile forces that can target airbases and aircraft carriers drove most of China's improved assessment.²⁶

The Chinese regional strategy is often described as anti-access and area denial (A2/AD). There is a Chinese intention to cordon off its immediate maritime periphery from U.S. intervention capabilities. U.S. responses have naturally followed to counter this threat. The U.S. Navy's AirSea Battle is explicitly set up against perceived Chinese intentions of achieving A2/AD.²⁷ Despite the emphasis U.S. strategists place on the component, achieving A2/AD is not a specific Chinese doctrine. Chinese forces and the doctrine underlying their creation related to A2/AD show up in specific PLA missions that different near theaters are assigned. However, in Chinese texts, the term A2/AD is never used, and the moniker of "counter-intervention" is used only rarely and never as a strategic term. It is not an overarching doctrine but a relevant element in Chinese campaigns. Crucially, doctrine takes the idea of such an intervention actively, but not proactively. It is never articulated that a prior effort to curtail third-party operations must be specifically achieved. This is notably the opposite of Soviet doctrine pertaining to A2/AD in eastern Europe. In Chinese defense planning, current operations that include a plan to curtail third-party intervention is applied explicitly to the Taiwan mission.²⁸ The clear Chinese presupposition of possible U.S. intervention into a regional conflict against a Chinese force inspired military forces' development to either

prevent this outcome entirely or make it appear too costly for the United States.

The United States, in turn, faces its dilemma if Chinese military action occurs. Any initial Chinese assertions will inaugurate escalation dynamics. The United States would naturally seek to roll back or deter further gains to prevent any creeping Chinese presence, and the intended or unintended impression of these responses will feed into Chinese decision making. Whether and how China militarily pursues revisionist intentions, and how threatening that will be to the United States and its allies, is unknowable. However, it is possible to better comprehend nuclear strategy and stability in the region by categorizing Chinese efforts to modernize its military capabilities in their service of its strategic ends. This is the place where U.S. responses must chart lessons of the Cold War.

STRATEGIC STABILITY BETWEEN THE UNITED STATES AND CHINA

Strategic stability refers to an international situation wherein a state can consider its core security interests as broadly unthreatened. James Acton provides a useful categorization of the meanings of "strategic stability" for the nuclear domain. The most narrow and usual sense refers to an environment that does not incentivize either an arms race or conflict escalation. Alternatively, it can refer to a general absence of armed conflict between states that have nuclear arsenals.²⁹ Usually, U.S. analysts discuss strategic stability around the former option, and it is this definition that guides the use of the term in Nuclear Posture Reviews.³⁰ The meaning of the "strategic stability" term when used by Chinese strategists and government officials is not nearly so clear.³¹ This paper takes the view that while Chinese strategists who reject the concept as inapplicable given asymmetries between the United States and China are mistaken, neither is the typical Cold War-era typology applicable. The unique situation between conventional and nuclear domains, notably the lack of parity between China and the United States in both, requires an assessment of strategic stability that is not limited to strict evaluations of crisis stability or the more meager threat of arms racing. Due to Chinese operational thinking, this environment needs a cross-domain appraisal.

The United States approaches its China relationship with decades of Cold War nuclear deterrence ingrained but facing a situation where the logic is variably applicable. The compensation role of nuclear weapons initially found in the Cold War was for a conventionally inferior military. Now, the United States maintains superior conventional forces and a much larger nuclear arsenal. However, its commitment to extended nuclear deterrence remains fundamental to its nuclear strategy. The in-theater military strength of China and its geopolitical ambitions alarm U.S. allies. The concept of a U.S.

purchase of strategic stability at the expense of regional security guarantees is conceivable, depending upon how extended deterrence relies upon the threat of nuclear escalation to deter any aggression. The contemporary Indo-Pacific region has historical precedents in this regard. During the Cold War, mutual vulnerability (a situation where two nuclear-armed states are mutually capable of striking each other's homeland) necessitated that the United States devise intermediate options that did not jump from conventional war-making to total nuclear exchanges to demonstrate resolve. What necessitated this logic was the need to maintain alliance credibility and thus extended deterrence.³² If the United States could not credibly threaten the use of nuclear weapons in defense of its allies, the entire program of stopping Soviet revisionism was deemed hopeless.

