China’s Future Role in Afghanistan – Vested Economic and Security Interests and a Shifting Geopolitical World Order

In the aftermath of the U.S. troop withdrawal from Afghanistan, the international community anxiously anticipates Xi Jinping’s next move. While Western nations are united in their unwillingness to acknowledge the Taliban as Afghanistan’s official government, China’s stance remains intentionally opaque. Chinese security and economic interests in Afghanistan could lead to future cooperation with the Taliban, positioning the People’s Republic of China (“PRC”) into a position of authority in the country, and signaling China’s 21st century approach to great power competition.

From the Taliban’s perspective, China seems to be the most obvious international partner poised to fill the sizable power void left behind in Afghanistan by the U.S. withdrawal. On September 2nd, Taliban spokesperson Zabihullah Mujahid stated that China serves as Afghanistan’s “most important partner,” commending the Chinese government for its willingness “to invest and rebuild our country.” 

In sharp contrast to U.S. policy, China’s foreign economic investment strategy is typically coupled with—or even predicated on—political impartiality. Though, in theory, this should work to the Taliban’s advantage, historically Afghanistan’s precarious security situation has hamstrung the PRC, resulting in relatively minimal Chinese economic development efforts to date. 

Over the past decade, ongoing conflict in Afghanistan rendered two major attempts at Chinese infrastructure projects in Afghanistan operationally infeasible. Though the Mes Aynak copper mine and the Amu Darya oil project are both regarded as development failures in Afghanistan, improved security conditions would allow for infrastructure construction and resource exploration to resume, opening the door for additional Chinese investment opportunities. In fact, less than two weeks after the U.S. withdrawal, China’s Jiangxi Copper Co. Ltd. stated that it was monitoring Afghanistan’s recent security situation, and that it would restart copper mine operations when possible. 

If operations were to resume, this would signify a strong first step, setting the stage for significant Chinese economic investment in Afghanistan. In China’s ideal scenario, improved stability would allow the PRC to incorporate Afghanistan into its Belt and Road Initiative (“BRI”) trade routes, opening access to the Middle East, and further entrenching China’s regional influence.

Given this potential economic trajectory for the PRC, it should come as no surprise that China is invested in a more stable Afghanistan. Aside from China’s ambitious goal of a more stable Afghanistan, the PRC is particularly invested in security conditions as they relate to Uyghur militants in eastern Afghanistan and western China. In China’s worst-case scenario, the Taliban would allow Uyghur jihadist extremists to gain momentum along the Afghanistan-China border. In this scenario, a resurgence of the East Turkestan Islamic Movement (ETIM), and its successor, the Turkestan Islamic Party, a Uyghur-founded Muslim extremist group based in China’s northwest Xinjiang Uyghur Autonomous Region, could stoke separatist sentiments in Xinjiang and pose an insurgent threat to China. Fortunately for Beijing, this scenario appears far less likely in the wake of recent Taliban decision-making. Recent reports of the Taliban forcibly removing Uyghur militants from Afghanistan’s border with China signify increased PRC-Taliban coordination. 

If stability does improve in Afghanistan, this move by the Taliban could mark the beginning of a longer-term quid-pro-quo arrangement, in which the Taliban provides the PRC with security assurances in return for Chinese economic investment. If the vast array of BRI projects currently underway serve as any indication for the PRC’s long-term investment strategy, China’s consolidated geopolitical influence would be sure to follow.

If the PRC can expand economic investment to the heightened level of BRI significance, Beijing could then leverage its amalgamated economic power in Central Asia, Pakistan and Afghanistan for political purposes. We have seen the PRC strategically garner support from United Nations member states, allowing China to evade accountability for allegations of its human rights abuses committed against the Uyghurs. Replicating this model, the PRC could utilize its influence in Afghanistan as a launching pad, establishing a regional bloc of partners who could support Chinese efforts to consolidate political power and expand economic influence without being confined by the West’s standard operating procedures—namely, international human rights law.

What remains to be seen is the degree to which the Taliban will allow the PRC to wield influence in Afghanistan. Provided that mutual interests could be established, it would be to the Taliban’s benefit to establish ties with a regional powerhouse like Beijing. Technically, another uncertainty is whether the PRC will acknowledge the Taliban as Afghanistan’s official government. For the past two months analysts have generally agreed that the PRC is likely to recognize the Taliban, underscoring that it is not a question of if, but when this recognition will happen.

Such official recognition would be a seismic step for the Taliban, who seeks to be recognized on the world stage. Official recognition would enhance political cooperation with the PRC, further solidifying China’s role in shaping Afghanistan’s future. If Chinese political influence were to take hold in Afghanistan, there is considerable risk for intensified corruption, weakened governance, and increased instability in Afghanistan and across the region.

The many contingencies and ‘what if’ scenarios outlined above demonstrate that a loss for the United States in Afghanistan is not an automatic win for the PRC. Improved stability in Afghanistan under Taliban rule seems unlikely in the near future and would hinge on the Taliban’s willingness to cooperate with the international community. However, given the significance of China’s security concerns and potential for economic investment in Afghanistan, the international community should continue to monitor PRC decision-making to better anticipate and navigate shifts to the international world order.  

The U.S. withdrawal from Afghanistan will impact the global balance of power. Although China’s state-owned media capitalized on the opportunity to criticize the U.S.-led war effort and troop withdrawal, China benefited from U.S. involvement in Afghanistan over the past two decades. Diverting U.S. attention and resources from other geopolitical endeavors, the costly War in Afghanistan granted China the time and space to grow its economy, finetune its foreign policy strategy, consolidate its military strength, advance its technological capabilities, and expand its geopolitical influence without U.S. interference. 

From a realpolitik perspective, the absence of U.S. troops in Afghanistan will force Beijing to expend resources addressing the transnational consequences of the Taliban’s takeover, ranging from mass migration to violent extremism and trafficking. Meanwhile, Biden now has the opportunity to meaningfully follow through on the Obama administration’s Pivot to Asia foreign policy strategy. In doing so, the United States could similarly signal and solidify its strategic shift to renewed great power competition. 

Looking ahead, a decisive shift from a 9/11 Era focus on counterterrorism in Afghanistan and the Middle East to a more diplomatic and economic-oriented foreign policy in Asia will ultimately serve U.S. national interests. Building on momentum from the trilateral security partnership recently established between the United States, UK and Australia, the United States should continue forging diplomatic partnerships while advancing economic development strategies in the Asia-Pacific region. Through enhanced diplomacy, targeted development assistance, and strengthened economic ties, the United States can establish strategic partnerships in Asia and thus position itself to more effectively counter China.