Charting a Safer Course: Non-Nuclear Solutions to Nuclear Problems

In the summer of 2021, satellite imagery revealed that China was constructing nearly three hundred additional missile silos capable of housing nuclear-armed intercontinental ballistic missiles (ICBMs). The U.S. Department of Defense estimates that China will have one thousand nuclear warheads capable of reaching targets inside the continental United States by the end of the decade, more than quadruple its current amount. Beijing’s dramatic nuclear expansion means that China will soon join Russia as a nuclear peer of the United States, leaving the U.S. with the unprecedented challenge of deterring two nuclear competitors simultaneously.

Some analysts have called for a broad-based increase in the size of the U.S. nuclear force to bolster deterrence in a two-peer environment. This approach is misguided. American adversaries will surely respond by accelerating their nuclear expansions, leaving the U.S. back at square one. Instead, the U.S. should focus on shoring up vulnerabilities in its nuclear command, control, and communications (NC3) infrastructure to ensure it retains control over its weapons and has full situational awareness in all contingencies.

Russia and China have invested in several capabilities in recent years that could pose new threats to NC3, the linchpin of any nuclear deterrent. Anti-satellite weapons could jam or destroy space-based early-warning radars; electronic warfare systems could disrupt key communications links, and precise missiles could destroy the launch facilities that control the ICBM force. To reduce risks to these critical nodes, the U.S. should harden its NC3 against cyber attacks, field more and smaller satellites to complicate enemy satellite targeting, and deploy limited missile defenses in ICBM fields to protect against disabling strikes.

Investing in these systems will close gaps in the most significant vulnerability affecting the U.S. nuclear deterrent: the threat to NC3. Today’s NC3 architecture is more or less as it was during the Cold War. Cyber and precision strike technologies have advanced significantly in the interim, while NC3 has remained stagnant. The size and diversity of America’s nuclear force make a successful first strike against it nearly impossible. However, a counter-NC3 strike could render much of the force incapable without destroying thousands of weapons. Thus, insulating NC3 against such attacks should be of paramount concern.

Missile defenses are helpful for this purpose, and they can also protect against limited coercive attacks from Russia or China and strategic attacks from North Korea or Iran in the future. Coercive attacks consist of small-scale strikes intended to force the U.S. into backing down in a conflict. Missile defenses are designed to bolster deterrence by denial in that they deter enemy attacks by convincing them such attacks would fail. One of the biggest concerns surrounding China’s expanding force is its ability to threaten the U.S. credibly with limited strikes, and missile defenses could effectively deter such attacks.

Modernizing NC3 and fielding effective missile defenses have merits beyond deterrence. Increasing the role of non-nuclear capabilities for strategic deterrence signals the United States’ willingness to reduce the role of nuclear weapons in its security strategy. Not only does reducing the role of nuclear weapons align with stated U.S. goals and commitments under international law, but it could also encourage Russia and China to do the same. Moscow and Beijing primarily size their force structures based on how they perceive threats emanating from Washington. Restraint on the part of the United States could tamp down on fears from adversaries and alleviate security competition. 

Restraint is not a popular position in the halls of power in Washington. The Congressionally-mandated Commission on the Strategic Posture of the United States recommends increasing the nuclear force's size, diversity, and alert status to confront the two-peer nuclear environment. Restarting the capability to produce fissile material for new warheads would take years and substantial investment. Meanwhile, programs for procuring the next generation of nuclear delivery vehicles are already facing programmatic delays and cost overruns. Further, building a more extensive force would be an invitation for China to accelerate its nuclear expansion and signal to Russia that it may need to develop more weapons as well. With a war in Ukraine and mounting tensions in Asia, a three-way nuclear arms race should be something the U.S. seeks to avoid.

In navigating the nuclear two-peer world, prioritizing the security and resilience of the United States’ NC3 infrastructure is the pragmatic choice. Rather than succumbing to outdated strategies, the U.S. should choose a clear-headed and technologically sound alternative. Amidst the shadows of potential conflict, America should avoid an unnecessary arms race toward a beacon of strategic stability.

Author: Jonathan Garcia

Managing Editor: Sebastian Reyes

Web Editor: Douglas Chen-Young