MUTUAL VULNERABILITY AND LIMITED WAR

There were many Cold War-era debates about Soviet aggression becoming enabled under conditions of mutual vulnerability.³³ Whether this is more true under the U.S.-China relationship calls for appreciating the nature of mutual weakness between the two states. A nuclear mutual vulnerability exists between China and the United States, owing to their survivable arsenals. Chinese nuclear strategists wholly accept and desire this reality. The U.S. perspective, however, is more complicated. Viewed historically, mutual vulnerability is a composite of mutually assured destruction (MAD) and assured exposure. Successive U.S. administrations implicitly accepted vulnerability to the Soviet arsenal but never formally stated it was an acceptable reality. Ultimately, the U.S. debate regarding the Soviet Union never resolved, and China assumed the mantle of the debate once its assured retaliation materialized.³⁴

The Chinese reaction to U.S. reluctance to formally embrace mutual vulnerability is adverse.³⁵ In discussions about mutual vulnerability, Chinese delegation members describe it as a fact.³⁶ Jeffrey Lewis argues that U.S. debates about accepting mutual vulnerability are analogous to Chinese views about whether the United States thinks it can subject China to nuclear coercion.³⁷ The implication for the U.S. debate would be that to accept mutual vulnerability would forswear the use of nuclear threats to coerce any Chinese action. While the United States officially recognized the technical reality of mutual vulnerability in the 2009 Nuclear Posture Review, nothing was said about this status's desirability.³⁸ Crucially, allies' fears weigh significantly on such debates. In particular, Japanese concerns expressed that U.S. acceptance of mutual vulnerability with China could embolden Chinese conventional revisionism.³⁹

THE INDO-PACIFIC STABILITY-INSTABILITY PARADOX

The potential of conventional war under conditions of mutual nuclear vulnerability should be analyzed in the unique context of U.S.-China relations. The United States and China do not have the same geopolitical relationship of the Cold War. However, it is worth mining the dynamics of nuclear deterrence between the United States and the Soviet Union for insights. This is especially true of the threat of limited conventional warfare below the nuclear threshold. After the Cold War's initial period, mutual vulnerability dawned between the two great powers, but the possibilities of initiating and escalating conventional, in-theater warfare did not cease. During the Cold War, Albert Wohlstetter and Colin Gray argued there would be a strict delineation between conflict nuclear deterrence covered and lower levels.⁴⁰ Other scholars, such as Robert Jervis, wrote of all levels of conflict as protected.⁴¹ Others noted that this new ultimate guarantor of stability could perversely enable instability in the form of limited war. Glenn Snyder coined the term "stability-instability paradox" to describe this situation.⁴²

Writing of Cold War nuclear dynamics, Thomas Schelling and Morton Halperin specified that "if one of the things that prevents local wars is the fear of both sides that it will spiral to total war, then agreements make it less likely that this will happen and may end up making local war more likely. On the other hand, this could be a reasonable price for greater insurance that local war will not go to total war."⁴³ A similar dynamic to this confronts U.S. policymakers now. Compared to the Soviet Union, Chinese ideas about nuclear escalation, crisis stability, and the role of nuclear weapons and war-fighting are all substantially different. Applied to the most alarming candidate for Chinese revisionism, Taiwan, the new nuclear dynamic's implications are not sanguine.

While China has shown little inclination towards abandoning minimal deterrence, the relevance of limited deterrence is worth considering due to Taiwan's unique status. According to the glossary assembled between U.S. and Chinese strategists, limited deterrence "requires a limited war-fighting capability to inflict costly damage on the adversary at every rung on the escalation ladder, thus denying the adversary victory in a nuclear war."⁴⁴ Limited deterrence, then, can be seen as the addition of deterring conventional war to minimal deterrence. Conventional deterrence would seek to compel an adversary that they cannot initiate a low-cost, short-term conflict. The ability to deter work is linked to how likely a state decides it can achieve its ends in short order and not become stuck in a prolonged war.⁴⁵

China's theater advantage is biased towards short-term conflicts, as the United States would need time to assemble its conventional forces. Its operational basis is restricted to a small number of airbases and aircraft carriers, as opposed to substantial deployments on the Chinese mainland. The dangers

of a short-term Chinese victory over Taiwan, representing a grand revisionist move against U.S. interests, complicate nuclear strategy dynamics between the two powers due to Taiwan's unique geopolitical status. The differences between U.S. and Chinese views of deterrence illustrate the problem.

The Chinese conception of *wēishè*, with its incorporation of both compellence and deterrence, deviates from the U.S. concept of deterrence. The United States foresees compelling an adversary to withdraw, or to refrain from attacking, as being based upon a legitimate, pre-aggression status quo. Chinese strategists do not regard the U.S. anti-revisionist notion of a status quo as a reliable indicator.⁴⁶ The difficulty for the United States is that this logic in a limited war could be severe. The United States is, after all, seeking to deter Chinese action against, for instance, Taiwan. That is not coercive unless coercion is understood to mean anything that impedes Beijing from achieving its core interests towards Taiwan, something explicable given their conception of that territory as a core part of China. It is unclear how the Chinese NFU policy applies to the officially "internal" conflict of Taiwan.⁴⁷ Chinese strategists have a traditional view that nuclear deterrence is nuclear coercion. It is relevant whether they still view them as paper tigers. If so, Beijing might conclude that aggression against Taiwan would show this thought if any US intervention into a regional conflict was presumed to remain conventional. The uncertainty of the status quo's importance and China's nuclear posture towards the island present a dangerous scenario.

