The Belmokhtar Network’s Waning Influence

It should come as little surprise that Al Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb (AQIM) announced that veteran militant Mokhtar Belmokhtar did not fall victim to an American airstrike on a suspected jihadist meeting in Ajdabiya, Libya, in mid-June. AQIM’s assertion was later confirmed by Belmokhtar’s splinter group al-Mourabitoun, and rumors of Belmokhtar’s demise were put to rest. Though this latest effort to eliminate a senior al Qaeda facilitator in North Africa may have failed, American policymakers can take solace in the fact that the systematic dismantlement of al Qaeda’s (AQ) core leadership and the growing strength of the Islamic State in the region will continue to marginalize Belmokhtar. While his groups will continue to plot against international peacekeepers and Western interests in North Africa and the Sahel, Belmokhtar’s diminished operational and logistical capabilities will limit his ability to threaten regional security on the magnitude of his brigade’s past attacks, which included the assault on the In Amenas gas plant in 2013.Belmokhtar is a notoriously slippery figure. Pervasive rumors of the one-eyed Algerian’s death due to infighting with AQIM or at the hands of French forces in Operational Serval have proved equally as false as the latest reports of his death by an American airstrike. Apart from operational security experience gained through decades of fighting in civil wars in Afghanistan, Algeria, and Mali, Belmokhtar’s elusiveness in large part is due to his extensive network in North Africa throughout which he can move with freedom. AQ’s view of the region as a critical theater allowed for the maintenance of a robust human network in the face of shifting political dynamics and disparate local jihadist groups, and Belmokhtar continues to use this fact to his advantage.Belmokhtar’s history with AQIM and its predecessors enables the commander to draw upon a rich variety of personal relationships to facilitate his group’s terrorist efforts even after his fractious split with the franchise. Belmokhtar joined the Armed Islamic Group’s (GIA) violent campaign to “re-Islamize” Algeria in 1992, where he met explosives expert and future AQIM emir Abdelmalek Droukdel. The pair moved through the turbulent 1990s with the GIA and later the Salafist Group for Preaching and Combat (GSPC), eventually connecting with key AQ financier Abu Qatada and moving the GSPC under AQ’s umbrella as the rebranded AQIM in 2007.Many jihadist groups in the region share a similar history and also came into contact with Belmokhtar’s Sahara Emirate during the Algerian’s time as AQIM’s primary facilitator. Ansar al Sharia Libya (AAS-L) and Tunisia (AAS-T) both sprung from the tradition of Afghanistan-trained AQ members and retained ties to AQ’s core via senior AQ emissaries such as Abu Yahya al Libi, Abu Anas al Libi, and Abu Qatada. Abu Yahya and Abu Anas represented figures from the region itself: critically, their area knowledge further enhanced AQ’s efforts to leverage AQIM and Belmokhtar’s splinter groups as a hub of jihadist coordination in North Africa. Parallel outreach existed from both AQIM and Belmokhtar’s Signers in Blood and manifested itself in AAS-L providing logistical support for Belmokhtar’s In Amenas attack while also collaborating with AQIM regarding the attack on the U.S. consulate in Benghazi.However, the golden age of cooperation in the North African theatre is waning, and Belmokhtar’s influence will decrease alongside it. Long gone are the days wherein Belmokhtar, AQIM, AAS-L, and AAS-T could discuss unified support for Jabhat al-Nusra among jihadist groups in the region while planning the restoration of AQ’s influence. Drone strikes, coupled with American forces’ keen intelligence capabilities, have wreaked havoc upon AQ’s senior leadership. A more inexperienced core of figures, lacking the local touch of their predecessors, has inherited a broken organization unable to wage its netwar on a shoestring budget under stifling Western surveillance and with the fires of Syria still raging. Thus, AQ prioritized operations in Yemen and Syria, diminishing its coordination and funding efforts in North Africa.Furthermore, the Islamic State (IS) has taken root in North Africa after what appeared to be an inauspicious first few months after arriving in Derna, Libya. IS took shrewd advantage of the death of AAS-L’s leader, Muhammad al-Zahawi, to exploit the jihadist vacuum left by both a lack of central leadership and heavy losses fighting against General Khalifa Haftar’s secular forces. AAS-L’s chief sharia official pledged allegiance to IS as well, leaving a once formidable AQ ally in the region rudderless: its only real current efforts remains a struggle to reassert relevance and drive out IS rather than advancing AQ’s broader agenda. IS’s gains in Tunisia, emphasized by acquiring the oft-contested allegiance of the Okba Ibn Nafaa Brigade and performing the Bardo museum attacks, served a counterproductive end for jihad in that nation as well. The resulting Tunisian government crackdown caused the death of the Brigade’s leader, Khaled Chayeb, and restricted jihadist groups’ operational freedom in Tunisia dramatically.All of this spells a diminished role for Mokhtar Belmokhtar in North Africa. Coupled with the defection of a faction within the Movement for Unity and Jihad in West Africa to IS, Belmokhtar’s Mourabitoun are losing allies at an alarming pace. Unable to wield influence over a shattered militant network in Tunisia, unlikely to affect the affairs of AQ-allied groups in Libya preoccupied with their own survival, and now growing isolated in Mali, Belmokhtar’s core of less than 100 fighters should register barely a blip on the United States’ map of myriad threats. While there is no indication that he will cease targeting Western interests, Belmokhtar will become far more selective and unable to carry out bold, complex attacks. In the end, it will not be an airstrike that ends his militant career, but instead the tumultuous nature of jihad in North Africa.