Poroshenko: Between a Rock and a Hard Place

September 1st is traditionally the first day of school for children across Russia and Ukraine. It is a symbolic day that is marked by much pomp and circumstance.This year, September 1st had added significance, as Ukraine and Russia approved a new ceasefire in the Donbas. Thus far, the truce is holding and President Poroshenko has lauded the renewed ceasefire in the east saying that not a single Ukrainian soldier has died in combat. But if previous ceasefires are any indication, this peace may be short lived.This ceasefire comes from Poroshenko’s effort to implement the measures outlined in multilateral negotiations. The Minsk II agreement, approved by the leaders of France, Ukraine, Russia, and Germany (known as the Normandy 4), set out provisions to quell the violence of the war in the Donbas region of eastern Ukraine.International skepticism persists, though, about the viability of the latest deal. Previous agreements were wrought with numerous violations. For example, combatants from both sides failed to adhere to a measure stipulating the removal of artillery from the frontlines. The political autonomy of the self-proclaimed Donetsk and Luhansk separatist republics and humanitarian access to war-torn areas remain points of contention as well.Addittionally, Ukrainian military forces reported several spikes in violence under the purported ceasefire. For instance, these units registered 100 ceasefire violations in a single day in July. Pro-Russian rebels aim to expand their territory in the east; an offensive against Mariupol is certainly not out of the question. The peace rests on the shoulders of Russia and the separatists, just as much as it does on Kiev.In Poroshenko’s attempts to implement the measures of Minsk II, he has faced growing resentment and pressure from many at home. For example, On August 31st the Ukrainian parliament geared towards granting greater decentralization to the east, and the approval of permanent legislation on the special status of particular districts of the Donetsk and Luhansk regions. Many Ukrainians find this idea intolerable. They see it as a capitulation to Russia and European powers, and against the best interest of a strong Ukrainian state.Protests took place outside the Ukrainian parliament in opposition to these measures and eventually broke into violent clashes with police. The demonstrations became deadly when a protestor, later discovered to be a member of the far-right Svoboda party, threw a grenade into the ranks of the police and national guard, resulting in numerous casualties.Additionally, Poroshenko has had to deal with another group in this battle—the oligarchs. Igor Kolomoisky, one of Ukraine’s richest men, has been a thorn in the side of Poroshenko. In March of last year, a group of armed gunmen from a Ukrainian volunteer battalion stormed the building of a major energy company of which Kolomoisky owned a large portion. The building was taken over by the Ukrainian government and rumors flew that Kolomoisky had directed his forces to seize the building. Because of the controversy, he was removed from his position as governor.Rinat Akhmetov is another oligarch who is causing tension in Ukraine. He owns mines and refineries in Ukraine and the rebel-held regions. Although Kiev would like him to reign in his operations in the separatist territories, he has refused. There is little the government can do to curtail Akhmetov’s business operations that would not cause him to retaliate financially, causing even more damage to the fragile economy.This lack of control over the most powerful regional elites is indicative of the larger situation facing Poroshenko. On the one hand, he is being pressured by Prime Minister Merkel, President Hollande, and other leaders to implement Minsk II. To ignore his European partners would be foolish and would bode poorly for the future of Ukraine. On the other hand, he is being pressured by many nationalist groups to deny the separatist regions greater autonomy, even threatening to remove him from power.The role of civil society in this matter is profound as seen in the various demonstrations by the Ukrainian people over the last year and a half that have shaped public policy—it will likely determine the ultimate fate for Poroshenko and Ukraine. Public concerns will only serve to exacerbate this issue as well, because of the varying opinions as to how to approach the Donbas from inside and outside of Kiev.Although far-right groups make up only a small contingency of the population, they are quite boisterous, and as can be seen by recent activities, prone to violence. As for the Ukrainian population as a whole, approval ratings for Poroshenko and Yatsenyuk are low, at 24 percent and 11 percent respectively.For now, it looks as if Poroshenko will move forward with the Minsk II agreements. He has said that alternatives do not exist, and that the Organization for Security and Co-Operation in Europe provides the most effective means for restoring peace and sovereignty in the east. He does not have much room for error either. Ukraine is currently in the process of restructuring billions of dollars of debt that would otherwise do irreparable fiscal damage to Ukraine. Exacerbating military tensions would not bode well for efforts to demonstrate the country’s stability to its creditors, but the more resolute Poroshenko grows towards the Minsk agreements, the West, and the IMF, the greater unrest he will face at home.Poroshenko’s best course of action is to acquiesce to the demands of the European powers. Although this may be perceived by many at home as capitulation to Russia, a prolonged conflict in the Donbas will only have negative repercussions on the home front, and should be avoided at all costs. Once the elements of the Minsk II agreement have been fulfilled by both sides, Kiev can turn inward and focus on domestic issues such as corruption and the crippled economy.Poroshenko will then have to deal with the far-right, and the meddling oligarchs looking to expand their power. They will no doubt keep pestering him, and again may turn to violence. Like all good leaders, Poroshenko must remain resolute and defend his actions, and do what is in the best interest of his country.