Several other characteristics of Chinese strategic thinking could bias Beijing towards riskier patterns of behavior. The prominent Chinese analyst Liu Chong argues the stability-instability paradox is obsolete.⁴⁸ For him, the stability-instability paradox cannot be applied to the U.S.-China relationship due to their economic entanglement and China not having a desire to compete with the United States in geopolitical contests, but only in the realm of global rulemaking. It cannot be expected that the limited, proxy conflicts of the United States and the Soviet Union would be replicated.⁴⁹ However, this logic misreads China's place in any potential conventional conflict. The unlikelihood of a conventional conflict between the United States and China is decreased if the conflict originates between China and a third party, only subsequently drawing in the United States. This scenario is not like the proxy wars of the Cold War. It is, however, like the threat of Soviet revisionism in central Europe. As such, the belief that peace will follow from a great power's unwillingness to fight the war is betting on only one of the parties - the United States.

Chong's second reason for the likelihood of peace argues that the United States and China could not face a proxy war due to the lack of geopolitical competition. However, this overlooks the possibility that a conventional war would not have to be similar to Korea or Vietnam. In fact, the Cold War saw the U.S. fretting about the stability-instability paradox being implicated in

a large-scale war between the Soviet Union and U.S. allies in Europe. Such existential stakes make nuclear escalation that much more alarming. Remote proxy conflicts do not have such stakes. Nevertheless, there is a fundamental geopolitical contest bearing on the U.S.-China relationship: Taiwan. For China, Taiwan is not an analog to a Cold War proxy war fought in a distant third country- its reclamation is the unfinished business of its civil war. Chinese disbelief in U.S. deterrence over Taiwan, alongside overconfidence in escalation control and a belief that its economic might wards off challenge, coexists with its mutual vulnerability with the United States. For the United States, finessing a strategy requires processing this perspective.

CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS

On a practical level, the stability-instability paradox is a result of alliances. For the United States, it is an unfortunate consequence of mutual vulnerability. While the instability-stability paradox in Asia does not directly affect a U.S. ally, the twin pressures of U.S. resolve and the Taiwan dilemma implicate the entire U.S. alliance system. Taiwan does not exist in a vacuum, and any forced geopolitical alteration would presumably affect U.S. allies' evaluations of U.S. security partnerships. This necessitates U.S. care over Taiwan's fate, as it could be the ground of its entire opposition to Chinese revisionism. An appropriate U.S. strategy must find a way to achieve stability, meaning both to avoid armed conflict, especially any tilt into nuclear escalation, and to prevent Chinese revisionism, goals which are far from harmonious. With this in mind, this paper makes two recommendations.

RECOMMENDATION TO FORMALLY RECOGNIZE MUTUAL VULNERABILITY AS POLICY

Mutual vulnerability is a real fact, and it is best to acknowledge it. While the United States should retain the threat of nuclear escalation as leverage against Chinese revisionism, its use as a hedging strategy against the reality of mutual vulnerability is an inappropriate corollary to retention. It does not send the message of anti-revisionism as much as the alarming image of nuclear superiority and is itself not conducive to the very peace that U.S. policy seeks. Not recognizing mutual vulnerability does not improve the outlook of plausible scenarios of limited and possible escalatory wars, even if it would have some marginal consequences on extended deterrence credibility. A fundamental component of any peaceful strategic stability between the United States and China requires mutual SSC. A formal recognition structures this. Of course, Beijing could prove simply too skeptical of U.S. intentions due to irreconcilable political differences.⁵⁰ Alternatively, it might not specifically pacify China

about ballistic missile defense or conventional capabilities that matter a great deal to Beijing. Nonetheless, the United States can advance nuclear dynamics' strategic stability and clarify its respectful intentions towards China's nuclear security guarantee.

RECOMMENDATION TO REJECT A MUTUAL NO-FIRST-USE POLICY

Advocates of a U.S. NFU argue it would promote strategic stability and that the United States does not need to use the threat of nuclear weapons because it lacks enemies that want to exploit a credibility gap to wage war. For their part, Chinese officials and delegations have been ritually pressing the United States for mutual NFU for decades.⁵¹ As an actual policy, there are two problems: alliance credibility and the preclusion of better U.S. strategy to curtail revisionism.

