Putin's Foot in the Door: Why Transnistria Matters

Under the watchful eye of the towering Lenin statue in front of the parliament building, time seems to have stopped in the early 1990s in the phantom state of Transnistria. Formerly under Moldova’s authority, this breakaway province declared independence in 1990 and gained de facto autonomy following a short but bloody civil war in 1992. The self-proclaimed Pridnestrovian Moldavian Republic has the unenviable characteristics of many fellow post-Soviet secessionist regions: no legitimacy under international law, a freefalling economy, a steadily declining population, and an alleged safe haven for organized crime.However, geopolitical shifts in Europe have given renewed importance to this sliver of land wedged between Ukraine’s western border and Moldova. Last year U.S. Senator John McCain declared Transnistria the next “country to watch” following Russia’s illegal annexation of Crimea. In light of Russian President Vladimir Putin’s professed ambition to defend ethnic Russians worldwide and his readiness to employ military force, the situation in Transnistria should be closely monitored for a number of reasons.First, close ethnic and political ties persist between the small enclave and Russia. Many Transnistrians hold Russian citizenship, have relatives living in Russia, and speak the language. Highly nostalgic for the Soviet era, the country still proudly displays a hammer and sickle on its flag, while Soviet uniforms and medals are a regular sight during military parades held in the capital, Tiraspol. Even Transnistria’s parliament is referred to as the Supreme Soviet. In a controversial referendum held in 2006, 97% of the population declared itself in favor of accession to Russia.The combination of a clear desire to be re-united with Russia and adamant rejection of Moldova led to Transnistrian authorities officially asking to join the Russian Federation in early 2014. Their application was extensively discussed by representatives of Russian ministries, but ultimately turned down. Despite the ruling, Russian Deputy Prime Minister and special envoy for Transnistria Dmitry Rogozin issued a thinly veiled warning specifying provocations that would prompt greater Russian intervention in the area: “all those who don't think like us: no need to poke one's nose in Transdniester, no need to try unleash hysteria on the border, no need to inflame tensions because Russian nationals live there.”Second, Russia is the financial patron of Transnistria, serving as the government’s main economic lifeline—Moscow accounts for 70% of the country’s government revenue. For years, Russia delivered free gas, heavily subsidized local businesses, invested in infrastructure, paid pensions, and provided humanitarian aid. It is also suspected that Transnistrian law enforcement agencies and intelligence services, including the aptly named KGB, are Kremlin-backed, but the amount or extent of the subsidies are undisclosed for evident reasons. Now that Russia faces economic decline hastened by international sanctions and low energy prices, it may prove less generous than before. Nevertheless, it is unlikely any other polity will be willing to financially support the beleaguered Transnistrian economy, which predominantly consists of outdated industrial plants and suffers from rampant corruption.Last but not least, Russia retains approximately 2,000 “peacekeepers” stationed in Transnistria, guarding large stocks of ammunition and military materiel left over from the 14th Soviet Army. The Kremlin has refused to remove the current Operational Group of Russian Forces despite repeated pleas by Moldova and the international community. Military exercises conducted in late 2014 in the renegade state are a timely indicator of geostrategic tensions in the area. Moldova is pursuing an ambitious, pro-Western political agenda, which includes an Association Agreement with the European Union and a Defence Capacity Building Initiative with NATO. Thus, Russian troops in Transnistria are a bulwark against further Western expansion into Moldova and a constant reminder of Russia’s continued vested interests in its near abroad.So is Transnistria truly Europe’s next Crimea? It does have some of the same explosive ingredients: ethnic tensions between pro-Russians and pro-Moldovans and a longing for reunification with Russia. Yet owing to the lesser strategic and historical importance of this impoverished territory, it seems doubtful for now that Putin will go to the same lengths as he did in Crimea to seize Transnistria, which is most likely condemned to go on living unnoticed on the fringes of the international system. But should Moldova continue its rapprochement with the EU or NATO, Putin will have the motives and the means to stir up trouble in the region, especially if the Ukrainian crisis escalates out of control. The Kremlin probably would not shy away from using its puppet state to further isolate and destabilize Kiev, possibly by sending agitators or weapons over the border. Transnistria matters because it may very well be Putin’s next stop on his “intervention list” to establish a land corridor of Russian-controlled territory that would encircle Ukraine and create further strategic and security challenges for the West.