Russia’s Flawed Support for Assad

The turmoil which the Islamic State, formerly the Islamic State of Iraq and al-Sham (ISIS), is causing in Iraq would not be possible without the civil war in Syria. Syria’s civil war gave ISIS a proving ground for radicalized militants and a launching pad to run roughshod over Iraq. Among the world’s great powers, Russia abetted these events by prolonging the war in Syria through its support for Bashar al-Assad.Analysts and pundits commonly give three reasons for Russia’s support for Assad: the military base at Tartus, Russia’s aversion to intervention and regime change, and Russian arms sales to the regime. However, these reasons neglect the long-term goals Russia should have for itself in Syria and the region. Russia should recognize that its long-term interests lie with a stable, post-Assad Syria, and should discontinue its support for the Assad regime in order to achieve those interests.Flawed reason #1: Tartus, Russia’s only foreign military base outside the former Soviet UnionAnalysts have argued that since Russia’s naval base at Tartus is the country’s only base on the Mediterranean, it is therefore strategically important. If the naval base at Tartus were as strategic as these commentators claim, why doesn’t Russia treat it as such? Why did Russia remove all personnel from the base in June 2013, and why haven’t any of its Mediterranean fleet’s 16 ships called into port recently? One would think that Russia’s only Mediterranean naval base would be better protected in a war zone, as Russia has demonstrated its willingness to do with its other naval bases, such as Sevastopol Naval Base in Crimea. Either Russia does not value Tartus as much as commentators believe or it believes that supporting Assad ensures the base’s security.If the latter is the case, then supporting the Assad regime is the wrong approach if Russia wishes to maintain its foothold in the Mediterranean. If Assad is ousted, any new regime will remember the Russian support for the former regime and will therefore be unlikely to support a continued Russian presence in Tartus. This story has played out before. During Libya’s civil war, Germany, Libya’s second-largest trading partner, withheld support for the intervention against Gadhafi. German companies suffered when Gadhafi was overthrown, and the new regime refused to deal with them. In Syria, such a scenario becomes more likely if the post-Assad regime includes Islamist groups like the Islamic State or Al-Qaeda affiliate Jabhat al-Nusra. Even if Assad stays in power, a sustained Islamic insurgency would put Tartus under constant threat of attack.Flawed reason #2: Russia’s aversion to intervention and regime changeRussia sorely remembers its abstention from the vote on UN Security Council Resolution 1973, which permitted NATO's intervention in Libya in 2011. Moscow remembers how NATO expanded that mission by broadening its mandate from protecting civilians to supporting anti-Gadhafi rebels. Russia regarded this as gross overreach and regime change. Hence, Russia avoids taking any steps that would legitimize a regime change that has the potential to undermine the current Russian regime. Its rulers frequently claim that sovereignty over domestic affairs is paramount to preserve world order.However cynically, Russia can overlook its aversion to intervention when its interests are threatened, as its actions in Ukraine demonstrate. Russian support for Assad has as of yet only resulted in a stalemate, which allows Islamists to grow stronger in the vacuum of any order in Syria. A failed state harboring Islamic extremists who could export their ideology and violence to Russia’s volatile Caucasus region is not in Russia’s best interests. To prevent this, Russia should help broker peace in Syria while maintaining a hardline against any military intervention.Flawed reason #3: Russia’s lucrative arms sales to AssadWith the end of Gadhafi in Libya, Russia lost $4 billion in weapons-sales contracts. The Stockholm International Peace Research Institute estimates that Russia sells hundreds of millions of dollars in arms sales to Assad and is unwilling to see this valuable revenue lost. However, while the Russian defense industry might need the money, it does not need to come from selling weapons to Syria.Reuters claimed that after having sold more than $1 billion in heavy weaponry to Assad, “Putin and other officials said [Russia] was no longer delivering offensive weapons” to Syria. Russia should go further and halt all weapons sales to the Assad regime. Russian defense firms can offset losses by shifting sales to Asian states skeptical of China’s peaceful rise. Vietnam and India are already among Russia's biggest arms buyers. Shifting arms sales to other regions would help starve Assad of arms and prevent Russian weapons from ending up in the hands of Islamic extremists, all while preserving revenues.Russia’s long-term interests lie with a stable Syria where Syrians can express themselves through the ballot box instead of through the muzzle of a gun. Assad’s Russian support has kept him hanging on, a state of affairs that provides fertile ground for Islamists like ISIS to grow and wreak havoc. If the Russian government truly thought through its Syria policy, it would realize that the longer Assad remains in power, the more a destabilized Syria will threaten Russia’s long-term interests.