Reform is Needed to Defeat Boko Haram

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Emboldened by the spotlight, Boko Haram has made gaudy claims about an African caliphate to resemble the Islamic State of Iraq and Syria (ISIS). A recent surge in violence, often aimed at taking and holding entire towns, follows the savagery of their infamous abduction of 270 schoolgirls in Chibok in 2014. Boko Haram seems to be shifting from disruptive guerilla tactics to more conventional battles for territory, and the group now confidently operates throughout virtually the entire northern state of Borno and beyond, an area the size of Belgium. Boko Haram’s affinity for ISIS is aggrandizing—the group has yet to show any interest in governing the territory they have captured in northern Nigeria. Yet its strategy remains reminiscent of ISIS’s rapid advances last year.A series of horrific attacks—Chibok was just one of 900 schools to be closed or destroyed so far—brought international attention and support to Nigeria’s government. When the insurgency could not be ignored any longer, President Goodluck Jonathan and his generals took the international pressure as a cue to implement scorched-earth counterinsurgency policies, ostensibly for the sake of stability. The president declared a state of emergency in the northern states in 2013, but the subsequent heavy-handed military campaign failed to halt the north’s ruination. Even worse, a number of serious human rights abuses committed by Nigerian soldiers and officers have given reason for northerners to fear the military as much as they do Boko Haram.Now, Boko Haram’s best asset in its mission to create an African Islamic State is the people’s fear of the government. Even before the flight of local officials from Borno state, the government barely held a presence in northerners’ daily lives. Schools and municipal offices peppered the mostly flat northern lands, but the government’s relevance during the routines of an average northern subsistence farmer was minimal—and vice versa, as evidenced by Jonathan’s longstanding reluctance to acknowledge that a problem exists. Northern Nigeria bears little in common with the booming hubs of manufacturing and petroleum exports in the south of the country.The conflict in northern Nigeria has turned into a violent, two-sided quagmire, with civilians dying in the middle. Yet the battlefield is not contained. Boko Haram’s leadership is pursuing a strategy of expansion, and given the example of ISIS, they are likely considering a transnational campaign into ethnically and economically similar parts of Chad, Niger, and Cameroon. In many critical respects, Cameroon has a similar demographic survey to Nigeria: an impoverished, dry, mostly Muslim north that feels increasingly ignored by the more prosperous Christian south. The European-drawn borders encompassing modern-day Nigeria will mean as little to Boko Haram as the line between Syria and Iraq means to ISIS. African governments, as well as the international community, have a duty to contain Boko Haram’s ability to recruit and operate in new territory.Neighboring states can learn from Nigeria’s mistakes. Foreign presidents should note the contributing factors that created such a vexing problem. Instability stems from years of political neglect, corruption, and high rates of poverty and unemployment relative to the south, and non-political factors such as desertification, which has diminished harvests and threatened food security. Just as in the Middle East a large population of unemployed, disenfranchised males creates a high potential for unrest.Nigeria’s neighbors need to address these issues in their own countries—especially in communities near the border—before Boko Haram’s viral pessimism convinces others to reject democracy and economic liberalization. Many traditional communities continue to take a skeptical view of Western-style politics, since corrupt, bloated governments misrepresent the promising gains of such institutions. On a positive note, communication technologies are bringing even the most isolated African communities together, exposing government abuse and increasing demand for accountability.The United States has taken measured steps to help Nigeria fight back against the insurgency. Last summer, President Barack Obama sent 80 American troops to help search for the missing Chibok schoolgirls; this week Secretary of State John Kerry is visiting the country to discuss the looming Valentine’s Day presidential election. As Mr. Kerry speaks with both President Jonathan and his major challenger, he must remind them each of the hard lessons that the United States has learned during its ongoing grapple with insurgencies. Boko Haram is capitalizing on the failures of political liberalism in Africa, and that disillusionment cannot be fought solely with weapons. At this point in the crisis, military deployment is necessary to protect civilians, but the Nigerian government must understand that even a robust military campaign is ultimately a defensive measure. At its core, Boko Haram is a social problem that has been brewing within and beyond Nigeria for decades.The era of Africa’s most brutal, bloody dictators seems to have faded. However, new generations are growing up under regimes that are less violent but just as egregious in their criminality. Too many African leaders only protect and provide for their richest, most well-connected citizens. When corruption infects nearly every level of society, from an overfunded military that lacks weaponry to the cash bribes required just to get through public education, the poor do not stand a chance. Crony capitalism has replaced the junta as the preferred method of holding power, since it writes fewer headlines and appeases global markets.The Nigerian ambassador to the United States recently complained of Washington’s refusal to offer weapons and more assistance to help in the fight. As tragic as the deaths in Nigeria are, the United States is wise to withhold further support of Nigeria’s supremely corrupt military. Washington must commit to supporting truly democratic regimes, while reprimanding those who commit human rights abuses ostensibly for the sake of stability. All lives matter, and until the governments of Nigeria, Cameroon, and beyond get serious about protecting the rights of their poorest people, their authority in impoverished communities will continue to diminish. The corrupt political regimes that the world has tacitly accepted across most of Africa since independence cannot hold on in the age of social media. The fight against Boko Haram is about whether those regimes break for better or worse.

Barrett Browne, Former Contributing Writer

Barrett Browne is a first-year graduate student in the Security Policy Studies program at the Elliott School of International Affairs. After completing a BA in Government at the University of Texas in Austin, he served as a Peace Corps Volunteer in Cameroon from 2011-2013. He is now focusing on economic development in Africa and how it affects terrorism in the region. He currently interns at the US Treasury Department, Office of African Nations, and can be reached at barrettlbrowne@gmail.com. The views expressed in this article are solely those of the author; they do not represent the views of the United States government or the United States Treasury Department.

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