

# HEZBOLLAH AND IRAN: THE NEW RESISTANCE MODEL AND WHY IT WILL FAIL

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Hezbollah has developed from an underground militia in Lebanon to an internationally recognized resistance force. It has used the full spectrum of tools to accomplish its objectives. Suicide bombers, assassinations, schools and health clinics put Hezbollah into a unique category among terrorist organizations. Hezbollah's profile and capabilities have been helped by its underwriter, the Islamic Republic of Iran. This close relationship has regional and international implications. Iran and Hezbollah have used their rhetoric and strategy in the Middle East to appeal to a broader group of potential partners. Resistance to Israel and justice for the Palestinians has now also grown to resistance to all things Western and justice for all of the "oppressed." Graduating to this level requires a dramatically different approach if they are to be successful. Hezbollah must use its profile to become a partner in peace. Secondly, tactics and language must conform to an internationally recognized standard of diplomacy. Not until these basic requirements are met can Hezbollah hope to realize even its most fundamental goals.

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Lebanese Hezbollah has evolved into a political and social force unprecedented in contemporary Islamism. From its early stages as a reaction to Israeli occupation, to its current role as protector of southern Lebanon, Hezbollah has demonstrated an uncanny ability to learn, transform, and adopt new tactics and strategies that help its political aims. Hezbollah has become a local, regional and religious force that demands the respect of even its most bitter enemies and rivals. Hezbollah began as a rag-tag group of young, disaffected Shi'ite youth with Iranian seed money and clerical guidance. In 1982, a few years into the Iranian revolution, an organized and diehard group of youth began to carry out sophisticated attacks

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on Israeli patrols. The group put out statements promising revenge against the Phalangists for their atrocities against civilians and more often than not delivered on these promises.

Since the 1980s, however, Hezbollah has been noted for both its social programs and efforts to support resistance to Israel<sup>1</sup>. Hezbollah remains a conservative and Islamic organization with deep ties to its Quranic invocation. The organization has positioned itself as a strong competitor for the sympathies and allegiances of the Lebanese people despite the country's factionalism and ever-shifting politics. Despite a diverse following composed of elements of poor, wealthy, Sunni and Shi'ite Lebanese, the organization has yet to make the transition from a guerrilla resistance to a credible, internationally recognized political actor. The United States (U.S.) and Europe for example have different positions regarding Hezbollah. While Europe refuses to label Hezbollah as a purely terrorist organization, the U.S. targets the organization's assets, operatives and blacklists its organization<sup>2</sup>.

An inquiry into the political and religious reasoning of Hezbollah would be incomplete without reference to the Islamic Republic of Iran,

which has underwritten and guided Hezbollah's theological and political framework since the organization's inception. Unsurprisingly, Iran's monetary and material support has attracted the attention and condemnation of the United States and Israel. Iranian guidance has helped Hezbollah to evolve and consolidate its operations to reflect strategic and political ends. Iran has organized a functioning bureaucracy and established camps and training visits to Syria. Despite the official designation of Hezbollah as a terrorist organization, the definition has failed to accurately describe the organization's full capabilities and actions.

Hezbollah was shadowy from the very beginning and its Iranian support added to the mystique. Members were not on a roster and meetings were never documented. Key players such as the young Hassan Nasrullah and Abbas Mussawi were natural selections to head up military operations and propaganda efforts. Hezbollah operated out of mainly poor Shi'ite sections of Lebanon and in the remote Baalbek Valley, where people notice outsiders instantly and are highly suspicious of new faces, making intelligence on the group difficult if not impossible to come by. As the

Islamic Revolution cemented itself in Iran and firmly established its authority in the Shi'ite world, Hezbollah began to echo, in Lebanon, the Revolution's message of anti-Westernism. Hezbollah called for a move back toward Islamic ideals that could build a new Islamic identity and culture." The organization's aggressive spirit of resistance to neo-colonial practices has quickly rallied support from similar regional organizations such as Hamas and the Muslim Brotherhood, despite differing interpretations of Islam and political ambitions. Hezbollah's initial revolutionary zeal eventually gave way to a pragmatic and immediate call to religious ideals that could appeal to the broad mass of Lebanese.

