COUNTERPOINT: When Questioning the U.S. Military is Wrong

In the recent International Affairs Review article “The Scholar: When Questioning the US Military is Right,” Dr. Thomas Griffith argues that questioning the advice of military commanders is “vital to forging a sound strategy” and “essential to democracy”. While the “essential to democracy” argument has some merit, Dr. Griffith’s “sound strategy” point rests heavily on historical examples. This reliance on select examples and disregard for key details is one of several fallacies that undermine Dr. Griffith’s argument.For every example of the Executive successfully over-ruling or questioning military assessments, there are equally compelling examples of times the Executive ignored military advice to the detriment of national security. A strong case could be made that 9/11 (and therefore Afghanistan) would never have happened had the Clinton administration not denied authorization for the use of covert Special Operations Forces (SOF) against Bin Laden in the 1990's, either in Sudan or Afghanistan. Likewise, Dr. Griffith’s point that the “2-division, $2 Billion dollar plan” was ultimately accomplished with a smaller, SOF-centric footprint seems to miss the obvious fact that the purpose for the original concept of operations in 1998 was to capture or kill Bin Laden, a mission that the SOF elements that overthrew the Taliban in 2001 were sadly unable to accomplish. If President Clinton had authorized the necessary forces when the option was presented, the “2-division, $2 Billion” the price paid would have been by far preferable to have both prevented the subsequent decade of Bin Laden-sponsored terror, and to have ended the egregious abuse of human rights in Afghanistan 3-6 years earlier than the 2001 invasion.The one reason President Obama's delay in granting General McChrystal's troops requests was judged politically acceptable was that it did not affect the General’s schedule for deployment. The passes between Pakistan and Afghanistan used by the Taliban to resupply their fighters were already beginning to freeze at the earliest the President could have made a decision, and the enemy operations tempo in Afghanistan usually stays relatively sedate between October and early March. However, this mitigating factor only diminishes the political fallout;it does not diminish the effect on the lives of the soldiers who must implement the President’s willfully overdue decision. Some of the troops are simply being re-routed from Iraq duty to Afghanistan, while others were only recently informed of deployment orders for the spring and summer. This leaves them with less than half the usual time for the pre-deployment training cycle. There are critically important practical issues related to the training of troops for Afghanistan duty (not the least of which are high-altitude conditioning, cultural awareness training, and off-road/mountain driving), as well as the more acute issues of leaving American commanders and soldiers freezing on forward operating bases in Nuristan and Konar, wondering if their hard-fought gains are about to be frittered away by a feckless administration.Few would disagree that it is both democratic and appropriate to question the advice of military commanders and the Joint Chiefs, but most of the examples in Dr. Griffith’s article relate to the Commander-in-Chief's role as a binary decision-maker or broad strategist. When it comes to military strategy, quibbling with the numbers is something that most Presidents (particularly the current one) are uniquely under-qualified to do. Senior military officers typically provide courses of action in terms of 'degree of risk' or 'probability of failure'. According to CBS News, General McChrystal originally wanted 50,000-80,000 additional troops for his counter-insurgency plan, lowering the request to a “firm bottom line” of 40,000 due to political pressure, but warning “anything short of 40,000 increases the risk of failure.” Every 10,000-soldier decrease represents approximately 2 Army Brigade Combat Teams (BCT) and additional support troops. If President Obama agreed with General McChrystal’s overall counterinsurgency strategy (which he publicly claimed to do), why did he choose to authorize a force 25% lower than General McChrystal’s bottom line? Dr. Griffith can decry the politicization of the debate, but the unfortunate reality is that the President played an embarrassing game of politics with the authorization of forces. Ultimately, by choosing the capricious number of 30,000 (in part to mollify the anti-war elements within his party), the President is sending the message that he is willing to accept a higher risk of failure. Sadly, he risks only his political legacy. The immediate risks of his long-delayed and arbitrary decision will be borne by young soldiers, sailors, airmen and marines in combat. The deeper, more long-term risks will be shouldered by the leaders throughout the military who would have to deal with the institutional effects of a possible American defeat in Afghanistan.Dr. Griffith argues that the politicization of the Afghanistan debate “damaged civil-military relations and in the long-run may have done more harm to the men and women in uniform than any delay”. The biggest threat to long-term civil-military relations is failure in Afghanistan linked to inadequate troop levels. Make no mistake, if the U.S. mission in Afghanistan fails during the Obama administration, it will do serious damage to the American military establishment and will severely undermine military trust in the Executive branch. There will be some portion of the most experienced, who have served multiple combat-tours, both officers and non-commissioned officers, who will resign from the military, unwilling to obey the orders of a President that ignores their informed advice and is viewed as wasting the blood sacrifices of friends and colleagues. The loss of that combat experience will undermine the national military strength at a time of growing threats from China, Iran, and others. There will also be a chasm of distrust and resentment between the military and the Executive that will take many years to bridge. These are the possible results of inadequate forces in Afghanistan. A failure caused by chronic doubt of the military, leading the President to ignore the careful analysis of a man with infinitely more experience, and relying instead on his own inexperience to form a judgment, All for the cost of two brigades.The author, who wishes to remain anonymous, is a former Army non-commissioned officer.The photo in this article is being used under licensing by the Department of Defense. The original source can be found here.