Ally reassurance is probably manageable with a declaration of mutual vulnerability. According to Nancy Gallagher, the Obama Administration was willing to acknowledge mutual vulnerability with China officially. The threat to alliances was deemed relatively low, but the administration opted to shelve the measure until it could be exchanged for a Chinese concession. The policy aimed to buttress U.S. reassurances to China that missile defense did not seek to degrade Chinese deterrence.⁵² Emboldened Chinese behavior is always alarming for U.S. allies. If U.S. policy ditches the leverage of nuclear escalation, it risks inviting less risk-averse Chinese behavior. If that behavior comes, U.S. allies could seek, in turn, to provide their own security, including the advent of nuclear arsenals. This would not better serve strategic stability for the region.

An NFU policy would also preclude the very leverage the United States needs to temper the stability-instability paradox's peril. The United States should tailor its nuclear strategy to deter Chinese attempts to revise the regional order, including in light of conventional methods that are crafted to impose escalation burdens upon the United States. The continuing diminished relevance of US conventional superiority in China's near abroad merits the retention of a declaratory policy that reserves the use of nuclear escalation to deter Chinese revisionism. Chinese confidence that aggression could work is the factor that threatens to inaugurate an escalatory cycle. The United States' best option is to prevent that confidence. American nuclear strategy can aim to prevent even a limited war of a revisionist nature. At the same time, the United States should be clear that it respects the reality of Chinese nuclear security and wants firm Chinese confidence in its deterrent. The dread of nuclear escalation can be leveraged for an inevitable but responsible contestation of the Indo-Pacific. The very danger of escalation itself is a relevant, plausible route to peace.

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A Changing Security Landscape: **NATO and Russia in the Arctic**

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ABSTRACT

Following the collapse of the Soviet Union and the conclusion of the Cold War, the Arctic served as a region free from geopolitical challenges and military tensions. This allowed the Arctic states – Canada, Denmark, Norway, the United States, and Russia – to focus on diplomatic cooperation and nonmilitary security challenges. Since the 1980s however, transformative physical-environmental changes across the Arctic threaten to destabilize regional relationships and heighten the possibility of a serious crisis or conflict. These changes are altering the region's longstanding geopolitical and economic character, as new development and investment opportunities open up in areas without clearly defined international rules and norms. In response to these developments, Russia seeks to take advantage of the relative deficiency of international law to carve out a hegemonic position in the Arctic, leaning on its military presence and unrivaled ice-breaker fleet to pursue its interests. This article will explore what role the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) can play in the Arctic to ensure stability, and whether it can establish international rules and norms in the face of growing Russian militarization.

Following the collapse of the Soviet Union and the conclusion of the Cold War, the Arctic served as a region free from geopolitical challenges and military tensions. This allowed the Arctic states – Canada, Denmark, Norway, the United States, and Russia – to focus on diplomatic cooperation and nonmilitary security challenges. Since the 1980s however, transformative physical-environmental changes across the Arctic threaten to destabilize regional relationships and heighten the possibility of a serious crisis or conflict. These changes are

altering the region's longstanding geopolitical and economic character, as new development and investment opportunities open up in areas without clearly defined international rules and norms. In response to these developments, Russia seeks to take advantage of the relative deficiency of international law to carve out a hegemonic position in the Arctic, leaning on its military presence and unrivaled ice-breaker fleet to pursue its interests. This article will explore what role the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) can play in the Arctic to ensure stability, and whether it can establish international rules and norms in the face of growing Russian militarization.

THE CASE FOR NATO

Currently, the Arctic lacks a single comprehensive governance regime focused on regional security issues, making the management of the region's rapid transformation a major challenge for the Arctic states. While the Arctic Council has "promoted cooperative governance in the region,"¹ its flexible structure and legally non-binding norms are insufficient to ameliorate the governance gap in the long-term. The United States presently lacks crucial capabilities and regional leverage to keep pace with the rate of transformation to provide regional stability. Compounding the issue, "the rest of the Arctic states...cannot by themselves balance competing great powers in the region."² To ensure that the Arctic remains a domain built on cooperation and diplomacy, the West needs to commit to a coherent security strategy to address growing competition and uncertainty. Otherwise, they risk having insufficient means to regulate interstate relations or deconflict geopolitical tensions.

