The Four Axes of the East: Russia, China, Syria, and Iran

As the violence in Syria continues to escalate, Russia and China remained focused on their strategic, long-term interests.
As the crisis in Syria deepens, world powers become more divided over how to respond. The death toll, according to the United Nations, has exceeded 10,000. In an unprecedented move, the Arab League called for the UN Security Council to end the violence in Syria. However, the UN Security Council resolution embracing the Arab League’s proposal on Syria was vetoed by Russia and China. Considering the Syrian regime’s atrocities, the West alongside the Arab League are pondering the reasons behind Beijing and Moscow’s reluctance vis-à-vis a change in Syria’s political structure.It is widely argued that Russian and Chinese economic and strategic interests embedded in the survival of the Assad’s regime have outweighed their humanitarian concerns. The Russian naval base in Syria—the only Mediterranean access available to the Russian navy—has intertwined Russia’s strategic interests with the current political establishment in Syria. Russia has a permanent Middle East military base in Tartus, the second largest port in Syria. In addition, Syria is considered an arms client for Russia, which has been purchasing arms from Russia for decades. On the Chinese side, Syria is considered a trading hub in which China has invested considerably.The factors behind the Chinese and Russian unwavering support for the Syrian regime, however, go beyond these common perceptions. Although Syria has bought arms from Russia for the last few decades it has not been a perfect client as it has struggled to make payments. On the other hand, from the Chinese perspective, Syria is not a key trading partner in the region compared to Arab states in the Persian Gulf. It is noteworthy that Syria is not rich in natural resources such as oil and gas in a region which is considered the world’s energy hub.Taken all into account, the above causes oversimplify the Chinese and Russian stances in the Syrian crisis. In fact, Syria’s relations with China and Russia are far more complex and are influenced by broader regional forces—particularly as they relate to Iran. The Iranian dimension of their relationship, however, has gone fairly unnoticed by the media. China and Russia are very concerned by the linkage between the Syrian crisis and the future of Iran in the region. Although Syria lacks abundant natural resources, its strategic location is of great significance; Syria is considered a lynchpin in many relationships in the Middle East e.g. Iran-Arab relations, intra-Arab relations, and most importantly, Iranian relations with Hezbollah and Hamas. Any change in the political structure of the Syrian regime would have resounding implications for all the above relationships especially those in connection with Iran’s role in the region.Losing Syria would be detrimental for Iran on several levels. The potential loss of Syria as an ally would cost Iran its most important regional proxy and would severely disrupt all the pieces on Iran’s strategic board – namely, Hezbollah and Hamas – as well as decrease its regional and international geopolitical leverage. Since 1979, Syria has served as a platform from which Iran has built formidable influence over the Arab-Israeli conflict. Iran’s alliance with Syria gave Iran the opportunity to establish Hezbollah, the powerful Shi’a movement in Lebanon, as well as to support the Sunni Palestinian movement, Hamas. The establishment of these proxy groups throughout the Levant has allowed Iran to strengthen and preserve its regional influence, as well as to maintain a strong posture internally.Iran seems to have benefited from the Arab revolts and regime changes in the MENA region for the first time since the immediate aftermath of the 1979 Revolution. It is already enjoying a better relationship with Egypt, gaining access to the Suez Canal for its warships, and moving closer to an ambassador exchange. But losing Syria would be a political nightmare for Iran.Should Syria go through regime change, it is unlikely that the new regime would be supportive of the Iranian government to the extent that the current regime supports the Islamic Republic. Undoubtedly, a democratic Syria with a Sunni majority (approximately 75% of the Syrian population) would be more sympathetic to the Arab world rather than Iran. More significantly, all opposition groups have already warned the Islamic Republic of its cordial relations with the Assad’s regime and asserted that the new Syria would view the Iranian government differently. This would tremendously shift the regional balance of power against Iran and further isolate the Islamic Republic in the region.Such developments, together with increasing international isolation and domestic pressure, would alter Iran’s regional role and even place the Iranian regime on the brink of collapse. The Chinese and Russians, well aware of the disastrous repercussions the removal of Assad would bring for Iran, are determined to keep the current Syrian government from downfall given their key interests in the survival of the Iranian regime. Indeed, China and Russia’s prominent geopolitical and strategic interests in Iran are undisputable. Thus, it would not be inaccurate to argue that Chinese and Russian long-term objectives in the region have outweighed their other considerations. In short, their support for the Assad’s regime is rooted in their intertwined interests with the survival of the current regime in Iran.

Photo courtesy of FreedomHouse2 via Flickr.