Foreign Fodder: Countering Russia’s Use of Foreign Manpower and Mercenaries

On November 18th the U.S. Department of Defense announced that it believed 11,000 North Korean soldiers had arrived in Kursk to fight alongside Russian troops. This news comes as Russia’s costly and reckless “meat grinder” tactics have killed or wounded 700,000 soldiers since the start of the war. While Ukraine responded to its manpower shortages by increasing recruitment drives through targeted advertising and by employing “increasingly coercive” measures like widening the age of conscription and forcefully drafting Ukrainians who have so far avoided the war, Russia has gone to great lengths to recruit and use soldiers from outside of its borders. Russia’s search for foreign sources of manpower is partially a result of President Vladimir Putin’s reluctance to conduct yet another unpopular draft; it is also part of a wider Russian foreign policy strategy that extends far beyond Ukraine’s battlefields.

The United States has attempted to counter Russian recruiting strategies. It has used targeted sanctions and preemptively stepped up diplomatic negotiations with countries Russia seeks to influence—and more work needs to be done. The United States must increase efforts to engage with countries targeted by Russia to highlight the realities of Russian recruitment schemes, shut down trafficking networks, and dissuade security cooperation with Russia.

Best estimates show that Russia had already recruited thousands of foreigners to join its war efforts before the arrival of North Korean troops. Russia has developed networks to facilitate this process, including in the Sahel region, where it rebranded and restructured the Wagner Group into Africa Corps. Through these networks, Russia can continue to support its war effort and undermine U.S. influence.

The greatest ability to curb Russian recruitment lies with the targeted countries themselves. India, for instance, convinced Russia to return its citizens after engaging directly with Russia on the issue and cracking down on trafficking networks. Central Asian states have lodged diplomatic protests against Moscow, negotiated changes in visa regimes, and tried and convicted citizens for mercenarism due to recruitment schemes targeting migrant workers. As with other forms of human trafficking, U.S. efforts to prevent Russian recruitment work best when they include cooperation with the nations Russia is targeting.

In pursuit of this effort, the United States needs to accurately and explicitly highlight the dangers of Russian recruitment to foreign governments and their citizens. Russia’s recruitment efforts are a product of decades-long efforts to cultivate soft power, political connections, and military influence in the Global South and other states. Examples of this policy in action can be seen in Cuba, Syria, Central Asia, and the Sahel. Yet Russian recruitment schemes for foreigners also include human trafficking and misrepresentation of the nature of contractual work. The United States has the intelligence networks, diplomatic capacity, and economic power to expose these schemes and help stop or slow Russian inroads. Failures by private military contractors to meet the expectations of their host states and provide for the families of killed members (e.g., the Wagner Group suffering a “major defeat” against militants in Mali) should be highlighted by U.S. officials to undermine their allure.

The most important part of U.S. policy relies on offering an alternative to Russian private military contracting efforts and mercenary groups. The incentive to turn to mercenary work is largely monetary; few foreign nationals volunteer for Russian military service out of a sense of patriotism. Using Africa as an example, the Biden administration made some efforts in this area, investing millions in regional partners and engaging in high-level discussions. Unfortunately, U.S. policy in Africa has resulted in few successes; coups, democratic backsliding, and rising extremism have derailed attempts at limiting Russian influence. Other actions, such as President Biden visiting Angola at the end of his term, feel more like afterthoughts than sincere diplomatic outreaches. As a result, Russia’s efforts have been increasingly effective at displacing U.S. influence in the region, most recently with the withdrawal of U.S. troops from Niger and the deployment of Russian mercenaries to Burkina Faso. Moving forward, the United States needs to commit to long-term strategies of engagement that adequately address partner nations’ needs.

Russia’s foreign recruitment operations are small compared to its ability to recruit domestically, but their impacts far outscale their size. They allow Russia to continue foreign operations without requiring a substantial diversion of resources from Ukraine. They promote a long-term vision of improving Russian staying power abroad. They allow Russia to rehabilitate its global image. They bolster Russian trade and political influence and draw nations away from the West. Exploitative access agreements to raw materials and valuable metals from countries that employ Wagner and other groups also provide Russia with a hard-cash stream from black market sales. In the Ukraine conflict, every foreign soldier who replaces a Russian soldier limits the domestic consequences of the war—and Russia is now targeting approximately six million economic migrants from Kazakhstan, Uzbekistan, and elsewhere in Central Asia.

The growth of Russia’s influence is not inevitable. A comprehensive strategy to engage at-risk nations, dismantle trafficking networks, and anticipate similar tactics can curb Russian advances and compel Russia to rethink its foreign ambitions. The United States taking focused and decisive action toward this goal would protect American interests, strengthen ties with vulnerable nations, and save lives.

Authors: William Mockapetris and Ryan Jurich

Managing Editor: Alex Sarchet

Web Editor: Elizabeth Mattson