In 1975, Lebanon descended into a bloody civil war that lasted more than 25 years during which time the country was ravaged by internal struggles and factional murders between Christians, Druze, Sunni and Shi'ite groups. The Israeli army invaded in 1982 under the pretext of liberating the south of Lebanon from the Palestinian Liberation Organization (PLO), which had fled Jordan after the Black September events that effectively routed the PLO from carrying out more terrorism in Israel and subversion against

the Jordanians. Israeli forces eventually became an aggressive, occupying force in Southern Lebanon, and the involvement of the United States (U.S.) and France's military forces served only to exacerbate Lebanon's troubles. In the mid-1980s, Hezbollah, then only a loose and secretive group of Iranian-backed youth, began carrying out guerilla attacks against Israel Defense Forces (IDF). Hezbollah's military wing established itself as a cunning and adaptable force that only targeted IDF as a foreign enemy, building domestic support and a perception that Hezbollah fighters sought retributive justice for the common Lebanese. This retributive approach defied the common image of a terrorist group engaging in simple suicide bombings and kidnappings. Hezbollah never carried out attacks on the government in Beirut; rather it further made appeals to shared Sunni and Shi'ite tenets of unity among Muslims, martyrdom and jihad against an oppressive enemy.

Since the end of the civil war in 1990, Hezbollah has taken conscious steps to ensure its survival and has sought to carve out its own unique niche among conventional concepts of terror groups, insurgencies, sub-state actors and political parties. Notably, Hezbollah activities have fallen

under each of these labels since its organization.

Hezbollah's vision for the future of Lebanon and for itself has changed since its early years in the 1980s.<sup>3</sup> Past successes and failures have shown Hezbollah the limits of its effectiveness and those situations and endeavors in which its efforts are most or least productive. On October 13, 2010, Hezbollah capitalized on its relationship with Tehran and welcomed Iranian President Ahmadinejad to Lebanon in a wave of support. The official visit was meant to show support to Lebanon and its fractious political groups amid political controversy, but even so the visit was also intended to underscore Iran's influence and backing of its proxy; Hezbollah. Meanwhile, the United Nations Special Tribunal looking into the assassination of former Lebanese Prime Minister Rafic Hariri is expected to conclude its investigation into Hariri's death and indict members of Hezbollah in the killing of the late Prime Minister, by late 2010. Hezbollah denies any involvement in the assassination and threatened serious consequences if accused.

Despite the current political cloud hanging over the organization, in 2008 Hezbollah's political muscle contributed to much-needed reconciliation and

national unity in the compromise that brought Lebanon's President Michel Suleiman to power. Hezbollah agreed to a power-sharing agreement that allows it a veto over key foreign and domestic issues, but did not, however, try to implement a Sharia-based agenda or introduce any Shi'ite-inspired legislation into parliament. This restraint and understanding of the Lebanese landscape gives credibility to the organization and aids its trust building. Hezbollah takes many opportunities to remind the Lebanese public that it is not interested in converting anyone to Shi'ite Islam and is only interested in building national unity<sup>4</sup>.

Hezbollah's networks of hospitals, schools and cash assistance programs for victims of violence and IDF property demolition has bought it popular acceptance as a force for justice in Lebanon. Hezbollah's enemies, and outside observers, however, see this as calculated and strategic maneuvering instigated by the organization's Iranian masters in the hope of eventually being a cornerstone for an overall transformation in the Middle East in which Islam plays a key role in domestic and foreign policy. Moreover, Hezbollah would like to see a Middle East without Israel.

Hezbollah's advocacy of

social programs and equality for all in Lebanon, as well as its popular appeal, has stood in contrast to what some observers may have expected from the organization. Hezbollah's political support has grown from its Shi'ite base to include popular favor among Lebanese who are exasperated by the patronage that dominates the fragmented political landscape in Lebanon. Hezbollah only asks for partnerships and coalitions that could bring true reform to the Lebanese system<sup>5</sup>. Although these demands are appealing and forward thinking, Hezbollah's true intentions and long-term political goals must not be forgotten. The organization has promised to never recognize Israel, even if every other country does<sup>6</sup>, even though Hezbollah would be hard pressed to keep this promise should its interest become aligned with partners who do eventually make that concession.

