Book Review: Counterinsurgency

The praise on the back cover of David Kilcullen’s Counterinsurgency is deceptive: “Required reading” (Fareed Zakaria). “Excellent” (The Economist). “In a master class” (Boston Globe). The reader soon realizes, however, that the universal praise is meant for Kilcullen’s last book – The Accidental Guerrilla – rather than Counterinsurgency.At its best, the book offers creative insights to ground-level counterinsurgents at the operational and tactical levels. In this vein, Kilcullen leverages his experience as both former Australian commando and student of insurgencies in South East Asia’s archipelagos. At its worst, Counterinsurgency feels rushed and jumbled, something Kilcullen compiled in haste to capitalize on the success of The Accidental Guerrilla.A former senior counterinsurgency (COIN) advisor to Generals David Patraeus and Stanley McChrystal, Kilcullen tells us Counterinsurgency is a “selection of my work” presented as a “unified body of thought”. The book is certainly quite a mix: a tactical-level case study, informal notes to company-level commanders, part of his doctoral dissertation, a lecture, and an academic journal article, among other chapters. However, readers searching for a “unified body of thought” regarding COIN should instead peruse The Accidental Guerrilla and the rest of the COIN canon (Mao Zedong, Roger Trinquier, Sir Robert Thompson, David Galula, et. al.). There is nothing unified about Counterinsurgency.Perhaps Kilcullen is smartly cashing in; after all COIN appears ready to endure another round of popular and political neglect. The last US combat brigade has left Iraq and the drawdown in Afghanistan will commence in July 2011. Once again, America has tired of what Kilcullen correctly terms “armed social work.” Pace Condi Rice, we simply do not want the 82nd Airborne escorting children to schools built by the US taxpayer in foreign countries. Despite the growing aversion to practicing COIN, Kilcullen reminds us that American power cannot last without it. Simply, the United States will continue to fight wars and most of its opponents will be insurgents. Using data from the Correlates of War project, Kilcullen notes that about 80 percent of conflicts since 1816 were insurgencies and civil wars rather than “conventional” state-on-state fights. Borrowing from the US Army COIN field manual (which he helped write), Kilcullen defines insurgency as:An organized movement aimed at the overthrow of a constituted government through the use of subversion and armed conflict…stated another way, insurgency is a protracted politico-military designed to weaken the control and legitimacy of an established government, occupying power, or other political authority while increasing insurgent controlCOIN is simply the range of activities – poltical, military, social, and economic - a government uses to defeat the insurgency.The book is divided into two perspectives: ground-level and strategic level. The ground-level section contains Kilcullen’s famous “28 Articles” essay. A takeoff of Lawrence of Arabia’s “27 Articles”, the essay offers aphorisms for the company-level commander. While much of “28 Articles” is by now COIN boilerplate (focus resources on intelligence, emphasize cultural sensitivity, practice restraint when employing force, etc.), he offers a number of unique suggestions. For instance, Kilcullen stresses the importance of engaging women, but not children. Co-opting females builds networks of “enlightened self-interest that eventually undermine insurgents” allowing the counterinsurgent to “own the family.” Conversely, insurgents will exploit relationships with children and “either harm the child as punishment or use the child against you.” Kilcullen reiterates the importance of “seizing the initiative” and building on early successes. Written in Kilcullen’s delightful breezy but direct tone, the average grunt (or student of COIN) would do well to pay attention.Kulcullen’s consideration of metrics for COIN is less famous than “28 Articles,” but more interesting. Insurgencies are usually long-lived affairs, lasting decades; insurgents possess the “longevity advantage” meaning they must only maintain a minimum level of violence rather than win decisively. Third-party counterinsurgents (like the US in Afghanistan and Iraq) are susceptible to loss of will, particularly with little idea of how to measure progress. Thus, the question “what does success look like?” remains as enduring as difficult to answer. Kilcullen presents a number of creative metrics in answer. What does the price of exotic vegetables tell us about insurgent strength? Vendors must price in the costs of transportation into the market price of their goods. For example, less pricey saffron in Afghan markets indicates increasing “popular confidence and perceived security” including, presumably, better infrastructure, less bribes to pay, and safer travel. Kilcullen also recommends monitoring where local government officials sleep. Do they feel safe enough to live in the districts and towns they govern? Or does fear of insurgent assassination attempts force them away?The rest of the ground-level section is forgettable. It contains part of Kilcullen’s doctoral dissertation on the Darul Islam insurgency in Indonesia and case study of his former Australian commando unit’s firefight with Indonesian troops in East Timor. Regrettably, Kilcullen eschews his colloquial style for a formal, academic tone in these two essays. The non-specialist reader should probably move on to the “global” section.The global perspective is limited to a long essay, “Countering Global Insurgency”. Kilcullen argues the United States faces a “globalized Islamic insurgency” consisting primarily of al-Qaeda (AQ) affiliates but also including similar jihadist groups such as Jemaah Islamiyah in Indonesia. Though seemingly disparate, these groups are linked through family and personal history, finances, operational planning, linguistic and cultural networks, and doctrine, techniques, and procedures. The global insurgency resembles less a franchise and more “a model of traditional patron-client authority relationships;” terrorist cells demonstrate patterns of “patronage and dependency” residing in a web of “traditional authority structures, family allegiances, and tribal honor.”Instead of spending vast resources attacking individual organizations, Kilcullen convincingly argues for a strategy of “disaggregation” or severing the connections between these organizations. Break down the whole into its constituent parts and eventually the Islamist menace becomes a local policing matter. States like Indonesia can manage small irritants without requiring a large US presence or deluge of military and economic aid. Thus, a serious US COIN strategy involves attacking “nodes, links, and inputs” such as cross-cutting financial transactions, soldiers, planners, and materiel that serve multiple insurgencies. Ultimately, the US must “identify and neutralize those elements in each theater that link to the global jihad.”Despite “disaggregation’s” emphasis on limiting objectives, make no mistake: COIN is still primarily a matter of “social work” with employment of force strongly discouraged in most cases. Among other things, this means that United States will still send the 82nd Airborne to escort children to schools, pour billions into nation building initiatives, and attempt to reform corrupt and incompetent regimes. The natives will still misallocate and steal aid and exacerbate the grievances causing the insurgency. In other words, COIN is a messy business requiring long-term and expensive commitments. While the United States’ seeks the clarity of high-tech conventional fighting, so-called “irregular” war will remain all too regular. If the level of effort is too great or moral implications too distasteful, Kilcullen has a simple message to Americans: do not get involved. Yet, the future of American power may rest on our willingness and capability to intervene while being much more selective about the interventions. The photo in this article is being used under licensing by Google Images. The original source can be found here.