North Korean Missiles in the Age of Diplomatic Dormancy

Hoejung-ni Missile Operating Base: 

U.S.-based think-tank Center for Strategic and International Studies (CSIS) announced on February 2, 2022, that it had identified the completion of a possible long-range ballistic missile operation base 15 miles inward near the North Korean (DPRK) border with China. Moreover, the base's proximity to the Chinese-North Korean border constitutes North Korea's Strategic Forces bases that have been completed in recent years. The North Korean government has not made any explicit references or remarks to the existence of the Hoejung-ni base, and its appellation was given due to its proximity to a town of the same moniker. 

According to sources of CSIS, the base will most likely hold “a regiment-size unit equipped with intercontinental ballistic missiles [or ICBMs],” and if ICBMs are not available for placement, more than likely intermediate-range ballistics (IRBMs). The units placed in the Hoejung-ni base, whether ICBMs or IRBMs, will delineate a key component of the ever-evolving strategy of North Korean leadership: the proliferation of strategic-level deterrence and strike capabilities within the country to deter U.S. encroachment. According to analysts at CSIS, the construction timeline of the base reaches around 20 years, suggesting a significant level of planning and development, and is not subject to previous denuclearization talks conducted with the United States.

 

Deterrence as Motivation During Expansion:  

The construction and location of the possible missile base is not only a deterrent of pre-emptive strikes from the United States as North Korea strives to expand the arsenal of its most important weapons, but the North Korean leader Kim Jong-un uses these missile tests as a signal towards the United States and its political leaders. Moreover, North Korea has fired nine missiles within the first three months of 2022, and the message is unmistakable: North Korea wants to force the United States into re-engagement and heed the economically ailing country. 

As its air force and air defense system are weak, North Korea concealing their missiles is expected and is the country's best defensive strategy. However, in recent years, the North Korean government has made it particularly difficult for the United States by constructing facilities and moving weapons, most underground and now near the North Korean-Chinese border. The Hoejung-ni base being only 15 miles off the Chinese border makes any pre-emptive strike difficult, as it jeopardizes impinging Chinese security and risks the ire of China. The position of the base keeps North Korea's prized possessions far away from South Korea's growing military defenses, such as conventional missiles and stealth jets. 

North Korea’s recent missile tests experienced a brief interlude during the 2022 Winter Olympics; however, according to South Korean officials, missile launches resumed on February 27th, one week following the Olympics' Closing ceremony. While individually, the missile launch tests may not amount to much, but the increasing propensity of these tests signals Kim Jong-un's desire to redirect Biden's attention to the peninsula amidst diplomatic dormancy. The year 2022 also marks the beginning of Kim Jong-un’s second decade in office and a chance for Kim to reassert his authority with a continual buildup of arms. Kim sees the development of the country’s arsenal as: (1) a prized possession that defends North Korea against any and all possible foreign invasion; (2) a negotiation tool to use against the United States; and (3) a force that runs parallel to economic and political development. 

Implications for the United States as North Korea Aspires for Stronger Weapons Capabilities:

This new missile operation base, alongside the extensive missile launch tests in previous weeks, indicates an increasingly volatile regime demonstrating its growing missile capabilities, risking the security of key U.S. allies in the region, such as South Korea and Japan. Biden stated he is pursuing a “calibrated, practical approach” based on the action-for-action principle towards “complete denuclearization of the Korean peninsula” while maintaining a stern deterrence principle. The Biden administration has reduced its economic pressure on North Korea, and its overtures have been routinely rejected; all the while, Kim has increased missile tests, and the development of its arsenal endures, placing the U.S.’s regional allies at risk. This growing aggression also implies Biden’s current strategy towards North Korea is not working and needs restructuring in favor of a more aggressive and active approach. 

The negligence of sanctions imposed against North Korea by the United States and the United Nations has atrophied. The sanctions are bypassed without continual enforcement and updates leading to a loss of effectiveness. Kim has taken advantage of this inactive environment with veiled fuel imports and shell companies to access the international financial system. Kim views his missile and nuclear armory as something that helps maintain stability, and an increased arsenal equals more robust negotiating capabilities. Ultimately, Kim seeks to normalize North Korean missile and nuclear capabilities without consequences. 

The Biden administration must convince Kim that these weapons are more of a liability and the continual proliferation of arms risks the stability of his regime. The Biden administration must focus on foreign threat reduction: trying to stop the production of fissile missile weapons, signing test bans and missile technology control agreements, and bolstering the ROK-US-Japan military and intelligence capabilities. However, in his State of the Union speech earlier this year, Biden did not mention North Korea or any policy ideas surrounding North Korea, the first sitting U.S. President to do so since the establishment of the DPRK. If Biden continues to ignore North Korea, Kim might see it as provocation for more erratic and volatile behavior and might test the commitments and limits of the United States.

Isabelle Brito, Staff Writer

Isabelle Brito is an M.A. candidate at the George Washington University’s Elliott School of International Affairs with a concentration in East Asia-U.S. relations. She holds a B.A. in International Relations from Florida International University. She can be reached at ibrit008@gwu.edu.

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