Lebanon's political structure is still based on confessionalism; the President must be Christian Maronite, the Prime Minister a Sunni Muslim and the Speaker a Shi'ite. This system is arguably directly responsible for Lebanon's checkered political history. Patronage and regional neglect has led to a sense of abandonment and little confidence in the central government. Hezbollah's domestic

agenda seeks to address these inequalities while simultaneously not waiting for the government to officially act. Moreover, Hezbollah has not forgotten the civil war and assigns blame to the Phalangists, an ultra-nationalist group of mostly Maronite Christians, who were notoriously brutal in the civil war and took extreme measures against Shi'ite civilians; one of Hezbollah's original objectives was to counter this abuse. Today Hezbollah is the main opposition to the Phalangists in parliament and takes every opportunity to articulate its position forcefully and to remind the Lebanese people of Hezbollah's efforts during the 1980s to fight the Israelis and protect the population from internal pogroms.

Hezbollah is and always has been an Islamic organization whose actions and policies are founded upon its interpretation of Quranic and Sharia sources. Leadership of Hezbollah includes a seventeen-member *Majlis-Al Shura* (advisory council) that discusses the organization's major goals and decisions, and fourteen members in parliament to help implement and advocate these views. On the surface, this organizational structure appears to be an attempt to democratize and rectify historical economic disparity among the population.

However, because of clear Iranian backing, many remain suspicious of Hezbollah's approach and intent. As a power broker and regional enforcer in Lebanon, Hezbollah has effectively partitioned both south Beirut and south Lebanon into its own domain, and worked to improve the local economies and implement its social ideas, oftentimes at the expense of long-time non-Shi'ite residents<sup>7</sup>. During the Israeli withdrawal, for example, strategic locations in the south were diverse and mixed. Some towns represented all of Lebanon both politically and ethnically. Hezbollah's goal at the time was to occupy the vacuum that the Israelis created when they pulled out in a matter of hours. Any civilians found to have collaborated would have had some very difficult times living in the same village with new Hezbollah supporters.

In an effort to remain relevant to the everyday citizen, Hezbollah also runs public clinics, disposal services and educational facilities for children and students of all ages. Day schools, established for children, focus on instilling morality and values based on Islam, and put government schools to shame<sup>8</sup> in terms of the standard of education. Hezbollah's reason for implementing its own agenda in these regions is simple; the Shi'ite

psyche, a sense of being wronged and oppressed for so long, seeks out a liberator from oppression and Hezbollah fills this role. The people in regions where Hezbollah is active do not benefit from the patronage business environment in other parts of Lebanon where Gulf money splashes around. On the one hand, parts of Beirut and Tripoli have been infused with large cash projects sponsored by Saudi princes, while on the other hand South Beirut has suffered greatly. A war zone that bore the brunt of even the most recent bombing in 2006, the people in the southern area of Lebanon's capital city are poor, Shi'ites. Hezbollah sees this population as its base; having been left out of Lebanon's good old boys business culture. Politics in Lebanon are still sectarian and elections are predictable, based on where a candidate is from; those from the south are Shi'ite and candidates from the north are Sunni. What remains to be seen is how and in what way Hezbollah will exercise its power in regard to the rest of Lebanon and its ethnic groups, when the country finds itself in yet another crisis, and especially if the organization is accused of a role in the assassination of former Prime Minister Rafic Hariri.

Choosing to take part in the elections of 1992 was a major

step and admittedly a move that was a natural progression for Hezbollah. In its manifesto, the organization advocates democracy instead of the proportional law that dictates which groups can achieve and hold specified positions in the government. These rules are outdated and help fuel the factionalism that still haunts Lebanon today. Although this system is still in place, the population demographic has changed and Hezbollah is vocal in reminding Lebanon of this fact, perhaps because the Shi'ite population has grown significantly.

**P r o n o u n c e m e n t s** condemning Western imperialism and its policies, which Hezbollah sees as oppressing the poor and less fortunate, have allowed the organization to steadily cultivate the support of other populist movements. This approach is identical to the message put out by the Iranian state propaganda machine both for the Iranian people and as a guide for the country's official position with other nations<sup>9</sup>. Arguably, Iran has replaced the Soviets as the voice of opposition and confrontation to the U.S. By extension, Hezbollah uses this populous tone and has been seen as a testing ground for translating these words beyond Iran's borders. Perhaps this is because

the area Hezbollah has under its control in Lebanon is war-weary, more sympathetic and easier to manage. Lebanon has been through years of conflict, and Hezbollah's and Iran's dualistic world view--the oppressed versus the West--is likely to find a receptive audience in shell-shocked, south Lebanon.

