Japan Must Tailor its Rearmament Plan

The thought of Japanese rearmament generates passionate reactions from all corners of the Asia-Pacific region. Given the legacy of Japan’s early twentieth-century imperial armed forces, many of its victims around the Asia-Pacific region find it difficult to accept Japan’s proposal to rearm. However, as China’s defense budget increases and the United States’ defense budget decreases, Japan’s strategic outlook and national security interests are changing. Indeed, even a cursory overview of Chinese and Japanese statistical information on current systems points to Beijing’s quantitative superiority on land, in the air, and at sea. As policymakers in Washington promote a shift in focus and rebalancing from Europe and the Middle East to the Pacific, American assurance and deterrence capabilities are being called into question, particularly as Washington’s defense budget is in decline. In light of these changes, Japan must not look to rearm simply to increase burden sharing with the U.S., but should begin the process immediately to ensure that it has the capabilities to preserve its strategic assets and security. Given this necessity, Japanese policymakers should use transparency and confidence-building measures (TCBMs)—both unilateral and multilateral—to promote the message that they are conducting Japan’s rearmament in a responsible and measured manner.In the short term, Tokyo can take several unilateral steps to demonstrate its commitment to rearming in a mature fashion. The national government should remove one of its most self-destructive practices by publicly disassociating itself with the Yasukuni Shrine. In conjunction, Japan can encourage a more balanced account of its imperial past in classroom history textbooks. The national government maintains the clout to influence public discussion on talk shows and in print media to move away from some of the more self-destructive national dialogues. For example, Tokyo should formally recommit itself to the 1993 Kono Statement to take any discussion on the use of “comfort women” off the table. The strategic messaging value of these steps would be invaluable. Unilaterally, Japan should legislatively prohibit the development of nuclear weapons, which would reduce strategic instability in the region. Conventional missile technology and other weapons systems are crucial to Tokyo’s ability to flexibly respond to provocations, but removing nuclear weapons from the discussion would ease concerns in other national capitals. Taking unilateral steps from the outset to reduce concerns across the Asia-Pacific region is integral to Japan’s strategic messaging efforts.Over the short- and mid-term ranges, Japan should seek to develop bilateral and multilateral engagement opportunities with its regional neighbors. Three potential cooperative openings exist today. First, Tokyo can continue to advocate for an International Code of Conduct for Outer Space Activities. This agreement promotes the preservation of outer space as a global commons by reducing the dangers of collisions. Second, Japan can build goodwill and demonstrate its interest in finding ways to help humanity by actively seeking opportunities for joint military exercises and offering assistance during humanitarian crises. Third, proposing the creation of a multilateral forum to work through issues surrounding the Diaoyudao Islands is paramount for the Abe Administration and its successors. Administrative governance over the islands would fall to a joint enterprise of China, Japan, Russia, the United States, and a non-aligned fifth party. Putting jurisdiction in the hands of a multilateral organization helps to diffuse the issue of sovereignty over the short term while assessments of the underwater resources and negotiations over the allocation of those resources take place. This would give both Beijing and Tokyo a mechanism to de-escalate and address the issue at a later date.As the balance of power in the Asia-Pacific region evolves over the long term, Tokyo is in a unique position to establish a viable and effective TCBM regime. An Open Skies Treaty variant in East Asia could be established between nations such as Japan, South Korea, China, the Philippines, Vietnam and others. The concept works as a foreign policy tool because it demonstrates good will and openness, and it is also palatable for military planners because it does not pose an operationally significant intelligence risk. As military modernization continues across the region, this TCBM demonstrates a collective willingness to reduce misunderstandings and misperceptions at the cost of low intelligence risks. An Open Skies variant can serve as a foundational agreement for an Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe-type structure in the Asia-Pacific region. Building upon earlier successes, this group could serve as a central repository and dissemination point for notifications regarding major troop deployments and strategic exercises. It could monitor budding conflicts and assist in non-traditional security development in some of the more volatile portions of the region. Japanese willingness to advocate for both of these long-term TCBMs would demonstrate its desire to rearm peacefully while promoting strategic stability.For Tokyo, assuming a leadership position for its own defense is a pragmatic and appropriate policy decision. However, Japan’s decision to progress with rearmament will require it take a series of policy initiatives. These measures are intended to avoid some of the criticisms and offset some of the concerns of its regional neighbors. Japan should actively promote joint multinational exercises and support humanitarian relief efforts to increase dialogue and cooperation between Japan’s military and the militaries of other nations. These policy options give the Abe Administration and future governments the opportunity to frame rearmament as a reasonable decision predicated on modern geopolitical developments, rather than a return to imperialism. Whether responding to the ongoing budget debates in the United States, increased defense spending in China, volatility on the Korean Peninsula, or troubles in the East and South China Seas, Japan will need to assume more responsibility for its own security.