Vaccine Diplomacy: The Next Wave of Great Power Competition

Pfizer. Moderna. Johnson and Johnson. Sputnik V. Sinovac. AstraZeneca. Covaxin. In the rapidly changing COVID-19 landscape, the development and approval of vaccines have been in and out of the news cycle for months. As the FDA approved the third COVID-19 vaccine for Emergency Authorization Use, the scramble for vaccines intensified both domestically and abroad. While some have said that the new Johnson and Johnson single-dose vaccine will make the shot more accessible to rural communities, that may not be the case, particularly in rural communities overseas. Vaccine-related organized crime appeared shortly after the vaccine rollout began and has hampered efforts to reach developing nations and rural communities. The simultaneous availability of alternate vaccines—such as the three FDA-approved American vaccines, the Russian Sputnik V, and Chinese Sinovac—created a wave of vaccine-related crime and provided a new channel of diplomacy that feels reminiscent of Cold War-era cultural diplomacy. The rise of vaccine-related crime will undoubtedly worsen the search for vaccines by developing nations, giving great powers an opportunity to improve diplomatic relations—and expand their global influence—by providing critically-needed doses of vaccines. The United States must use this opportunity to bolster its alliances with developing nations through vaccine diplomacy or risk losing ground to other international powerhouses.

INTERPOL issued a global alert at the beginning of the vaccine rollout warning against “the falsification, theft and illegal advertising of COVID-19 and flu vaccines” by organized crime networks. Issues with COVID-19 related fake vaccines have emerged across Asia, Africa, and Latin America. The South African Police service raided a warehouse outside Johannesburg and discovered 2,400 fake COVID-19 vaccine doses, as well as a large number of counterfeit N95 face masks. Multiple foreign nationals, including persons from China and Zambia, were detained in relation to the incident. Chinese police broke up a similar ring at a factory, finding 3,000 doses of fake vaccines. The INTERPOL secretary general noted that these incidents were only the beginning of vaccine-related crime. 

Vaccine-related crime in Latin America and Mexico raised concerns about supply chain security. Fake vaccines, tests, and websites have already appeared across Latin America. In recent months, Mexican police arrested six men for allegedly trafficking in fake Pfizer vaccines for nearly $2,000 USD per dose. In mid-March, Mexican customs officials seized a shipment of more than 5,700 doses of fake Sputnik V vaccines headed for Honduras; the shipment violated packing and transportation standards for the Sputnik vaccine, and the Russian Ministry of Health agreed to cooperate with Mexican authorities for analysis. Mexican officials are still debating about the veracity of the vaccines days after the seizure. However, Russian officials have already called this incident into question, disparaging it as a “large scale information campaign aimed at creating bias” toward the Russian COVID-19 vaccine by the United States and its allies. A Kremlin spokesperson noted that U.S. efforts to limit Russian influence in the Western Hemisphere included using American health attaches to “persuade Brazil to reject the Russian COVID-19 vaccine” following a report from the U.S. Office of Global Affairs. Vaccine-related crime has opened up another way for great powers to disparage global competitors even as vaccine diplomacy spreads in the same way that cultural diplomacy emerged during the Cold War. 

While the United States had just begun distributing vaccines to allied countries such as Canada and Mexico, other international peers have pushed this version of soft power in the previous months. Notably, Russia, China, and India became early players in vaccine diplomacy. Both China and Russia have used their versions of the COVID-19 vaccines to bolster alliances with developing nations. China distributes medical supplies—including COVID-19 related supplies—through its “Health Silk Road,” a part of its ongoing Belt and Road initiative. The Chinese Belt and Road Initiative has already put nations in Asia and Africa into massive debt and into high-risk debt distress categories. The extension of this program through the lens of the coronavirus pandemic could worsen the developing nation’s debt to China. Russia’s outreach to Latin American countries and partnership with nations such as Mexico on countering vaccine fraud leaves the country in a strong position to push its agenda in the Western Hemisphere. Russia’s quick steps to cast blame for the seizure of fraud Sputnik vaccines back onto the United States and its allies adds another layer of concern about soft power and disinformation to the mix. China and Russia’s focus on reaching the markets of developing nations—particularly those in Africa and Latin America, both areas suffering from a spate of vaccine-related crime—comes in sharp contrast to the U.S. strategy of focusing on high-income countries in select regions. As the vaccine rollout continues, the United States must ensure that it prioritizes its allies in developing countries or risk losing footing to Russia and China in this next wave of great power competition.