Hezbollah has the potential to be an agent instead of an obstructor of peace in the eyes of the international community, but there is an obvious double standard by which Iran operates. While on the one hand Iran says that it wants peace and independence, on the other hand, the country trains terrorists and hides its nuclear activity from the international community. Hezbollah, through Iran, develops ties to countries such as Cuba, Venezuela, Bolivia and others where a populist and anti-Western rhetoric prevails. Where there is a Shi'ite minority, or in the case of Iraq, a majority, Hezbollah naturally sets up shop. Leftist organizations that oppose the United States are looked upon as potential friends of Hezbollah. The organization's calls to the oppressed gives it intellectual justification, according to its own supporters,<sup>10</sup> however, Hezbollah's documented trafficking in illicit drugs, arms and people do not help its rise to legitimacy in the eyes of

the international community<sup>11</sup>.

Many groups such as the Irish Republican Army (IRA), Spain's Basque separatists, and in the same vein the Muslim Brotherhood in Egypt, which have used terror as a tactic, have arguably made efforts to move from the violent attacks for which they gained notoriety, to cease fire, democratic participation and compromise that allow them to survive, although the Muslim Brotherhood is still officially banned in Egypt. Hezbollah has made moves in this direction, which stands in contrast to other violent Islamist organizations such as Al-Qaeda, but has not fully made the transformation.

Currently, Hezbollah's military wing conducts a wide variety of defensive and offensive operations, mainly against Israel, which in Hezbollah's view is both the instigator of unrest in Lebanon and an enemy state. The organization's hard-line position on Israel is however juxtaposed to Hezbollah's willingness to be practical when circumstances require, even if independently acting outside of Lebanon's official government channels. Most of these actions are, however, back channel and through neutral intermediaries, and even then only on matters such as exchanging dead and prisoner swaps<sup>12</sup>. South Lebanon is the main

theater of Hezbollah's military planning and activities, and Israeli sentries routinely exchange fire with Hezbollah border patrols. In 2006, Imad Mughniyyeh orchestrated a kidnapping/ambush operation targeting an Israeli tank patrol that went awry. The attack led Israel to invade and bomb southern Lebanon as far north as Beirut, leaving thousands of Lebanese dead. Hezbollah retaliated with guerilla tactics and Iranian technology. Hezbollah's symbolic successes, such as reports of an unmanned aerial vehicle (UAV) that targeted an Israeli warship off Beirut and inflicted four casualties, raised the profile and reputation of Hezbollah around the Arab world yet did little to satisfy the local population exasperated by the high casualty rate inflicted by superior Israeli firepower. Hezbollah admitted that it did not anticipate such a heavy response<sup>13</sup> from Israel. The Lebanese public expressed anger at Hezbollah for acting on its own behalf and disregarding its own statements and promises to not endanger the Lebanese people. As of 2010, Hezbollah is still rebuilding and emphasizing that its actions, and not the government's, are making things better for the people of south Lebanon.

Hezbollah's political activities mirror those of many



popular political groups found worldwide, and it has developed a public relations organization that includes a news channel, newspapers, websites, and statement mill that operates on a twenty-four hour cycle. The Hezbollah-run news channel broadcasts in Hebrew to reach the ever-close Israeli public, a strategic audience which Hezbollah knows listens in<sup>14</sup>. Hezbollah also crafts its interviews and public gatherings to construct the best possible public image. Hezbollah Secretary General Hassan Nasrullah regularly incorporates witticisms, employs perfect Arabic and sprinkles humor throughout his speeches in an effort to elevate the status of Hezbollah public speaking outreach on media websites such as YouTube, and reach as many as half a million viewers for individual clips<sup>15</sup>. Hezbollah certainly knows how to project itself and appeal to a common decency and justice in the organization's effort to be perceived as vindicator and punisher of what the region sees as the heavy hand of Israel.

With all of its successes and newfound political clout, Hezbollah still has a few steps to take if it truly seeks to become a legitimate entity in the eyes of the international community. The United States still lists Hezbollah as

a terrorist organization. Hezbollah's involvement in the 1995 bombing of an Argentine Jewish cultural center has not done anything to help the organization's cause. Hezbollah and the Iranian Quds Force routinely carry out international operations and assassinations in the Middle East and Europe,<sup>16</sup> which simply solidify the resolve of Hezbollah opponents.

