Golan or Go Home: The nearing permanency of the Golan Heights

Ongoing conflict in Syria is cementing the fate of the Golan Heights.
A recent UNHCR count puts the total number of Syrian refugees at just over 2 million since the outbreak of the Syrian conflict in 2011. Hundreds of thousands of refugees have fled to crowded refugee camps in neighboring Lebanon, Jordan, Turkey, and Iraq to escape the violence. Yet while all this displacement is happening, the contested border region between Israel proper and Syria – the Golan Heights – has remained largely silent.
This disputed territory, administered by Israel since the 1967 Six-Day War yet considered by much of the international community to be occupied Syrian land, is nearing a fate of political permanency akin to the current status quo of Israeli control. This is because the Syrian civil war delegitimizes Syria’s de facto claim to the Golan in two ways. The longer the fighting continues, the less the Assad regime can claim a monopoly of violence over its current borders, much less the Golan. Second, a prolonged, adjacent conflict reinforces Israel’s mantra of the necessity for an extended territorial buffer zone to protect its civilians. In other words, Israel is gaining a stronger hand in the Golan Heights dispute every day Syria remains in turmoil, ultimately ensuring the land becomes a permanent part of the state of Israel.
Though Israel ceded 5% of the Golan to Syria after the 1973 Yom Kippur War and allowed UN peacekeepers to demilitarize a 200-meter-wide no man’s land separating the two sides, it has since created an apparatus of control and sovereignty to combat Syria's claim to the land. In 1981, the Knesset – the legislative branch of the Israeli government – passed the Golan Heights Law, which extended Israeli law and jurisdiction – de facto annexation – over the territory. More than 20,000 settlers (and growing) now live in dozens of settlements scattered across the plateau. Likewise, lucrative agriculture and valuable water resources exist alongside the Israeli Defense Forces' Northern Command outposts. In all but an international legal sense, the Golan Heights is part of Israel.
For Syria, the window of opportunity to regain the territory is quickly closing. In the past, Israeli leaders have tentatively supported withdrawal from the Golan in exchange for peace and diplomatic recognition of Israel. Negotiations in 1999-2000 between Israeli Prime Minister Ehud Barak and Syrian Foreign Minister Farouk Sharaa showed promise for a breakthrough, except for a fundamental disagreement over whether the withdrawal would be along the pre-1948 or 1967 borders (the latter giving Syria access to the Sea of Galilee).
Since the breakdown of the 2000 meetings, negotiations have been sporadic and cryptic. Ehud Olmert supposedly had secret communications with President Assad in 2007 to discuss Israeli withdrawal. Benjamin Netanyahu also held secret negotiations with Assad as late as 2010, but any prospects for a negotiated settlement were cut short with the Arab Spring uprisings in early 2011. Publicly, however, Netanyahu has rejected any notion of an Israeli withdrawal, citing security concerns.
While a negotiated settlement to return the Golan Heights to Syria would be a popular move for Assad, it is unlikely Israel would negotiate with Syria as long as the conflict continues. This possibility is also muddled by the intransigent Israeli demand that Assad cut ties with Iran and Lebanon’s Hezbollah, something he cannot afford to do because of the central role Shia fighters play in assisting pro-regime forces. Consequently, if Assad ultimately defeats the opposition forces and regains control of the country, Israel would still not negotiate with Assad because he will need Iranian assistance in the aftermath of the war. Meanwhile, his political authority will remain illegitimate and unrecognized in the eyes of crucial Western allies that Israel would not risk upsetting over the Golan.
If opposition forces prevail, Israel will not be inclined to negotiate with a future Syrian government. First, the blatant presence of extreme elements among the opposition coalition raises a red flag among Israel’s security community.
Negotiating with a government that may include extremist Sunni groups is a definite non-starter for Netanyahu or any Israeli prime minister. Second, a fledgling post-authoritarian state will naturally witness instability reminiscent of Libya and Egypt, a situation that would keep Israel’s defensive posture on alert. Third, a new government comprised mostly of irregular militia forces will have very limited capabilities to credibly promise and deliver sufficient security guarantees in the Golan on par with Israel’s expectations.
The only feasible situation in which Israel would discuss the Golan Heights with Syria is the potential emergence of a moderate, pro-West, post-Assad government, legitimately elected, devoid of religious fanaticism, and able to properly secure the territory. However, given Assad’s upper hand in the conflict and contentious infighting among the opposition, this scenario is unlikely to happen. Going forward, Israel has no immediate incentive to discuss withdrawal from the Golan Heights; and the longer the civil war continues, the more likely Israel is to hold onto the land for the foreseeable future.

Photo courtesy of Magnus via Flickr.