The Threat of Nuclear Proliferation: A response to “Thou Shalt Not Fear a Nuclear Iran”

Jennifer Caylas responds to a previous IAR article arguing a nuclear Iran should not threaten the U.S.
In the January 28th issue of this newsletter this year, contributor Tim Miklos touched upon the real issue of whether or not a nuclear Iran would pose a threat to the international community (“Thou Shalt Not Fear a Nuclear Iran”). That issue is, into what type of adversary would the possession of nuclear weapons transform Iran? A common fear is that if Iran crosses the “red line” and develops nuclear capabilities it will be too late to take military action against Iran. Historic evidence, however, suggests that this would not be the case. The “red line” of nuclear development is not as definitive as recent administrations assert, and has actually been crossed several times over the past few decades.Deterrence theory asserts that the mere possession of a nuclear arsenal protects a state by deterring would-be aggressors. One has only to look at the recent history of Russia, India, Pakistan, and Israel to see that this is not quite accurate. What nuclear arsenals do successfully deter is nuclear attack in general, and the potential of global nuclear war. Nuclear weapons did not deter Chechnya from waging a guerrilla war against the Russian Federation, or Tibet from defying China. They have not deterred conventional attacks on Israel by Hamas, Egypt, or Syria – despite Israel’s conventional attack on Syria’s nuclear facilities. Nor have they deterred attacks on Indian, Pakistani, or U.S. forces (or allies) in proxy wars in Afghanistan or Kashmir.A nuclear arsenal grants a state a stronger image of sovereignty in the eyes of the international community, not due to a new capacity to defend itself, but to the security threat any new nuclear power poses as a potential proliferator.Ironically, what is most threatening about a nuclear Iran is not the military threat it would pose to its neighbors, nor a domino effect it might have on other Middle Eastern states’ nuclear efforts.A nuclear Iran presents expanded potential for proliferation – overt, covert, and unintentional. First, while latent and “second-tier” nuclear proliferation is already a problem without Iran’s contribution, its participation in the nuclear black market thus far indicates it would most likely follow Pakistan’s example, should it become a primary source. Second, a proliferation threat posed by the emergence of any new nuclear power is the possibility that such a state could follow a path similar to that of the Soviet Union – that being the fall of the regime and the destabilization of its internal security and infrastructure.After the fall of the Soviet Union, its former territory became a haven for black market activity, including the illicit sale and trafficking of nuclear materials, to unknown and unaccountable recipients. The economic and political chaos of the 1990s particularly impacted Russia’s “nuclear cities,” which thrived on the nuclear facilities around which they were built. In other words, the potential threat posed by a new nuclear power is not so much the mere possession of its arsenal, but the stability (or lack thereof) of its regime and security infrastructure, and to what extent it can remain accountable for its nuclear technology.Having a nuclear arsenal makes the stability and integrity of a state more important to the international community, precisely because of the potential threat its disintegration would pose. Since 1991, the United States and the International Atomic Energy Association (along with several non-governmental organizations) have worked to establish greater control and oversight of Russia’s nuclear arsenal and facilities, with incomplete and inconsistent success. In part this is due to the limitations posed by sovereignty – Russia is deeply suspicious of foreign intervention within its territory and unlikely to voluntarily halt a defense program it sees as invaluable to its national security. Likewise, Pakistan refused to take direct action against A.Q. Khan, when his network was exposed in 2004, for the same reasons. The threat posed by each of these states is not that they might use their arsenals, but that they do not have complete control over them.Last year, Soviet and Russian scholar Kenneth Waltz argued that Iran should be given the bomb, in addition to other powers wishing to acquire it, as such a possession would place all states on common ground and reduce tensions by essentially transforming nuclear weapons into a more “conventional” weapon (“Why Iran Should Get the Bomb”). While wanton proliferation of nuclear technology cannot conceivably improve global nuclear security, the degree of proliferation that currently exists in the world validates the argument that quantity has become irrelevant – what now matters is the accountability of such weapons and of the means to make them.In the post-Soviet world the rules of the nuclear game have irrevocably changed – deterrence no longer applies, and with technology, communication, and transportation advances prohibition has only driven proliferation underground. Therefore, the international community, starting with the United States, should change the game. More accessible and, importantly, regulated proliferation might be more effective at bringing rogue states in line than demonizing and sanctioning them.

Photo courtesy of kamshots courtesy of Flickr.