NATO has a significant interest in preserving and enhancing the Arctic's rules-based order, which includes open access to global sea lines of communication, protecting transatlantic communications cable networks, and preventing Russia from exercising unilateral military control of the region. In the pursuit of these interests, NATO is the ideal candidate to promote regional stability and norm-setting due to its foundational principles, strategic mission, multilateral authority, and defensive and deterrence capabilities. NATO was founded in part as a norm-building institution, to promote European security and stability through the development and formalization of political relationships between states both inside and outside of the alliance.³ By including the Arctic in NATO's purview the alliance can use its norm-building role to impress rule of law and promote the peaceful settlement of disputes. Moreover, the current NATO strategy incorporates a 360-degree approach that seeks to "acknowledge and address threats and challenges from diverse actors and from all directions."⁴ It is through this approach that NATO expanded its purview to include Eastern Europe, North Africa, and the Middle East. As Russia continues its military modernization efforts in the Arctic, concerns over

instability and geopolitical competition grow. A strategic reorientation toward the polar region would serve as a legitimate progression for NATO, given five of the eight internationally recognized Arctic states are members of NATO. To be certain, NATO could wield immense multilateral authority in a region which is strategically important to Euro-Atlantic security.⁵ Ultimately, NATO's defense and deterrence capabilities provide the most compelling justification for it to counter Russia's expansive militarization efforts in the Arctic, enabling it to strengthen the region's rules-based order. For NATO, "Russian militarization risks transforming Arctic relations, and [the alliance] will not want to be left unprepared."⁶ In this case, diplomacy may prove ineffective and legal ambiguity could incentivize Russian revisionism.

BACKGROUND

The Arctic's physical transformation over the last forty years has created new opportunities for development and investment, and greater access to Arctic shipping routes such as the Northwest Passage and the Northern Sea Route. Indeed, the Arctic has experienced a period of warming and declining sea ice coverage, with "climate change expected to lead to a nearly ice-free Arctic Ocean in late summer and increased navigability of Arctic marine waters by the middle of this century."⁷ At present, approximately three-quarters of summer sea ice has been lost.⁸ These changes bring new commercial opportunities, such as new fishing stocks, access to untapped resources, and shorter commercial travel times between Europe and Asia.⁹ In fact, the Arctic is estimated to contain 25% of the world's oil and gas reserves, some 90 billion barrels of oil and 1,700 trillion cubic feet of natural gas.¹⁰ These opportunities have piqued many non-Arctic states' interests. China looks to capitalize on them with renewed regional investment and increased diplomatic presence.

Most concerns regarding an 'Arctic Scramble' are misleading, as "many of the [untapped] resources lie uncontested, well within the lands and waters of the Arctic states"¹¹ exclusive economic zones. These exclusive economic zones, governed by both the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS) and the Arctic Council,¹² are essential to the diplomatic management of territorial claims in the Arctic. However, overlapping territorial claims and ambiguous legal authorities pose significant challenges to continued cooperative governance in the region. The most widely known example of this regional challenge are the ongoing territorial boundary disputes between Russia, Denmark, and Canada over the Lomonosov Ridge, an underwater continental ridge dividing the Arctic into two oceanic basins. Yet even this is being resolved diplomatically, as most disputes over Arctic maritime boundaries have been resolved peacefully.¹³ However, within this realm of established international law, where disputes are settled through negotiation, lie legal ambiguities which

could be exploited by Russia.

Specifically, the ambiguous legal status of Svalbard is one of the most concerning issues for NATO in the Arctic. Svalbard, a collection of Norwegian islands located approximately 500 nautical miles off the northern coast of Norway, is governed by a legal framework that generates significant ambiguity and uncertainty as to which states have the legal authority to control activities on the island.¹⁴ In 1920, the Spitsbergen Treaty granted Norway sovereignty over Svalbard, however, it granted “the citizens of each party to the treaty ‘equal enjoyment’ and ‘equal liberty of access’ to the islands.”¹⁵ This left Svalbard under the authority of Norway but allowed dozens of states unrestricted access to the archipelago and its resources. This ambiguity in the law became apparent when former Russian Deputy Prime Minister Dmitry Rogozin visited Svalbard in 2015. Norway had imposed a travel ban on Rogozin following his involvement in Russia’s annexation of Crimea in 2014, making his presence undermine Norway’s assertion of control and authority over the archipelago.¹⁶

Understanding that Russia has a history of exploiting “gray areas, where the rules and norms are less defined,” Svalbard’s ambiguous international legal status makes it a potential target for Russian revisionism.¹⁷ Russian officials express contempt for the way the archipelago’s governance was determined, citing its exclusion from the 1920 treaty talks. Moreover, Moscow views the archipelago as part of its national identity, as an estimated 10-20% of Svalbard’s population are Russian citizens whose presence dates back to the 1500s.¹⁸ Given Russia’s interest in Svalbard’s rich oil reserves and fishing stocks,¹⁹ and recent annexation of Crimea, there is concern Russia could make a nationalistic appeal to exploit the archipelago’s ambiguous legal status and secure its interests on the islands.²⁰

Norway has made repeated attempts to consolidate its jurisdictional authority over Svalbard, including efforts to establish its own exclusive economic zone around the archipelago.²¹ European countries, including several NATO members, responded with intense objection.²² NATO members remain divided in their positions concerning Norway’s legal authority over the islands, and as a result, Svalbard could undermine NATO cohesion and become a source of division should Russia attempt to seize control.²³ Without a clear consensus and united Western front, Moscow could determine the risks of a NATO military response for reclaiming the archipelago are minimal.

