The Case Against an Obama Doctrine

International relations have become too complex to view through any one grand strategy.
The Obama administration has adopted a policy of responding rationally to crises and issues as they arise, taking the time to study and analyze each successive issue in order to appreciate its complexity and uniqueness. This can be seen in the (initially) divergent policies toward Iraq and Afghanistan as well as the differences in responses to Libya and Syria, despite those two conflicts’ seemingly similar circumstances and characteristics. While some in the foreign policy discourse have criticized President Obama for his lack of a grand strategy, this betrays an accurate depiction of the reality of the current international system.There was a time when presidential doctrine determined the direction of American foreign policy. Beginning in 1823 with the Monroe Doctrine—which warned European powers not to meddle in the Western Hemisphere—presidential doctrines represented the core values and principles leaders used to formulate policy. Presidential doctrine not only served as the guiding light for long-term strategies, but also framed responses to urgent crises. Examples of this mechanism can be found in the policies of Monroe’s successors, such as Teddy Roosevelt’s adoption of gunboat diplomacy. With only several fleeting intermittencies, the powerful influence of presidential doctrine persisted through the twentieth century.As the Monroe doctrine waned in relevance, new conflicts arose that spurred the creation of new doctrines. Most significant among these was the Truman Doctrine, the formalized policy of Communist containment that became the lens through which all U.S. foreign policy and strategies were viewed during the Cold War. Ensuing presidential doctrines, from Eisenhower’s to Carter’s, all harkened back to Truman. Foreign policy during this period cannot be properly examined without considering the overwhelming influence of presidential doctrine.The Powell Doctrine, named for Secretary of State Colin Powell and which set forth criteria for military intervention, signaled a shift in the significance of executive doctrine and the utility of its invocation. The Doctrine, while a very influential strategy, was largely limited to one event: the first Gulf War. The Clinton administration that followed never seemed to definitively develop its own doctrine, as the former Arkansas governor centered his agenda on domestic priorities and dealt with foreign policy on a more case-by-case, ad hoc basis. The George W. Bush administration returned the emphasis to doctrine, but in doing so initiated a period in which scholars began to vigorously debate the defining features and qualities of such grand strategies. Bush’s Doctrine has alternatively been described as supporting the use of unilateral preemptive force or democratic state-building; some have asserted that he had upwards of six individual doctrines. Today, members of academia and journalists alike try to identify what the current Obama Doctrine is or whether one exists at all.While these debates have produced a valuable and entertaining discourse on foreign policy, they fail to recognize the withered influence of grand strategy. As the international structure shifted from multi-polar, great-power balancing to the bipolar world of the Cold War, presidential doctrines were representative of the periods out of which they grew. Just as scholars struggle to classify the current international structure, with theories ranging from unipolarity to vague post-modern pyramid structures, presidents find it increasingly challenging to develop and apply a broad, all-encompassing foreign policy.Given the nature of modern international crises and the diversity of influential actors on the global stage, it is only logical that such grand strategies are difficult to identify and define. The rapid and constant proliferation of wide-ranging and complex issues translates to a more improvised policymaking process. This reality has created a scenario in which administrations will only be able to form micro-grand strategies, as we have seen with the reallocation of American foreign interests to the Asian Pacific region. These micro-grand strategies will not be the driving force of policy formulation, but rather represent calculated initiatives aimed at supporting long-term security and stability goals that are not created under the duress of a particular crisis or in response to a pressing issue.Let us end the debate over whether President Obama has a grand foreign policy strategy. Given the reality of the current international structure, the careful crafting and application of a grand doctrine would not be a true reflection of international trends and would do little to further American interests abroad.

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