Why Beijing Needs Universal Suffrage in Hong Kong

Over the past two weeks, Hong Kong witnessed the largest protests since its handover from Britain to the People’s Republic of China in 1997. Thousands of pro-democracy protesters packed the streets, sitting, chanting, and singing songs while listening to speeches from protest leaders. Peaceful protesters wore masks and held umbrellas as riot police used pepper spray, tear gas, and batons; mobile-phone users flocked to off-grid chat applications amid fears of an Internet shutdown. “It’s quite possible that at least more than 100,000, if not up to 300,000, 400,000 people will join in the protest in a show of people’s power,” said Willy Lam, adjunct professor at the Chinese University of Hong Kong.These events showed Hong Kong’s demand for true universal suffrage rather than the limited system proposed by the Standing Committee of the National People’s Congress in August. Previously, Hong Kong’s chief executive—the leader of the Hong Kong government—was nominated by an election committee comprised of 800 to 1,200 members, mostly from the conservative business class trusted by Beijing.On August 31, 2014, Beijing announced that citizens in Hong Kong could vote in the chief executive election of 2017, but a nominating committee, modeled on the old election committee, would pre-select the candidates on the ballot. Voters will have a choice under this plan, but many predict the choice will be among two or three like-minded pro-Beijing candidates.Under Deng Xiaoping’s principle of “one country, two systems,” the Sino-British Joint Declaration of 1984 stipulated that Hong Kong was to enjoy substantial autonomy in governance and economic policy for 50 years after the handover. Those supportive of a full democracy in Hong Kong heralded the Joint Declaration as a promise of universal suffrage.Yet Hong Kong’s constitution (the Basic Law), drafted after the Declaration, relies heavily on indirect elections and favors the interests of big businesses in Hong Kong and the central government in Beijing. For example, in the 2004 Legislative Council elections,1 pro-democracy candidates won more than 60 percent of the direct vote, but only claimed 25 of 60 Council seats. Unrepresentative business and government constituencies filled the remainder of the seats.This disappointing result created a largely business-dominated environment in Hong Kong. Affordable housing was sacrificed for real estate development, small farmland was sacrificed for shopping complexes, and equitable redistribution was sacrificed for lower taxation. The city’s Gini coefficient—a measure of income distribution—was 0.537 in 2013, making it the most unequal developed economy in the world.A famous article in The Economist listed Hong Kong at the top of the magazine’s crony-capitalism index. “The Communist Party must protect rich people in the interest of continued capitalism in Hong Kong,” explained Chinese academic Wang Zhenmin. State-protected capitalism, however, does not guarantee sustainable development. Political democracy may not be sufficient in solving all Hong Kong’s economic and social problems, but it will give the government the legitimacy it currently lacks and will hold it accountable to the people.After the 1989 Tiananmen Square Massacre, a perception grew in Beijing that “disloyal” democrats, manipulated by the West, would collaborate with outsiders to destabilize the Chinese system. Yet by ignoring the Hong Kong public’s frustration caused by economic injustice and constantly refusing popular aspirations of democracy, Beijing fuels anti-China sentiment among the general public.According to a poll released by Hong Kong University, the percentage of respondents who hold positive views toward the central government’s Hong Kong policies decreased from 53 percent in 2010 to 31 percent in 2014, and younger respondents tend to hold an even more negative appraisal. Many protesters believe that the Hong Kong government failed to pursue effective policies to deal with inequality because it is too beholden to Beijing.Furthermore, the consequences caused by inadequate electoral reforms in Hong Kong will damage Beijing’s confidence-building measures in Xinjiang and Tibet, accelerate the territorial disputes between China and neighboring countries, and weaken China’s position in the international community. These consequences will directly influence China’s strategic and economic trajectories going forward. The increasing political instability inside China and the government’s repressive response to protests will erode trust among those interacting with China, discouraging regional security and economic interconnectedness.More important, Beijing’s actions toward Hong Kong will inevitably affect its cross-strait relationship with Taiwan. The leader of Taiwan, Ma Ying-jeou, has already said, “if the mainland authority can handle this appeal with a delicate hand, it can help to shorten the mental gaps between people across the Taiwan Strait and benefit cross-strait relations.” A harsh response, he warned, would “alienate Taiwanese people and cause damage to cross-strait relations.”The central government of China needs to collaborate with the Hong Kong government to carry out immediate and comprehensive electoral reforms that meet the Hong Kong public’s demand for universal suffrage. To achieve this outcome, Beijing should initiate dialogues with Hong Kong’s protest representatives. Such dialogues will foster trust, facilitate consensus building, and enable the formulation of a more creative roadmap forward.This action is necessary for addressing Hong Kong’s internal problems. It is also of great importance to Beijing’s attempts to secure its regional role in the future. By allowing a certain level of flexibility and creativity in its periphery policies, China maintains structural stability, integrates itself more deeply into the international community, and builds trust in security and economic cooperation with other states.

1. Ngok Ma. "Hong Kong’s Democrats Divide." Journal of Democracy 22, no. 1 (2011): 54-67.↩