NATO’s concerns include additional challenges. Russia has developed high-end maritime capabilities and increased its presence in the Arctic as part of a broader military strategy, outlined in Russia’s 2014 military doctrine and 2015 maritime doctrine.²⁴ Russia maintains two strategic goals in the North Atlantic and Arctic Region: “protect Russia’s nuclear deterrent forces in the Barents Sea” and “project power and fulfill Moscow’s global ambitions.”²⁵ To pursue these goals Russia has implemented an immense military modernization

program, which included creating or reopening 14 operational airfields and 16 deepwater ports in the Arctic, establishing an Arctic Command and two Arctic Brigades, and constructing newly refitted submarines for its Northern Fleet.²⁶ Russia's armed forces continue to conduct regular naval exercises and patrols in the Arctic, and expand their trans-regional radar systems and radio-electronic jamming capabilities.^{27, 28} Together, these investments and capabilities are essential to Russian Arctic dominance, increasing their capacity to control the region's maritime domain.

This build-up of military capabilities and infrastructure in the Arctic underscores the geostrategic importance of the region and its vast energy resources for Russian security and economic development. As Russia's naval nuclear capability is intended to "phase NATO out of [the] Arctic,"²⁹ the importance of a NATO security strategy for the Arctic is underscored. As it stands NATO has no formal role in the Arctic, though it did reaffirm its commitment to the region during the 2016 Warsaw Summit Communiqué:

*"In the North Atlantic, as elsewhere, the Alliance will be ready to deter and defend against any potential threats, including against sea lanes of communication and maritime approaches of NATO territory. We will further strengthen our maritime posture and comprehensive situational awareness."*³⁰

In line with this position, NATO reinstated naval patrols in the North Atlantic to deter Russian aggression, while NATO Arctic states invested in greater ground-based surveillance, early warning, and ballistic missile defense systems for the region.^{31, 32} Additionally, the United States responded by recommissioning its navy's Second Fleet to operate in the North Atlantic and Arctic, placing American forces in Iceland, and finalizing plans for the construction of new icebreakers.³³ These efforts on their own do little to resolve the challenge of preserving a stable, rules-based regional order in the face of Russian militarization. A comprehensive, overarching strategy is needed.

NATO's strategic approach to the Arctic must strike the right balance for the various members of the alliance, as they lack a crucial consensus on the scope and character of their involvement in Arctic regional security.³⁴ Notably, Canada would prefer that NATO maintain a minimal role in the Arctic, concerned that anything more would dilute the influence and authority of Arctic states over regional security issues and "would afford non-Arctic NATO countries influence in an area where they otherwise would have none."³⁵ This is misguided, as Denmark, Norway, the United States, and Canada itself have failed to counter Russian militarization or promote international norms and rules on their own. Norway would prefer that NATO take a significantly larger role in the region, as the country perceives Russia as a major threat and

the Arctic to be a critical vulnerability in NATO's defenses. For Norway, the Russian annexation of Crimea was a wake-up call, and as a result, it initiated its own military modernization program with the acquisition of submarines and fighter jets, and recommissioning of military bases.³⁶ Norway also hosted 2018's Exercise Trident Juncture, NATO's largest military exercise since 2002.³⁷ Norway understands that the alliance wields significant institutional power and authority capable of addressing a challenge of this scope and scale.

Finally, it is important to note that there are no multilateral forums or institutions dedicated to addressing hard security issues in the Arctic region. Both the Arctic Council's and the Barents Euro-Arctic Council's organizational purviews intentionally exclude military matters, while NATO primarily keeps out of Arctic matters in consideration of its Arctic member states.³⁸ Therefore, efforts to strengthen NATO's role in the Arctic must address this critical security gap. Otherwise, NATO risks triggering a regional security dilemma. The build-up of security forces and bilateral tension between two or more actors in the international system as a response to perceived aggression or growing insecurity may generate a security dilemma that could devolve into mutual hostility and conflict. Neither NATO nor Russia want conflict in the Arctic. Consequently, bridging the dialogue gap would serve to reduce misperception, build trust, and demonstrate peaceful intentions.

COURSE OF ACTION

As stated in the 2017 Political Committee Report on NATO and Security in the Arctic, "the Arctic is once again of profound importance to NATO security."³⁹ Despite this acknowledgement, NATO currently lacks an Arctic regional security strategy. This article aligns three strategic courses of action to address the changing Arctic security landscape, providing regional stability while reinforcing governance norms.

