Why Domestic Politics Rule Middle East Policymaking: Jordan 1990 and Israel 2014

The Middle East is often portrayed as a playground for Western powers, suggesting that international interests dictate the actions of Middle Eastern states. However, an analysis of the decision-making process of Middle Eastern leaders reveals that they give primacy to domestic priorities over the demands of systemic international pressures. Since the authority of Middle Eastern rulers is often not popularly based, they must remain hyper-conscious of domestic challenges to their authority, such as the Arab Spring. In the face of such threats, Middle Eastern rulers will act in defiance of overwhelming international pressures, as in the cases of King Hussein of Jordan in 1990 and Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu today. In 1990 King Hussein defied conventional logic by refusing to join the multinational coalition against Saddam Hussein, even though Jordan relied on foreign aid. Jordan was not an oil-rich state, and the King relied on foreign aid to secure economic and political stability. To obtain sources of foreign aid, the King had cultivated close relationships with the United States and Britain, as well as regional actors such as Saudi Arabia and Kuwait. A year prior, in 1989, Jordan received $550 million worth of aid from the Gulf States, in addition to $600 million in remittances from the 850,000 Jordanians working in the Gulf. These funds were incredibly important given the severe economic downturn in Jordan that started in 1988; disappointing these donor states was very dangerous.The cause for King Hussein’s decision lay within the domestic system. He chose to act despite systemic international pressure because the domestic consequences of attacking Saddam Hussein posed a direct threat to his authority. In the years leading up to the crisis, Jordanians had felt connected to Saddam. After the Iran-Iraq War and the fall of Nasser, they revered Saddam Hussein as the defender of the Palestinian cause. When the Gulf Crisis broke out, parties ranging from the Islamic Jihad to the Jordan People’s Democratic Party held pro-Saddam protests throughout the country. Public opinion stood vehemently opposed to the King’s traditional allies; protesters burned American flags and speakers called Saudi Arabia and Egypt traitors for supporting Kuwait.Under such domestic conditions, King Hussein could not risk siding against Saddam despite overwhelming international pressure to do so. Choosing either side would yield significant challenges to his government. King Hussein’s decision not to join the coalition proved that he prioritized domestic concerns over external pressure. This trend holds true in many other Middle Eastern states, including those without an authoritarian regime. Internal concerns also act as determining factor in Israeli Prime Minister Bibi Netanyahu’s recent push for settlement-building.Netanyahu is clinging fiercely to his authority. Having first attained the premiership from 1993 to 1996, he worked his way back to that title in 2009 and won a third election in 2013. Yet having 34 parties occupying 120 seats in the Israeli parliament, and growing polarization in Israeli society, undermines prospects for stable coalition governments. Settlement-building remains a key focus of political infighting, and Netanyahu’s current coalition consists of parties that range from full-throated support to vehement opposition to the policy. The religious, pro-settlement camp currently holds more power than the moderate coalition members. Therefore, acting in direct opposition to the right-wing groups would pose an immediate threat to the stability of the government and, ultimately, Netanyahu’s power. This dynamic informs Netanyahu’s decision to continue settlement-building despite consistent international pressure.Despite Israel’s long reliance on the United States (Israel has received over $233.7 billion in aid since its establishment), Netanyahu blatantly defies the demands of the United States when it comes to settlement issue. Earlier this year, White House spokesman Josh Earnest admonished Netanyahu, stating that “This development will only draw condemnation from the international community, distance Israel from even its closest allies, poison the atmosphere, not only with the Palestinians but also with the very Arab governments with which Prime Minister Netanyahu said he wanted to build relations.” Despite this rebuke and many others, Netanyahu has continued to announce more settlement plans to appease the pro-settlement camp in his coalition.Although Netanyahu understands the international consequences of continuing settlement construction, he faces a more immediate internal political threat. Knesset Member Naftali Bennett has publicly threatened to bring down Netanyahu’s government if he approved any plan to evacuate settlements. Bennett said that if Netanyahu were to do so, Bennett himself would resign his seat and “[Netanyahu] would lose his power base in the Likud Party and will no longer be able to serve as Prime Minister.” Under the design of the Israeli political system, the greatest threat to Netanyahu’s rule comes from within his own coalition. He would be forced out of office—regardless of his own opinion of the settlements—if he chooses not to advance the coalition’s agenda. In the face of such pressure from his own countrymen, Netanyahu’s desire to maintain power led him to ignore the overwhelming international pressure.These case studies illustrate that leaders will prioritize addressing the internal challenge when presented with competing demands from foreign and domestic actors. Rulers have to make difficult decisions, and acceding to external or internal pressure carries significant consequences for the stability of their rule. By examining the circumstances that lead to defiance of international pressure, outside observers can discern where their true priorities lie. As mentioned earlier, the Arab Spring has brought global attention back to the Middle East. During such uprisings, politicians will do their utmost to stay in power, as evidenced by the ongoing war in Syria. By looking first at the domestic conditions as opposed to the makeup of the international system, outside analysts and policymakers can better understand, and potentially predict, the actions of leaders in the Middle East.