Tactically, Hezbollah's operational discipline along with its organizational structure has made the military wing a model to be duplicated in terrorist groups. The organization has an advanced counter-intelligence program<sup>17</sup> in place and its tier-one operators are trained and provided full cover under Iranian diplomatic passports<sup>18</sup>. Hezbollah has an independent Special Forces wing along with a local voluntary militia within Lebanon that can be called on short notice. The command structure is well-organized and regionally placed. Offensive surveillance operations are carried out with Hebrew-speaking Arabs that routinely keep track of the positions of Israeli units and record their movements to detect patterns and rotations, and in 2010 IDF officers were arrested on suspected ties to Lebanese drug dealers with connections to Hezbollah<sup>19</sup>. Offensive violent activities and

potential entrapment efforts need to stop if Hezbollah is to move from a guerilla resistance to a populist movement that is an internationally recognized entity.

It is difficult to gauge the workings of Hezbollah's inner circle and its decision making process. It is a notoriously hard organization to penetrate from an intelligence standpoint<sup>20</sup>. Perhaps in an effort to open up and show its true intentions, Hezbollah should discuss its short- and long-term goals. If the organization is to truly transform into a progressive Islamic model, one based on reform and advocacy -- a position which Hezbollah gives lip service to<sup>21</sup> -- the organization has some difficult decisions to make. In Hezbollah's 2009 manifesto, Hassan Nasrullah states that, "The Resistance in Lebanon has evolved from a Lebanese national value to an Arab and Islamic value and has become today an international value that's taught all over the world<sup>22</sup>." It is unlikely that Hezbollah doctrine is taught all over the world, but Nasrullah may have a point if he's referring to a new bloc forming based on countering Western "hegemony."

With Iran's increasingly hard-line, anti-Western stance, a shift away from the Iran relationship would garner Hezbollah significant

appreciation from both regional neighbors and enemies. Of course, the question remains over whether or not this shift is possible, and what the potential repercussions would be if Hezbollah were to "bite the hand that feeds it," let alone lay down its weapons and take a position of non-violence. The Middle East, however, has not fully explored the benefits of a non-violent, strategic resistance model. Tried and tested by oppressed people throughout history, the moral high ground is the only method that has brought about sweeping change in the last century--most notably during the U.S. Civil Rights Movement led by Martin Luther King Jr. in the 1960s and Mohandas Karamchand Gandhi's early twentieth century, nonviolent resistance movement in India. Non-violence would be an about-face in broad-scale, resistance tactics in the Middle East. Hezbollah would move from a Lebanon-based insurgency movement to a prime example of Islamic teachings guiding a forward-thinking agenda based on social justice and democratic principles. Hassan Nasrullah has advocated for and already sees changes in Hezbollah's resistance model taking place, only to undermine this shift by the use of force. Moreover, Hezbollah has yet to fully persuade a skeptical and

conflict-weary Lebanese population of a change in tactics. Even Lebanon's own Shi'ite population – Hezbollah's base of support in the country -- has expressed doubt over the organization's capacity to deliver on its promises of reform and true change<sup>23</sup>.

To truly integrate into a divided Lebanon, Hezbollah must carry its message to an international audience and grow from short-term, cash-based aid to a partner in peace and constructive dialogue in the larger Islamic world. Hezbollah has made clear one of its main purposes is to act as a resistance force to Israel. As much as Hezbollah demonizes and routinely places the blame on Israel for the problems of the Middle East as an extension of the Israeli-Palestinian conflict, the organization has taken few steps to offer tangible, practical solutions that could bring about true peace and prosperity for the region. Hezbollah, by virtue of its proximity to Israel and its homegrown character, is ideal to fill this niche.

Iran, Hezbollah's ideal form of government, sees itself as the sole model in the region of a government that stands up to an international coalition of countries that in Iran's view seeks to keep Muslims from taking their rightful place among nation-states. Iran

has downplayed the fact that it is Shi'ite and Persian, unlike the Arab world which is predominantly Sunni Muslim. In an effort to reach the regional community, Iran broadcasts numerous TV channels in Arabic while its leaders seek to appeal to the broader Middle East, despite reminders of Iranian actions and stances toward Arab governments supported by the U.S. As Iran's proxy, Hezbollah echoes this reminder when prudent. Hezbollah lightens its message in Lebanon to appeal to the in-country population but there is no mistake that Hezbollah's message for the rest of the world is written in Tehran.

