Analyzing President Obama's New Sudan Policy

W. Douglas SmithStaff WriterOctober 25, 2009W. Douglas SmithStaff WriterOctober 25, 2009This past Monday the Obama administration unveiled its much-anticipated new policy for Sudan. At a press conference, Secretary of State Hilary Clinton, along with Special Envoy to Sudan Major General J. Scott Gration (ret.) and U.S. representative to the U.N., Susan Rice, announced the first official details of the plan.Three objectives are at the center of the Obama administration’s policy. The first is to end the conflict and human suffering in Darfur. Second, is the successful implementation of the Comprehensive Peace Agreement (CPA) between North and South Sudan—success understood as a process that ends in a stable unified Sudan, or a peaceful two-state situation. And the third is to assure that Sudan does not provide a safe haven for terrorists.For several decades, Sudan was split between the north and south in one of Africa’s longest wars. That war ended in 2005 with the signing of the Comprehensive Peace Agreement. But the Agreement is now in jeopardy with its implementation at a critical juncture. By its terms, a 2011 referendum is supposed to determine whether the country will split or remain unified. Controversy is already stirring about details of the referendum, and whether it will be peaceful.Coupled with this is the situation in Darfur. Since 2003, the region has been the scene of widespread, indiscriminate violence that has produced one of the largest refugee populations in the world. While the overall level of violence has diminished in Darfur in the last two years, the humanitarian condition in the region remains desperate.The new policy contains several major shifts from the Bush administration. The first is an explicit focus on metrics and tangible results. In her press release, Secretary of State Clinton made clear that the administration would hold both parties to the CPA accountable for their responsibilities in implementing the Agreement. The Secretary strongly emphasized the need for progress. If there is not any progress, then the US will consider punitive action.The administration indicated that it would consolidate international support around the CPA implementation process to better leverage options for carrots and sticks. This is to be achieved through the formation of a group, called the “Envoy 6”, which consists of the five permanent members of the Security Council – the United States, China, Russia, Great Britain, and France -- plus the European Union to work in concert on Sudan. The rationale for it being that such international cooperation could further levy sanctions against the government in Khartoum.In the past, a lack of international support for sanctions, especially from Russia and China who are invested in Sudan’s oil industry, had hampered efforts by the Bush administration to persuade the Khartoum government to comply with the demands of the international community.A second change of policy was the decision to renew the call to end violence in Darfur. In tandem with this, the Obama administration reintroduced an idea put forth by Secretary of State Colin Powell back in 2004: that the situation in Darfur qualifies as genocide. The use of this word to describe the situation in Darfur has very serious legal and moral implications. Under the 1948 Convention on Genocide, a country is legally obligated to take action if it recognizes genocide is occurring. The administration’s choice of words may signal they are really determined to put an end to the never-ending crisis in Darfur.In an evolution from previous Sudan policy, the Obama administration’s policy makes explicit their intent to deal with both CPA implementation and the situation in Darfur in tandem. Earlier attempts at engagement have separated these two problems. While it is true that there are separate peace agreements for each of these conflicts—the 2005 CPA for the North-South conflict and the oft-forgotten 2006 Darfur Peace agreement—they are very much part and parcel of the same larger issues.The government in Khartoum signaled that it was pleased with what it deemed “positive points” in the policy, but expressed displeasure with the description of the situation in Darfur as genocide. There had been hope in Khartoum that U.S. sanctions currently in place would be relaxed. This did not prove to be the case, as Washington announced that the sanctions would remain, but it did hint at the possibility removing some of them if Khartoum continued to cooperate. There was also mention of removing Sudan from the U.S. list of state sponsors of terrorism; a designation Sudan’s leaders are eager to erase.These changes in policy are likely to cause a measurable shift in the dynamics of U.S.-Sudanese relations. More important, renewed focus on multilateral efforts to support the CPA and engage the parties involved have the potential to be effective where unilateral U.S. action has failed. Given the tenuous nature of the peace in Sudan and the vast number of contentious issues that must be dealt with between now and the 2011 referendum on Southern independence, the international community is needed to keep the Agreement on course.But large implications may loom as a result of the Obama administration’s decision to influence Sudan by engagement. It is difficult to reconcile a policy of open diplomacy and engagement while at the same time maintaining the circumstance in Darfur qualifies as genocide. Although many applaud the administration’s efforts with North Korea and Iran, negotiating with a government that is guilty of genocide raises heart-rending questions about the policies moral underpinnings.