1. Maintain "a credible, Arctic-capable, amphibious force in Norway" to deter Russian revisionist intentions in Svalbard.⁴⁰

2. Utilize the NATO-Russia Council to "close the Arctic security dialogue gap through the creation of an Arctic security working group."⁴¹

3. Review NATO's maritime force posture and capabilities in the North Atlantic to ensure that NATO's collective defense remains credible.⁴²

In lieu of alliance cohesion surrounding Svalbard's legal authority, maintaining "a credible, Arctic-capable, amphibious force in Norway" is vital to deterring Russian revisionist intentions in the archipelago.⁴³ To be certain, NATO does not need to "gain parity in Arctic capability" with Russia to demonstrate its resolve and commitment to defending Svalbard, a commitment NATO has upheld since its incorporation into the NATO defense area in 1951.^{44, 45} Rather, a credible military force capable of responding quickly and

effectively to Russian incursions would be enough to change Moscow's calculus. Supporting Norway's military forces in the Arctic is an effective measure, considering they are best equipped and more active compared to other NATO Arctic states.⁴⁶ Furthermore, the Norwegian joint headquarters are located within the Arctic Circle, and Norway's 'Marine Rotational Force – Europe' (MRF-E) maintains significant amphibious operational capability. NATO could augment the MRF-E by providing amphibious shipping and aviation platforms to strengthen MRF-E deterrent credibility.⁴⁷ With the requisite equipment, training, and specialized units for military operations under severe conditions, Norway has NATO's most-Arctic capable forces.

For this course of action to be effective, NATO must address its internal differences with regard to Norway's legal authority over Svalbard. Otherwise, NATO risks its northern flank remaining a critical vulnerability, providing Russia an opportunity to recreate its strategy of annexation through the exploitation of legal ambiguities to cast doubt whether international rules were broken to undermine NATO cohesion. In the event of a Russian attack on Svalbard, NATO requires unanimous consensus to invoke Article 5's collective defense obligations. Up to this point, Russia has complied with the UNCLOS, and "if the Alliance can take the lead on a resolution to that issue and provide a unified diplomatic position... a potential seam [within NATO] would be mended and a significant conflict driver removed."⁴⁸ This would also provide legal certainty to the 200 nautical mile zone surrounding Svalbard, encouraging greater economic investment and resource exploration.

Employing the NATO-Russia Council to "close the Arctic security dialogue gap through the creation of an Arctic security working group"⁴⁹ can promote transparency and risk reduction in the Arctic. Historically, the NATO-Russia Council has served as an important forum for "consultation and joint action between NATO members and Russia," and its applicability to the growing security challenge of Arctic stability and security is self-evident.⁵⁰ Avoiding a security dilemma in the Arctic is crucial to upholding regional stability and peaceful cooperative governance. As such, it will be imperative that NATO communicate its intentions and plans to Russia to reduce possible misperceptions and miscalculations, similar to how NATO uses the forum for issues pertaining to the European continent. It should be noted, however, that this course of action does risk diluting the influence and authority of NATO Arctic states over security matters in the Arctic, as it would give non-Arctic NATO members a voice and role in the governance of the region.

Utilizing the NATO-Russia Council in this manner would also respect the merit of the Arctic Council and empower it to continue to serve as an important policymaking forum for non-military security issues in the Arctic. Not only would this resolve the existing security dialogue gap in the Arctic, but it would ensure that Russia, the largest Arctic state, had a seat at the table. Any

security dialogue efforts excluding Russia would be ineffective at mitigating regional tensions and alleviating Russian insecurity. Due to the fact that the NATO-Russia Council is an already established and recognizable forum to Russia, it could be more effective than temporary or informal arrangements which do not have the necessary structure, mandate, resources, or time to address regional security challenges.⁵¹ Finally, this would strengthen NATO as a norms-building institution and demonstrate non-military intent to Russia. The rapid transformations in the Arctic are upending decades of political stability in the region. If NATO could install its institutional values and founding principles as Arctic norms it could serve a vital role in stabilizing the region.⁵² This would prevent Russia from controlling freedom of navigation in the Arctic, and assuage Russian concerns regarding NATO involvement in the North Atlantic and Arctic.

Reviewing NATO's maritime force posture and capabilities in the North Atlantic is critical to ensuring the 'credibility of NATO's collective defense capability.' Moscow's military modernization and expansion efforts over the past decade demonstrate Russia's capacity to "challenge NATO's control of the high seas...[and] disrupt critical allied sea lines of communication."⁵³ If the United States and NATO wish to continue their freedom of navigation and safeguard trans-Atlantic lines of communication and telecommunications cable networks, then NATO must be equipped to do so. The North Atlantic served as a top strategic priority for NATO during the Cold War. Considering the changing risk landscape, NATO should restore the attention and emphasis it placed on the region during that period as part of its contemporary, 360-degree approach. Otherwise, NATO risks critical vulnerabilities in the face of a more aggressive Russia. However, with the Arctic increasingly a domain for power competition, this course of action risks tensions expanding.⁵⁴ NATO should proceed cautiously with deployments in the North Atlantic and use the NATO-Russia Council to communicate its purpose and intent in the region.

