The Three Front War: An Update on the War against Terrorism

Amid all of the panic surrounding Umar Farouk Abdulmutallab’s attempt to bring down a U.S. jetliner Christmas Day, one critical fact seemed to have been lost in the mix: the plot failed. Meanwhile, the successful attack launched on a CIA base in eastern Afghanistan on December 30 received far less attention and was far more devastating, killing 7 CIA officers and a Jordanian intelligence officer. Nearly two months before that incident, Major Nadal Malik Hasan gunned down 12 soldiers at Fort Hood after meeting with a radical cleric with connections to al-Qaeda .As a new decade begins, these three incidents highlight the progress and challenges in the struggle against al-Qaeda and its affiliated groups. In this “war,” they are representative of the three main battle fronts: the one at home, the one abroad, and the one for the mind. The United States is winning the war at home. The other two it is not.This observation is important, because it is more than a coincidence that terrorism scholars divide al-Qaeda’s current organization into three different kinds.The first is “Al-Qaeda Central,” which includes Osama bin Laden, Ayaman al-Zawarhi and those who plan major terrorist attacks and distribute al-Qaeda’s propaganda. Undeniably the United States is much better at preventing terrorist attacks against the homeland than it was on September 10th, 2001. Due to measures such as the hardening of cockpit doors, reforms to the intelligence community, and the expansion of law enforcement powers under the Patriot Act, there has yet to be a single successful attack on American soil since 9/11—despite many attempts.Further, Al-Qaeda Central’s ability to launch an attack against the United States has diminished significantly in recent years. The 9/11 attacks took years to plan, during which time al-Qaeda enjoyed a largely unmolested safe haven, an ample set of funds, and relative anonymity on the U.S. foreign policy agenda. Today the United States has cut off much of al-Qaeda’s finances and killed or captured a number of top operatives. State sponsorship of terrorism is at a historically low level. What remains of Al-Qaeda Central is confined to the tribal regions of Pakistan where American drones harass its members. While Al-Qaeda Central no doubt still seeks to carry out attacks against the United States, its ability to do so may be at its nadir.The second iteration of al-Qaeda are “al-Qaeda franchises”—terrorist organizations that have pledged allegiance to bin Laden, but either existed prior to or emerged independently of al-Qaeda. These groups include al-Qaeda in Mesopotamia, al-Shabaab in Somalia, al-Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula, and Lashkar-e-Taiba, among others. These groups have been very active in recent years, launching attacks in their respective areas. However, with the exception of Mr. Abdulmuttalab, these groups have shown little motivation to carry out attacks against the United States in spite of their pledge to fight the “far enemy.” They seem more concerned with regional interests, such as toppling the Saudi government or destabilizing Pakistan.However, these al-Qaeda franchises are proliferating, and they are improving their capability to carry out sophisticated and devastating attacks. The number of terrorism incidents across the globe continues to increase, and the majority of that violence can be attributed to these regional al-Qaeda franchises. The attacks have increased in boldness and effectiveness, which range from the elaborately planned attack on the CIA in Khost on the one end, to the Mumbai massacre on the other. These franchises have also become more creative. Al-Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula first tried to use an underwear bomb similar to Mr. Abdulmutallab’s when a terrorist nearly killed the Saudi head of counterterrorism in August, 2009. Additionally, the Khost attack showed a remarkable amount of sophistication and planning, which fooled not only the CIA, but Jordanian intelligence as well. It is these regional franchises that have become the vanguard of global terrorist operations.The third group includes people like Major Hasan, who received no training from a terrorist group, but was nevertheless inspired by al-Qaeda’s radical ideology to carry out an attack at Fort Hood. These “lone wolf” acts of terrorism are very difficult to defend against. They are unpredictable, often involving little planning, which makes them less susceptible to interdiction. Additionally these terrorists can draw their inspiration and direction from a variety of different sources, including the Internet. Al-Qaeda’s propaganda arm has created a “virtual safe-haven,” which allows the group to spread its ideology and disseminate instructions on how to carry out attacks to whomever is inclined to do so. Fortunately, these online instructions are no substitute for actual training, and the operations are also often poorly planned and executed. Major Hasan is the exception to this rule and serves as a reminder of how dangerous these “lone wolf” terrorists can be.Nearly a decade ago, U.S. intelligence and law enforcement were caught unprepared to intercept operatives as al-Qaeda launched its spectacular attack. Since that time, the group that struck a devastating blow to the United States has been significantly crippled. However, a new threat has emerged. Regional terrorist groups are more powerful and capable than they have ever been. Additionally, the Internet adds a new weapon to al-Qaeda’s arsenal, allowing it to spread its hateful message to those who may commit acts of violence. If the United States wishes to pursue a truly global war on terrorism, it must refocus its attention on the latter two groups.