Eyes Forward: Considering the New (Old) Sudan

An important trend emerges from the increasing volume of news on Sudan: while the north is mentioned, it usually only serves as a foil for discussions about the south. The South Sudanese will vote in a referendum, currently scheduled for January 9, 2011, to decide if Sudan continues to be a unified country, or if the south will become an independent nation. The vote is one of the crucial final steps in the implementation of the Comprehensive Peace Agreement (CPA). The CPA, enacted in 2005, effectively ended the civil war between the north and the south that spanned two decades and cost an estimated 2 million lives.Theories and ideas abound about the fate of the south after the referendum, but little is being said about what will happen in the north. Admittedly, the prospect of a new state on the African continent is an important one, and the potential implications deserve consideration. It is equally important, however, to remember that the rest of Sudan will also emerge from this process inexorably altered.For the purpose of this analysis, let’s assume that the south will vote to become an independent nation thereby creating North Sudan and South Sudan. All available evidence indicates that this will be the case: a report published by NDI in October said that Southern Sudanese expressed a “strong yearning for separation from the North” in opinion polls. We will also assume that conflict, if it breaks out, will be localized and contained, and that, by the end of the CPA transition period in July 2011, it will have largely ended. Following these assumptions, what can we expect from a new old Sudan?Perhaps the most marked change will be North Sudan’s turn to the East. President Omar al-Bashir is fed-up with the West, especially Washington. Sudan is currently one of four countries on the State Department’s list of State Sponsors of Terrorism. This dubious distinction comes with a number of negative externalities, not the least of which is strict sanctions. President Bashir has lobbied for years to have Sudan removed from the list of terrorist states and to have economic sanctions lifted. His efforts have included assistance tracking al-Qaeda cells in Sudanese territory. The United States continues to use the promise of easing these sanctions as a carrot in its diplomatic toolbox.It is likely that North Sudan will also turn its attention away from organizations like the United Nations and focus more on regional memberships with the African Union and the Arab League. The Government of Sudan has already said that the mandates for the two UN peacekeeping missions in Sudan, UNMIS and UNAMID, will not be extended beyond July 2011. Recently, National Assembly Speaker Ahmed Ibrahim Al-Tahir, a strong player in the Khartoum government, promised that, “From now onwards, we will never succumb to any pressures especially from the Security Council”.The shift will not be purely diplomatic in nature. With the current strict sanctions regime in place against Sudan, and their observer status at the World Trade Organization, Sudan does not feel strong economic ties to the West. As such, North Sudan will likely focus on bilateral agreements with Russia and China and regional trade agreements. While this will not represent a significant shift in the status-quo, it will yield important implications for U.S. influence in Sudan and the region. Currently, the hope of increased economic ties with the United States is one of the important levers of influence in the area. If the Sudanese government abandons this prospect, U.S. influence in the region will be greatly diminished.Since 2005, space for political expression and civil society in Sudan has grown tenfold. This is especially true in the north. The state still maintains a robust and impressive domestic security network, but there is a burgeoning sense of freedom and true democratic transformation. It is extremely doubtful that this will be the case post-referendum. Once the North Sudan government unfetters itself from the many promises of the CPA, it is very likely to quickly tighten the noose around political plurality and civil society. This will prove a dramatic, and potentially dangerous, step backwards.President Bashir is facing the very real possibility of losing one-third of his country’s territory and Sudanese Minister of Finance Ali Mahmoud recently stated that the north could lose 70% of its current oil reserve and 50% of its oil revenues if the south secedes. It is not difficult to imagine that, if the south chooses secession, President Bashir will have to do everything in his power to consolidate his control over the new North Sudan. He will have to do this quickly and decisively, lest he be removed from office in the same manner in which he assumed it - through military coup.The question on the minds of US policy-makers now should be one of how to engage with the government in Khartoum after the referendum. As the CPA expires, so too will the many policy incentives that the West has used to ply compliance from the Sudanese government. The options of easing sanctions and removing Sudan from the State-Sponsors of Terrorism list should be closely examined. If Western nations do not begin serious efforts to open ties with Sudan’s government, it will quickly turn away from them and seek economic and diplomatic ties elsewhere. This could dangerously shift the dynamics of an already unstable region and create problems for years to come, as well as end any real chance for Western powers to assist in brokering a peace deal in Darfur.For all the effort and resources that have been put into managing Sudan during the CPA period, it seems worthwhile to strive toward bolstering the potential for future engagement. As repugnant as it may seem to incentivize or reward a country that is governed by a president indicted on war crimes by the International Criminal Court, it may be the soundest course of action. The author of this article wishes to remain anonymous and therefore, has adopted the pseudonym,Kris Khawadja . The author currently works for an NGO that deals with governance and democracy promotion, and resides in Sudan. This image is being used under Creative Commons licensing. The original source can be found here.