Thou Shalt Not Fear a Nuclear Iran: Eliminating the Nuclear Finish Line

Recognizing the United States’ ability to militarily confront and defeat a (hypothetical) nuclear-armed Iran can help deter the acquisition of nuclear weapons and lead to a diplomatic solution.
High-ranking officials in both the Israeli and U.S. governments have advocated attacking Iran preemptively “before it’s too late.” This assumes there is a point at which Iran is no longer attackable and must be contained—a policy the Obama administration refuses to accept. The Iran puzzle has been framed so that containment and preemption are the extreme ends of the policy spectrum with diplomatic negotiations in between. However, containment isn’t the only option. The United States can attack a nuclear Iran.A nuclear Iran is not ideal, but the Western fear of it becoming “too late” overestimates and distorts deterrence. A nuclear deterrent did not prevent a joint Egyptian-Syrian invasion of Israel in the Yom Kippur War in 1973, and it has not prevented small-scale conflicts between Pakistan and India. Furthermore, Pakistan’s nuclear arsenal has not prevented the United States from projecting power into the country, despite Pakistani protests, through the use of drones and special operations.The idea of “too late” signals to Iran that there is a nuclear finish line where it becomes immune to military action. The current structure of threatening to punish Iran militarily for trying, yet rewarding it for succeeding is not only silly—it’s dangerous. It signals to Iran and other potential rogue proliferators that the United States is deterrable by crude, non-survivable nuclear arsenals (such as North Korea’s). It shows a lack of confidence in U.S. ability to project power in nascent nuclear-armed states, wage limited wars without allowing them to escalate beyond a nuclear threshold, and carry out a disarming first strike (missions for which the United States is well-equipped).A primitive, non-survivable nuclear arsenal should not make the United States or Israel tremble, considering their robust survivable deterrents and advanced conventional capabilities. A nuclear Iran is not comparable to the Soviet Union. The United States was forced to contain the Soviet Union because it was a power-projecting super-state with a survivable thermonuclear arsenal. Iran is unlikely to reach this level of sophistication, so there is no reason to bestow upon it all the benefits of deterrence from the mere acquisition of crude nuclear weapons.In addition, the assumption that a nuclear Iran would take a more aggressive, threatening approach toward its neighbors is not based on evidence. Historically, nuclear posturing has shown little success. After World War II the United States was the world’s premier superpower, held a 4-year nuclear monopoly, and had even used nuclear weapons in war, yet was unable to enforce its will on the Soviet Union. Despite Truman’s subtle nuclear threats and hard-line policy toward the Soviets, the Kremlin expanded its influence into Eastern Europe, initiated the Berlin Blockade, and developed the bomb. As Secretary of State Byrnes later lamented, “The Russians don’t scare easy, I think we’ve milked these babies [nuclear weapons] for all they’re worth, time to make a compromise” (Ron Suny, The Soviet Experiment Oxford University Press 1998, pg. 346).Recognizing the United States’ ability to successfully wage war with a (potentially) future nuclear Iran eliminates the need to constantly make empty, counter-productive threats of preemptive military action. Robert Jervis asserts that American usage of threats and coercive diplomacy has a history of poor results in Panama, Iraq, Serbia, and Afghanistan. Threats have not worked with Iran and U.S. credibility is already in decline, as the regime knows that American public opinion is against another Middle East conflict. Since Tehran has taken no definitive step toward producing a nuclear weapon, ceasing threatening American rhetoric toward Iran will help build confidence, increase transparency, reduce tensions, and possibly facilitate a positive nuclear agreement.Instead of threats, the United States should cautiously, but firmly, express to Tehran the futility of nuclear weapons—it will gain from them neither security, nor prestige, nor concessions from neighbors. Iran must know that not even a crude nuclear arsenal can protect it from American power, not as a threat but a fact. It would also be the best way to prevent the feared nuclear cascade in the Middle East because U.S. allies would be assured that not only do they have positive security guarantees, but that the United States would still maintain the credibility to deter and defeat a nuclear Iran with a crippling first strike through conventional means.By fearing primitive nuclear arsenals (both real and theoretical), the United States is empowering rogue regimes and adding great value to the acquisition of weapons that deserve no such awe, thereby making the prospect of global disarmament even more unlikely. A clear message that such arsenals will not deter the United States would send a powerful signal of resolve and confidence to nuclear rogues and therefore help to impede the acquisition of nuclear weapons.

Photo courtesy of amphalo via Flickr.