COUNTERPOINT: In Defense of Covert Action

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Counterpoint is a new section of the International Affairs Review, which provides a platform for open and fair debate on a variety of international affairs topic. See the other side of this debate at The Immorality of Covert Action by Elizabeth Finan. Covert action is an often misunderstood facet of U.S. intelligence as well as a common subject for wild speculation in popular culture. In reality, covert action—an umbrella term for a range of activities that run the gamut from propaganda to paramilitary operations—is the third option for policymakers when diplomacy and direct military action are deemed unfeasible. Though the United States formally banned assassination as an instrument in 1976, an important question about covert action remains: Is it moral?While this article is far from a comprehensive defense of the U.S. use of covert action, it covers some of the key arguments in support of its effectiveness and morality.Covert action requires presidential authorization in the form of a signed order that—according to the U.S. Code Title 50, Chapter 15, Subchapter III —finds such action “necessary to support identifiable foreign policy objectives of the United States and is important to the national security of the United States.” This order, known as a “presidential finding,” is given to the persons in charge of the operation as well as to members of the House and Senate Intelligence Committees.Certain activities like Radio Free Europe are fairly benign and do not aggravate the conscience, but others, like the attempt to engineer a coup in Chile, are much more antagonistic and merit discussion. In order to avoid a tiresome debate over every incidence in the historical record of covert action (made even more difficult by its clandestine nature) I suggest using the criteria proposed by author James Barry, which are also many of the same criteria found in Just War Theory. According to these guidelines, covert action is moral if it satisfies the following conditions: just cause; just intention; proper authority; last resort; probability of success; proportionality; discrimination and control.Does U.S. covert action fulfill these criteria? I offer two examples to test: U.S. support of anticommunist parties in Western Europe during the Cold War and the present use of unmanned aircraft (drones) to launch attacks against targets in the border regions of Pakistan.In the first case, the U.S. had the cause of opposing the spread of communism into Western Europe (which would threaten the United States). The intent was only to achieve that cause. The authorization of the President along with notification of the appropriate legislative committees, it was a last resort since diplomacy was not an option and military action could spark greater conflict. The probability of success was high. The means used were proportional to the ends desired (providing economic assistance to political parties). And, most importantly, the action did not harm civilians. Despite its involvement in the domestic affairs of other countries, this covert action meets the criteria for morality.In the second case, the use of unmanned drones, the cause is fighting terrorism. The intention is to use force to disrupt dangerous networks. The method has been authorized by both President Obama and President Bush before him. It qualifies as a last resort because the U.S. extends no diplomatic privilege to terrorists and direct military action in Pakistan is impracticable. The probability of success is high (senior U.S. officials have declared the airstrikes so successful that a complete al-Qaeda defeat is now foreseeable. And the precision of these strikes against terrorists and insurgents ensures that the action is both proportional and discriminate.The claim that U.S. covert action is immoral rests on two arguments: that covert action violates the non-interference principle of international law and that the collateral damage caused by covert action violates the criterion of discrimination and control.Non-interference, the practice of not operating within another state’s territorial bounds, is the normal operating procedure of international relations but it is not as strictly observed as one might suspect. All states seek to influence the policies and decisions of other states, sometimes in very disruptive ways. Sanctions and other economic reprisals (like China ceasing all exports of rare earth minerals to Japan during a dispute a few weeks ago ) are internationally accepted as foreign policy tools despite the fact they are intrusive and often much more damaging than covert action (i.e. post-Gulf War sanctions against Iraq). Furthermore, states have a primary obligation to protect their own citizens that overrides non-interference. Covert action, by law, is a tool used solely for that purpose.Collateral damage is an unfortunate facet of many policy decisions including covert action. In World War II, often held up as the exemplar of a “just war,” both sides practiced the strategic bombing of cities at great cost to civilians. Sanctions, as mentioned above, can similarly cause great hardship to civilian populations. Many forms of covert action, however, represent little to no threat to the ordinary citizen. The instances mentioned above of propaganda campaigns, assistance to political parties, and precision airstrikes are a few examples. Moreover, the necessity to keep the United States’ involvement concealed requires a much higher level of control which fosters discriminate action. High civilian casualties are detrimental to the mission of covert action.Covert action is not only an effective and moral practice, but is an essential tool for policymakers to ensure the vital interests of the United States are met. This image is being used under Creative Commons licensing. The original source can be found here.

Miranda Sieg, Former Staff Writer

Miranda Sieg is a second-year Masters Student at the George Washington University Elliott School of International Affairs studying Security, Development and Conflict Resolution. She is primarily focused on education and cross-cultural violence issues in East and Southeast Asia, but has recently developed an interest in post-conflict development and the integration of refugees and at risk migrants. Miranda spent two and a half years studying and working in Japan and traveling extensively in East and Southeast Asia. She currently works for the International Education Program at GW and is a Presidential Management Fellow Finalist and GW UNESCO Fellow.

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COUNTERPOINT: The Immorality of Covert Action

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