State of Jihad: 2010 and Beyond

The sky was the limit in 2001 as al-Qaeda’s propaganda arm, named “as-Sahab,” or “the clouds” in Arabic, broadcasted global jihad online for the first time. The organization and its affiliates enjoyed absolute purity of message, operational success that September, and many expected that a global insurgency would follow. Nearly a decade ago, they were certain of their project’s religious appeal and convinced that Allah’s blessing was manifest. Yet within a brief and dramatic two-year period, the United States invaded both Afghanistan and Iraq, providing jihadists with laboratories for armed resistance and sanctifying their message that the United States was a familiar villain: that Americans were new Crusaders bent on Islamic subservience, exploiting the Middle East and occupying holy land. Nine years later, though, the sky is falling and global jihad is splintering.The message itself was wounded most conspicuously by those promoting it. Since 2003, and especially from 2005-2007, brutal tactics undermined the movement, especially in Iraq. Certain episodes indicate that al-Qaeda knew popular opinion was drifting as early as 2005. Second-in-command Ayman al Zawahiri then wrote that the organization had gone too far and Iraq’s fragmentation would only endanger the jihadist enterprise. Such warnings came too late, however: al-Qaeda’s brand was tainted by daily bombings, kidnappings and mass-killings which cost them their moral authority in the heart of the Arab world. “In the absence of this popular support,” Zawahiri warned, “the Islamic mujahideen movement would be crushed in the shadows.” Two years later, Zawahiri reached out to Muslims in an online discussion where he was confronted with stinging questions about jihad and murdered innocents.New data from West Point’s Combating Terrorism Center also indicates that regional media outlets constrain violent extremism like never before. “Only 12% (371) of [al-Qaeda’s] victims [outside of war zones] were Westerners [from 2004 to 2008],” the report found. These findings are particularly valuable because the survey was limited to Arab-language media sources only – meaning local media reiterates these facts daily and potential al-Qaeda recruits are increasingly aware of the group’s failures. (See: “Deadly Vanguards: A Study of [al-Qaeda‘s] Violence Against Muslims.”) For many observers, even those sympathetic, tactical failures are eclipsing strategic goals as violence becomes an end in itself.Regardless of publicity setbacks, global jihad is under siege both in the physical and philosophical realm. Jihadists now operate under constant threat: in Pakistan, American drones buzz overhead and Pakistani Army offensives are pushing back; Sunni extremists are losing ground in Iraq; perhaps only 100 al-Qaeda members remain in Afghanistan; and, most importantly, local regimes believe these groups pose an existential threat and now imprison, execute, or de-radicalize them with urgency. Muslim credentials are being contested with greater frequency. This year, authoritative religious scholars dismantled ibn Taymiyya’s fourteenth-century Mardin Fatwa, which Osama bin Laden applies as a mandate for modern jihad. And in March, Sheikh Muhammad Tahir-ul-Qadri of Pakistan released his 600-page fatwa attacking al-Qaeda and the Taliban’s religious arguments. Both clerical developments received considerable attention and benefit today from a widening debate about terrorism’s moral shortcomings.Beyond documenting negative developments, contrasting goals and achievements is the best way to qualify the ongoing jihad. In 2001, many believed in the myth of a worldwide Islamic insurgency. Instead, conflicts have crystallized geographically in very specific places like Iraq, Afghanistan, and Pakistan – two of which may lose prominence if the United States begins or completes withdrawals next year. Fantasies that the “near enemy” (i.e. authoritarian regimes) would succumb or that the “far enemy” (i.e. the United States) would collapse have not materialized; the status quo endures while U.S. dominance is challenged more by Chinese markets than the mujahideen. 2001 was followed too by claims that America was the newest battleground and future attacks would humble the Crusaders. U.S. authorities responded with vigilance, homeland security has proven moderately effective thus far – at least avoiding incidents on the scale of 9/11 – and international efforts ensure terrorism is a trickier business than ever before.Without question, the scorecard is lopsided, but the threat is dynamic, progressing towards a new variant of armed resistance. Put differently, the game is changing. What was al-Qaeda is now marginalized, certainly, but more and more Westerners have recently joined the struggle – pursuing it on their own terms abroad – or are developing terrorist plots independent of other parties. In this sense, al-Qaeda and its ideology is a more complex organism in 2010 and perhaps a more dangerous one: it inspires jihad online, can claim credit for or praise the actions of “lone wolf” terrorists from a distance, and relies less and less on vulnerable command structures. The challenge of the last decade is thus being redefined: the United States was once tasked with defeating a threat that, though unconventional, was still identifiable and destructible. Today, however, the threat is growing more disjointed but remains dangerous as recent episodes confirm a new trend toward small-scale, individualized terror (e.g. Daniel Boyd’s interrupted jihad; Abdulhakim Muhammad’s “jihadi attack” on an Alabama recruiting station; Nidal Hassan’s one-man assault on Fort Hood, etc.).Al-Qaeda and others have been in flux for years now, but 2010 may be the year jihad changes decisively. What we are seeing is a new dynamism and dualism in jihadi circles: larger groups are declining in sophistication while single terrorists are growing just as dangerous. The “state of jihad” has reached operational equilibrium.The photo in this article is being used under licensing by U.S. Department of Defense. The original source can be found here.