Iran Proliferation Triggering a Nuclear Domino Effect in the Middle East: An Unrealistic Scenario

Despite warnings that Iranian acquisition of a nuclear weapon will lead to an arms race in the Middle East, in reality, regional proliferation is highly unlikely.
President Obama has stated that Iranian acquisition of a nuclear weapon will spark an arms race in the Middle East. This view is a status quo dogma among policymakers of both the Republican and Democratic parties, and dissenting views are generally ignored. Ari Shavit of Haaretz identifies the most at-risk states as Egypt, Saudi Arabia, and Turkey. However, a nuclear arms race in the Middle East in response to an Iranian weapon is highly unlikely. For those countries most likely to proliferate, the political and financial costs are too high. The nuclear domino scenario has been an accepted doctrine since 1962 when President Kennedy warned that by the 1970s there would be around 25 nuclear weapon states. Yet, today there are only nine.According to a recent Center for a New American Security (CNAS) report, “Cairo does not see Iran’s nuclear ambitions as an existential threat.” Egypt’s true enemy is Israel, which has defeated Egypt in four consecutive wars. If Egypt did not pursue a nuclear option to deter its nuclear-armed enemy Israel, then it will not do so against Iran. Egypt simply does not have the financial resources, nuclear infrastructure, or motive to build a successful clandestine nuclear program, as its facilities are under IAEA safeguards. As a signatory of the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT), Egypt has remained committed to non-proliferation since the Treaty’s inception and would be unlikely to withdraw.Even if Egypt had the capability and intention to pursue nuclear weapons, its security would not be enhanced. An attempted breakout would likely be destroyed in a preemptive strike by Israel, which has proven the credibility of this threat twice by destroying the Osirak reactor in Iraq in 1981 and the Al Kibar reactor in Syria in 2007. Unlike Iran, Egypt does not have long distances, deep reactors, and strong air defenses to protect itself from Israeli preemption.Iran poses the largest threat to Saudi Arabia and, as such, the Kingdom would have the strongest security motive to pursue a deterrent. Riyadh has called on a Nuclear Weapon Free Zone (NWFZ) in the Middle East, yet has repeatedly warned that an Iranian nuclear weapon may compel it to follow suit. This is not credible and is likely an attempt to pressure the United States to take greater action against Tehran. According to Philipp Bleek of the Monterey Institute, “states whose rivals pursue or acquire nuclear weapons are much likely to themselves explore a nuclear weapons option…but are no more (or less) likely to pursue or acquire nuclear weapons” ("Why do states proliferate?," Forecasting Nuclear Proliferation in the 21st Century: Volume 1 The Role of Theory). Nasser of Egypt made a similar threat in response to Israel’s nuclear program and explored Egypt’s nuclear possibilities, but in 1968 chose to sign the NPT instead.Saudi Arabia has virtually no domestic nuclear infrastructure, resources, or knowledge base to conduct a “crash” program. It is also an NPT state and has many U.S. military and foreign investors on its territory, making it difficult to support such a program. Its only option would be to purchase a nuclear weapon from Pakistan. However, Islamabad is unlikely to spare any weapons, as they are needed to deter India. Additionally, selling a nuclear weapon would bring world condemnation on Pakistan and leave it a pariah state surrounded by nuclear enemies. Riyadh would risk losing the support of the United States if it were to attempt to pursue a deterrent, leaving it open to an Israeli strike. Instead, Saudi Arabia will likely rely on its preferred weapons of “cash and diplomacy,” finding the U.S. nuclear umbrella a “more attractive offer.”Turkey is a NATO member with around 70 tactical nuclear weapons on its soil and is protected by the U.S. nuclear umbrella. An indigenous nuclear program would forfeit this position. Etel Solingen (“Domestic Models of Political Survival," Forecasting Nuclear Proliferation in the 21st Century: Volume 1 The Role of Theory) asserts that states with integrated economies face greater costs to proliferating and are therefore less likely to do so.There is too much at stake for these nations to develop nuclear weapons, as they each stand to suffer great financial and political losses and will ultimately be less secure because of it. The United States has far greater influence over these nations than it does over Iran. Washington should keep the pressure on Tehran to adhere to IAEA safeguards. However, alarmist rhetoric of a Middle East arms race is unjustified and not conducive to reaching an agreeable diplomatic settlement with Iran.

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