Election and Integration: Moldova’s Battle for Sovereignty and Democracy

Former Soviet nation Moldova voted on two pivotal issues on October 20th, 2024, and held a runoff on November 3rd, 2024. The nation held its presidential elections, which resulted in the reelection of pro-western President Maia Sandu, alongside a referendum that decided that European integration has a place in the Moldovan constitution. This election positioned the nation at a critical juncture in its sovereignty, democracy, and stance with respect to the West. As expected, this shift westward put the Kremlin on high alert. However, it has also raised the question of whether accession to the EU would actually be beneficial to Moldovans. 

The current president of Moldova, Maia Sandu, has been in office since December 2020. She successfully defeated pro-Russian former President Igor Dodon, who was later arrested for conspiring in support of the Russians. Sandu’s 2020 election signaled an inflection point in Moldova’s social and political climate. She is notably pro-Western and anti-Russian in her politics, going as far as publicly denouncing Russia’s use of “foreign saboteurs” to attempt a coup on her pro-EU administration. Relations between Russia and Moldova further soured in June 2022, when Moldova acquired candidate status to begin its integration process into the EU, and again in December 2023 when the European Council agreed to open accession negotiations with Moldova. Sandu’s decision to hold a referendum in conjunction with the presidential election was seen as strategic. The move showcases the importance of aligning with the West and forces the EU to envisage its long-term commitment to Moldova.

An October 2024 opinion poll showed that 63 percent of Moldovans supported the EU integration proposal. The referendum that followed a month later reflected even thinner margins when 50.46 percent of Moldovans voted ‘Yes,’ while 49.54 percent voted ‘No.’ Although Sandu claims that the results were close due to foreign interference, it is also worth scrutinizing the reasons why some Moldovans legitimately did not want to join the EU.

 Many who did not support the proposal cited the potential negative economic impacts of this decision. Moldova is currently one of the poorest countries of Europe; its citizens face high unemployment rates, scarce compensation, and few economic opportunities. Those Moldovans are frightened that this economic disadvantage will be exacerbated, especially in rural areas, if Moldova were to join the EU and further distance itself from Russia. Moldovans must also grapple with their sovereignty and national identity. These two elements of their society had already faced realignment after the fall of the Soviet Union, and it is unclear if EU integration will blur this national identity and undermine the culture that has been so recently and delicately constructed.

The biggest threat to Moldova’s presidential election lay in the hegemonic tendencies of global giant Russia, which had previously tampered with Moldovan elections to enable the appointment of pro-Russian leaders such as Igor Dodon. Maia Sandu claims that Russia has even attempted to overthrow her government through varied means. Moldovan Foreign Minister Mihai Popșoi noted, “The aggressive policy of the Russian Federation and its regional consequences create a significant negative effect for the Republic of Moldova, making it a target for hybrid threats, such as cyberattacks, disinformation campaigns, which are complemented by attempts to disrupt public order and interference in electoral politics.”

Maia Sandu ultimately won the presidential elections with 55 percent of the vote against Alexandr Stoianoglo, a candidate backed by the pro-Russia Socialist party. Prior to the election, National Police Chief Viorel Cernautaenu expressed that a Russian-managed network bribed 130,000 Moldovans to vote against EU alignment in the referendum and in support of Russian-aligned candidates. In fact, a total of $15 million was transferred to bank accounts as a means of remuneration for their treasonous acts. In September 2024, National Security Advisor Stanislav Secrieru estimated that Russia would spend a total of $100 million trying to interfere with the referendum and election.

Although the 2024 election turned out in favor of Maia Sandu, it is crucial to be cognizant of future instances of Russian interference. Sandu’s win has already been deemed as illegitimate by the Kremlin, signaling that its information manipulation campaign will continue. Kremlin spokesman Dmitry Peskov stated that an enormous portion of Moldovans were unable to vote due to voting irregularities and limited polling stations. Russia argues that Moldovans in Europe were able to vote, thereby supporting the pro-West agenda, but those living in Russia were barred from participating in their civic duty. Consequently, protests saturated with Moldovan and EU flags have erupted within the streets of Moldova, rallying against the alleged violations concerning the election results.

In order to effectively mitigate the effects of Russian interference, Moldova must be extremely vigilant. It ought to enforce strict regulations on foreign funding and foreign investment. Implementation of such foreign interference laws would consist of multiple internal measures. For instance, any foreign donation to a political party, campaign, or non-governmental organization would have to be publicly disclosed. A failure of proper disclosure would result in fines imposed on the receiving entity. Further, review boards should be established to assess the impact on investments into media companies and prolific content creators. However, it should be recognized that similar “foreign agent” laws imposed in other countries like Georgia act as a form of censure and contribute to democratic backsliding. These potential foreign interference laws can therefore only be beneficial for pro-Western Moldovans if the government shares their stances and values.

As a way to promote transparency, the Moldovan government should also encourage independent media, particularly media outlets that would monitor and neutralize state-controlled and foreign media. The government can grant tax relief to these independent media outlets in order to ensure their productivity and growth. These measures to encourage independent media would help showcase information free from government and foreign bias, letting Moldovans formulate their own opinions. Media literacy programs could also be implemented to educate the public on detecting potentially deceptive information. Without this recognition, the public might ingest compromised media that will likely influence their opinions concerning Moldova’s democracy, EU integration, and other matters.

Although Russia may never completely retreat its information manipulation attacks, Moldova would be better equipped with such laws. It would take Russia more time, effort, and money to carry out successful attacks, thereby potentially deterring their frequency. Further, it is simply the Moldovan government’s duty to protect their citizens from foreign disinformation.

Ultimately, the citizens of Moldova faced a dire decision. They weighed the implications of either staying within the periphery of Russia or gravitating towards the EU. Their choice will impact their democracy and social and political spheres, as well as their relationship with Russia for years to come. The potential strenuous economic transition and social polarization of integrating the EU now needs to be heavily investigated. The future of Moldova has been decided, and the popular response of the country’s citizens will now control its future.

Author: Elsa Debargue

Managing Editor: Alex Sarchet

Web Editor: Jerry Browne

Elsa Debargue, Staff Writer

Elsa Debargue is a first-year graduate student studying International Affairs with a concentration in International Security at George Washington University’s Elliott School of International Affairs. She holds a B.A. in International Affairs and Spanish from the University of Wisconsin-Madison, where she also minored in Russian, Eastern European, and Central Asian Studies (REECAS), Gender Studies, and European Studies. Debargue is currently a Cyberspace Initiative Cooperation Intern at the Observer Research Foundation America per her interest in technology policy. She can be reached at elsa.debargue@gwu.edu.

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