CONCLUSION

NATO can play a leading role in preserving stability and establishing international rules and norms in the face of growing Russian militarization through implementing these three courses of action. The Arctic lacks central, comprehensive governance and norm-setting authority to manage its regional transformation and the subsequent geopolitical and geoeconomic consequences.⁵⁵ NATO's foundational principles, strategic mission, multilateral authority, and defense and deterrence capabilities make clear that it remains the most effective mechanism to counter Russian militarization in the Arctic and preserve rules-based order. Given Russia's commitment to maintaining its military advantage and infrastructural lead in the Arctic, NATO must ensure

that: delimitation disputes in the newly accessible regions of the Arctic are still peacefully resolved through legal means; Svalbard will not become the epicenter of a Crimea-style Russian attack; Russian insecurity and distrust of NATO do not engender an Arctic security dilemma; and that NATO's defense and deterrence credibility in the North Atlantic remains robust.⁵⁶ Any NATO involvement in the Arctic beyond these measures risks destabilization through further militarization in the region. As the Arctic continues its environmental transformation, geopolitical and geoeconomic competitions will continue to grow. Therefore, it is imperative that NATO work to prevent Russia from achieving Arctic military dominance while building the international legal framework capable of maintaining regional peace and stability.

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Why Allies Rebel: Defiant Local Partners in Counter-insurgency Wars

By Barbara Elias

A review by Alexander Morales

What makes managing local partners in counterinsurgency operations a formidable challenge? That is the question that author Barbara Elias, an assistant professor of government at Bowdoin College, seeks to answer in her book *Why Allies Rebel: Defiant Local Partners in Counterinsurgency Wars*. Her overarching argument is summed as “policymakers associated with intervening forces have not fully recognized key structural factors that motivate local compliance and defiance.” Rather than explaining the challenge by blaming specific unlikable politicians or institutions, She explores the complex political-military relationship by using principal-agent theory and through considering alliance politics to discuss how foreign intervenors and local partners act in counterinsurgency (COIN) situations.

To test her argument, she examines four independent variables to assess the likelihood of compliance: (1) local partner capacity, (2) converging interests, (3) foreign dependency on local implementation, and (4) external threats. The dependent variable is framed as local compliance to the intervener’s demands. In this schema, she avoids reducing the complexity of the relationship to local allies to comply when interests converge and to defy when interests diverge. She then examines nine large-scale noncolonial COIN interventions. For five of these interventions, she uses primary source documents and archival data to form the basis of her arguments and tests her independent variables against 460 discrete policy requests derived from this research. For another the last four interventions (Egypt in Yemen, Syria in Lebanon, Cuba in Angola, and Vietnam in Cambodia) which she covers in Chapter 9, she relies on secondary

sources due to the difficulty in obtaining primary sources and are examined on a qualitative basis, but the inclusion of these interventions hedges against selection bias.

In building her theoretical framework, the author Elias makes great efforts to emphasize both the differences between colonial and noncolonial COIN interventions and the role of popular legitimacy. In noncolonial COIN, she points out, that there is a severe dependency on the part of the foreign intervener to the local partner which grants them an element of bargaining power in order to extract more resources from the foreign intervener. Further, she cautions that she is seeking general trends in compliance against noncompliance and that local priorities and pressures can change the relative perceived importance of foreign intervener requests. She acknowledges that further work will need to be done on building unique compliance gaining strategies in a COIN environment.

In terms of book structure, Chapters 2-3 clarify the author's hypotheses of compliance and methodology. Chapters 4-6 deal with, respectively, the United States in Iraq, Afghanistan, and Vietnam. Chapter 7 covers India in Sri Lanka and Chapter 8 covers the Soviet-Afghan War. Helpfully, each section covering a major intervention has a subsection covering a summary of the findings for that intervention. Chapter 9 covers the previously mentioned interventions by smaller states. The author includes helpful appendices in the end comparing requests across wars, her use of United States diplomatic cables covering the US interventions in Iraq and Afghanistan, and her statistical analysis of local compliance that provide quick reference points for the future.

Covering many different interventions in different times and contexts, *Why Allies Rebel* provides useful data and analysis of what drives compliance that moves beyond blaming specific political personalities. Outside of the field of studying compliance, it provides helpful historical insight into the frustration of large powers attempting counterinsurgency with its use of primary study materials. Overall, this well written work is worth the read for both the practitioner and lay person.



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