Moving Forward: America and Pakistan

In 2003, President Bush authorized a five-year, $3 billion package of military assistance to Pakistan. The following year, the US declared Pakistan a major non-NATO ally, further strengthening bilateral defense ties and giving the Pakistani military access to a range of benefits. But as important as this aspect of US-Pakistani relations is to America’s long-term national security, its importance should not be exaggerated. Even if force of arms alone could defeat Al Qaeda and the Taliban, millions of Pakistanis would still have feelings toward the US that are skeptical at best and hostile at worst, unless the US made a strong effort to change their minds.Although Pakistan has received a great deal of attention from Washington since the terrorist attacks of 2001, this attention has not translated into positive attitudes about the United States among the Pakistani people. A survey by the Pew Global Attitudes Project, released in June 2010, reported that only 17% of Pakistanis polled had a positive opinion of the US; the highest America’s approval rating has been in previous Pew surveys is 27% (in 2006). According to the 2010 poll, 56% of Pakistanis opposed American anti-terror efforts, while 65% wanted to see US troops withdrawn from Afghanistan.Moreover, as The New York Times reported in its coverage of the recent assassination of Salman Taseer, the governor of Punjab province, many young, well-educated professionals, thought by many to be the vanguard of any future drive for liberalization of Pakistani society, are actually very conservative on political and religious matters. This is evident in the scenes of young lawyers, many of whom protested against Pervez Musharraf’s dictatorship in 2007 and 2008, rallying to the defense of Taseer’s murderer, who was motivated to kill by the governor’s desire to reform Pakistan’s anti-blasphemy laws. The ‘moderation’ America puts a premium on may indeed be elusive.But the news is not all bad for America. When asked when they thought suicide bombings could be justified, 80% of Pakistani Muslims surveyed by Pew in 2010 answered “never.” The proportion of Pakistani Muslims who said suicide bombings were “often” or “sometimes” justified was only 8% in 2010, down from 33% in 2002. Meanwhile, 65% of Pakistanis surveyed said they were either “very concerned” or “somewhat concerned” about Islamic extremism in their country. Data like this suggests that if the American military presence in Afghanistan is reduced in the years ahead, and if the US resists the temptation to launch counterterrorist operations on Pakistani soil if and when such urges arise, more and more Pakistanis might think differently about the US.While a sudden, complete withdrawal of US and allied forces from Afghanistan would severely heighten the risk of the Taliban seizing control of all or most of that country, gradual troop withdrawals will make it clear to Afghans and Pakistanis alike that, while the US seeks their cooperation in fighting the Taliban and Al Qaeda, Washington does not and will not take it upon itself to dictate the policies of other countries. Every Pakistani (especially a young, un- or underemployed male) who feels imposed upon by a foreign power is a potential recruit for the jihadist cause. What is more, the fact that most Pakistanis reject violent extremism does not mean they will welcome foreign soldiers on their soil, or drone aircraft in their airspace (which have already inflamed anti-American sentiments), to combat extremists. As counterintuitive as it may seem, President Obama’s plan to “begin to bring our troops home” in July 2011 is consistent with his message to Al Qaeda: "we will defeat you."In October 2009, President Obama signed legislation appropriating $7.5 billion in non-military development assistance to Pakistan over five years. While this funding is a significant step in the direction of a well-rounded US-Pakistani relationship, it is incomplete. The best American strategy in dealing with this deeply troubled country is one that incorporates military, economic and diplomatic measures, all aiming toward the eventual goal of helping Pakistanis make their country a safe and stable place to live, as well as a country that actively and voluntarily helps the West fight back against international jihad.One easy and relatively inexpensive thing the US could and should do to help boost the Pakistani economy is to lift its tariffs on Pakistani textiles. According to a December 2010 article in The Washington Post, US textile tariffs cost Pakistani exporters $315 million in 2009, a significant blow to an economy whose number one export is textiles. The article cited Waqar Masood Khan, head of Pakistan’s Ministry of Textile Industry, as stating that if both American and European tariffs were removed, Pakistani textile exports would likely increase from $10 billion to $13 billion per year.If the US can afford $1.5 billion per year in development aid, surely it can afford a much less costly measure that would increase employment in a country whose stability is a vital US security interest, while simultaneously lowering the cost of clothes and linens for American consumers. American textile producers and their employees will doubtless complain that such a measure would further damage an already injured industry. But there are other ways for the US textile industry to revitalize itself that do not involve hurting a populace whose support the US greatly needs (see, for example, the statements of Representative Sue Myrick, whose district relies heavily on textiles, in favor of trade liberalization in the industry).Most importantly, while it liberalizes economic relations with Islamabad, Washington should also clarify its support for Pakistan’s democratic process. It may be tempting for the US to support a coup d’état by a military strongman who can keep jihadists down by force, much like the Bush administration backed Musharraf as long as he said the right things about fighting terrorism. But this would only increase suspicions, which are encouraged by Islamic fundamentalists that America’s aim in Pakistan is to keep its people down. If any American support for Pakistan is to prove durable, Pakistanis must attribute it to shared interests and the common threat jihadis pose. It cannot be forced upon them by a dictator, a foreign power, or anyone else. This image is being used under Creative Commons licensing. The original source can be found here .