Why the U.S. Must Fight an Information War Against ISIL

President Barack Obama’s announcement on the formation of an international coalition to combat the Islamic State elicited a range of responses throughout the Arab world. His administration has received the enthusiastic support of U.S. allies across the Middle East, including the Arab League. Yet the Obama administration still struggles to win over public opinion, even in the region’s most cooperative states.The United States’ ubiquitous unpopularity in the Middle East has clearly become a State Department priority. Secretary of State John Kerry said that “drying up this pool of [potential] jihadis” is “probably far more important than the military [component].” Undersecretary of State for Public Diplomacy and Public Affairs Rick Stengel said, “the countries in the coalition against ISIL understand that it is not only a kinetic battlefield, but an informational one.” Yet simply understanding is not enough. The anti-Islamic State coalition partners must become major players on that informational battlefield. In line with President Obama’s desire for allies to contribute their fair share to the United States-led military effort, the Obama administration needs a comprehensive strategy to prevent free riding in the public relations war. That strategy must address two major problems: (1) the appeal of the Islamic State, and (2) the perceived lack of a grand strategy justifying the coalition’s intervention.First, the Islamic State must be shown to be a non-alternative for those who seek a more pure form of Islam, or those who are generally disaffected with Western influence. The United States has already launched information campaigns denouncing the Islamic State’s abuse of women and its violations of the true teachings of Islam. Russia and Iran oppose military action by the United States-led coalition without the cooperation of the Syrian regime that they both support; these countries have massive propaganda networks working to delegitimize American public diplomacy efforts. The new media-savvy misinformation machine of the Islamic State itself adds to the threat. Negative campaigning is critical to dissuading potential Islamic State sympathizers against joining the cause, and the United States should not bear that burden alone.Although strong condemnations of the extremist group have come out of Saudi Arabia’s leadership in particular, regional partners should be more fully integrated into a broader attack strategy whereby they can produce and disseminate important media content in local languages to local audiences. Major universities, prominent religious leaders, and news networks should be provided incentives by their host governments to participate in these efforts and counter the spread of peer-to-peer Islamic State promotional media.Second, the importance of a well-articulated comprehensive strategy to fight global terrorism cannot be understated. As Stengel said, “our job isn’t to make people like us, or to persuade people that we’re right. It’s to tell people what our policies are, it’s to explain why we have come up with these policies, and then engage in a conversation.” The “why” of Washington’s policies in the region poses the most salient challenge today. The United States has long been criticized for its failure to articulate how the anti-Islamic State coalition fits into a long-term plan for eradicating or minimizing the threat of violent extremism. In this mission, the United States’ Western allies in particular can provide much-needed support and fortify the coalition with greater international legitimacy.Many critics of the current approach toward countering violent extremism believe that a long-term plan must include solutions to the conflicts in Syria and Palestine. Additionally, they believe that economic reforms should be implemented to meet the needs of the unemployed and marginalized young men most susceptible to recruitment by terrorist groups. These arguments fail to acknowledge what a benefit the coalition could provide for resolving those long-term issues.In Syria, coalition successes in military engagement and public diplomacy would remove the biggest barrier to Western support of moderate Syrian rebel forces: fear that aid will wind up in the hands of violent extremists. The altered dynamic and threat of increasing Western involvement would dramatically increase the pressure on all parties to return to the negotiating table. Israel, on the other hand, is eager to assist the coalition against the Islamic State as it struggles with its own public image after the Gaza war. Further, Israel seeks to expand ties with the Arab states that are facing a common enemy. If Israel is permitted to make significant contributions to the coalition’s military effort, it will have a powerful incentive to revive peace talks with Palestine and consolidate counter-terrorism security gains.Lastly, a decisive anti-Islamic State coalition victory would help relieve some of the region’s economic burdens. These include the refugee crisis, the restrictions on access to humanitarian aid, the systematic piracy of local oil resources, and rampant extortion by the Islamic State in its areas of control. It will take time to mobilize the coalition’s military components, but that military effort will be doomed from the start if the U.S. cannot make meaningful progress to improve its image in the Middle East.