Iran, and by extension Hezbollah, needs to realize that international public opinion is indeed an important commodity. Currently, many in the West view Iran's mullahs with contempt and take their vehement statements against Israel and its allies as an espousal of religious violence that effectively seals Iran's fate. Hezbollah puts out this same message. The organization's fiery rhetoric regarding Israel serves only to alienate it from the rest of the world. Hezbollah would benefit significantly if it broadcast in English and took slightly different tones in regards to the Israeli-Palestinian issue, much similar to

the tones it uses in Lebanon when appealing for partnerships and national unity.

Any fair-minded observer will acknowledge that abuses have taken place on both sides of the Israeli-Palestinian conflict for many years. There is no excuse for terrorism, extrajudicial killings carried out by soldiers or the blatant destruction of property. The Palestinian cause, whether articulated by Hezbollah, Iran, Hamas or the Palestinian Authority, must reach a wider audience. Public opinion generally sympathizes with those who are persecuted. However, the propaganda machine of Iran and Hezbollah needs to move from a violent depiction of Israel as the demon and instead paint the problem as a source of mutual suffering. Iran should use its clout in the Middle East to move away from its inflammatory rhetoric to one of diplomacy. This suggestion may sound antithetical to Iran's vision and strategy, but any other course of action has consequences that have been exhausted and tested before, with little or no positive result. Hezbollah has routinely used rocket attacks against Israel only to be answered with return fire. The organization's collusion with Iraqi resistance in the south near Najaf and Karbala, two holy Shi'ite cities, has been documented

and proven by U.S. and British intelligence. Despite its military prowess, Hezbollah has little to show for when force is used. On the other hand, the organization's social programs and public outreach is where many people find sympathy and gratitude for Hezbollah.

There is no ambiguity in Hezbollah's support for the Palestinians, and the organization enjoys support from Islamic groups of various orientation and ambition for this platform; if not logistically then definitely in spirit. In terms of actual material support, Hezbollah is the one that is providing, and it was recently acknowledged that Hezbollah sends "any kind of support" to Hamas<sup>24</sup>.

If solving the Palestinian issue is high on Iran's and Hezbollah's agendas, the organization could use its social and political capital to reorient its message toward a more conciliatory tone. In this regard, Hezbollah has enjoyed success in Lebanon by using the Quran to build legitimacy and authority with the majority of the Lebanese public. If the model is to fulfill the organization's advocacy objectives, Hezbollah must eventually move toward a new message of unity, justice and rule of law; all of which have bases in the Quran.

Iran would of course need to change

its stance first. An overtly public shift would be challenging while a behind the scenes method would be the most practical approach. Saudi Arabia currently serves as a precedent for this course of action. Hezbollah's agenda for Lebanon and Iran's plan for the Middle East are punctuated by similar objectives: a Palestinian state, independence from foreign interference and meddling, and an overall shift from despotic governments toward leadership that

reflects an Islamic set of values. Advocating for justice and Islamic unity needs to go hand in hand with international relations, and there could be a basis for these objectives but only if implemented with tact. Hezbollah's statements have laid the groundwork for nonviolent positions to take shape, and if the organization has been practical and politically savvy up to this point, it is reasonable to assume that a transformation into a credible, internationally recognized political actor may yet take place.

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<sup>3</sup> "Full Speech of H. E. Sayyed Nasrallah : Hizbullah's New Political Manifesto. "We Want Lebanon Strong & United." Islamic Resistance In Lebanon - Official Web Site. <http://english.moqawama.org/essaydetails.php?eid=9632&cid=214> (accessed October 03, 2010).

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<sup>5</sup> Ibid.

<sup>6</sup> "Al-ManarTV: Hezbollah New Manifesto: We Want Strong, United Lebanon," Hezbollah New Manifesto: We Want Strong, United Lebanon, accessed October 04, 2010, <http://www.almanar.com.lb/newssite/NewsDetails.aspx?id=113379&language=en>.

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<sup>9</sup> Behnoud, Massoud. "Propoganda and Reality." *Regime Change Iran*.

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<sup>15</sup> "هلل او بلقل اع طقي نيزح و ملؤم عطقم مللا رصن نسح دي سلا." *YouTube*. <http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=ISYkBIb64w> (accessed October 04, 2010).

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<sup>23</sup> Antelava, Natalia. “Lebanese Sceptical over Unity Talks.” BBC News - Home. <http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/7618480.stm> (accessed October 04, 2010).

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