Trust Is Key To Cooperation With Iran: A Response to "Why Rouhani’s 'Charm-Offensive' Should Not Be Trusted"

An alternative analysis of Lowry’s arguments leads to a much more optimistic view of the current dialogue between Iran and the P5+1 (the five permanent U.N Security Council members and Germany).
In “Why Rouhani’s ‘Charm-Offensive’ Should Not Be Trusted” (International Affairs Review, October 14, 2013), Jennifer Lowry casts doubt on the will of Iranian president Hassan Rouhani to cooperate on his country's nuclear program. She acknowledges that Rouhani’s participation in the United Nations General Assembly and his phone call to U.S. President Barack Obama in September 2013 demonstrated major diplomatic progress. But she fears such progress to be, “nothing more than words.” However, an alternative analysis of Lowry’s arguments leads to a much more optimistic view of the current dialogue between Iran and the P5+1 (the five permanent U.N Security Council members and Germany). Three of her assertions warrant particular scrutiny.First, Lowry contends that “if [Rouhani] cooperates too much with the United States, there is a chance of another revolution in his country.” Assessing Iranian public opinion on the nuclear program and economic sanctions remains difficult. Yet the victory of Rouhani, the only moderate candidate in the June 2013 presidential election, offers strong evidence that the public favors diplomacy over conflict. Polls suggest that although the nuclear program does have significant support in Iran, that support is decreasing. While 87 percent of surveyed Iranians backed a civilian nuclear program in 2010, this number dropped to 56 percent in 2013, indicating more Iranians now consider the costs of extremely harsh economic sanctions to outweigh the benefits of national pride and independence. Second, the proportion of Iranians surveyed supporting the development of nuclear weapons fell from 40 percent in 2012 to 34 percent in 2013. Even more striking, 58 percent of Iranians claim to be somewhat or very hopeful that the EU and Iran will reach an agreement. Overall, these numbers do not add up to revolution.Lowry continues: “[W]hen asked of specifics of how Iran will cooperate, [Rouhani] either avoids the question or insists, once again, that Iran has a right to develop peaceful nuclear energy under the Non Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons Treaty.” In fact, during negotiations last month, Western diplomats recognized Iranian efforts to hold detailed discussions on how to end the crisis. That Rouhani did not immediately provide his Western counterparts with specifics is highly understandable given his operating environment. He was the top nuclear negotiator when Iran suspended its nuclear program between 2003-2005 and the West failed to give then-President Mohammad Khatami any reward. Today, he is careful not to give the United States and European Union too much for nothing. Critically, while Iran can quickly stop its nuclear activities, U.S. congressional approval to lift sanctions will prove difficult, as U.S. lawmakers want to increase pressure on the regime. With such problems, the original question can easily be inverted: Why should American promises of cooperation be trusted?Lowry argues: “Khamenei steadfastly refused to allow United Nations oversight of the nuclear program, and stated that the U.S. could not stop Iran if it wished to obtain nuclear weapons.” Yet in the same speech, Khamenei also stressed that Iranians consider nuclear weapons to be a crime against humanity and that Iran had no intention of producing them. Washington cannot blindly trust this claim. But can the Obama administration arbitrarily decide that threatening Iranian declarations are always true and reassuring statements always false? Such a stance leaves little chance for cooperation. Khamenei’s attitude is historically consistent with Iranian rhetoric toward the West. A sudden change in tone could prove domestically risky, since the Ayatollah is an anchor of the Iran's internal stability. Moreover, on other occasions Khamenei has said Iran would negotiate if the U.S. showed respect instead of dictating its own conditions. Iranian politics are more complex than dramatic, hard-line statements taken out of context.Three reasons support an optimistic view of Iranian readiness to cooperate on its nuclear program. First, Rouhani may enjoy more public support than previously thought. Second, tangible results rely on Western assurance that sanctions will be lifted if Iran cooperates. Lastly, Khamenei’s opposition to negotiations may be mostly rhetorical to reaffirm his symbolic resistance to the West. The U.S. and EU must continue trusting Rouhani’s charm offensive in order to secure a mutually beneficial agreement. Missing this opportunity would jeopardize Iran’s willingness to cooperate for years to come, trigger public support for the regime’s hardliners, and increase nuclear activity — possibly to the point of no return.

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