Reconciliation Between Baghdad and Erbil is Key to Iraqi Counterterrorism Efforts

On December 9, 2017, Iraqi Prime Minister Haidar al-Abadi declared victory over the Islamic State of Iraq and Syria (ISIS). The U.S.-led Coalition against ISIS, along with the ground military campaigns of Kurdish Peshmerga and Iran-backed Popular Mobilization Forces (PMF) Shi’a militias, reclaimed Iraqi territory and drove ISIS underground. These military efforts effectively relegated the group to a low-level insurgency, deprived of the territorial sovereignty and strategic territorial bases necessary to plan and conduct major operations. However, the dynamics that facilitated the rise of ISIS still plague Iraq today, specifically sectarianism, state-sanctioned violence by security forces, and a factionalized security sector. The ongoing dispute between the Kurdish Regional Government (KRG) and the Iraqi central government exacerbates these fissures, requiring the United States to mediate and resolve the political impasse to prevent the reemergence of the Islamic State.

The Islamic State is exploiting security gaps engendered by the long-standing political dispute between Erbil and Baghdad to undermine local governance, aggravate sectarian tensions, and degrade Iraqi and Kurdish military forces. The Islamic State is notably active in the disputed territories of Kirkuk, Salahaddin, and Diyala provinces. On November 27, 2021, an unnamed Peshmerga official confirmed ISIS conducted over 200 attacks between January and November 2021 in the disputed territories, resulting in the deaths of more than 350 people. While Kurdish Peshmerga, Iraqi Security Forces (ISF), and Iran-backed Shi’a militias continue to conduct counterterrorism operations against ISIS, existing tensions and competition between these different security elements inhibit Iraq’s ability to fight the Islamic State. These tensions have deep-roots in post-2003 Iraqi political development and have intensified following the 2017 referendum on Kurdish independence.

Baghdad and Erbil have seemingly irreconcilable differences  in the disputed territories. Erbil seeks to annex and integrate Kurdish-populated districts and locales into the Kurdish Regional Government. Conversely, Baghdad wants to preserve Iraq’s territorial integrity and prevent any KRG attempts to annex these disputed areas. While political status and demographic make-up are core aspects of the dispute, the region’s oil fields make the territories vital to the KRG and Iraqi central government. In 2014, the Islamic State occupied the disputed territories and integrated them into the caliphate, expelling the Iraqi Armed Forces from the areas. The Kurdish Peshmerga liberated these areas, provided security, and, most notably, established control over oil-rich Kirkuk. On September 25, 2017, KRG President Masoud Barzani held a referendum for Kurdish independence that included Kirkuk and the other disputed territories, prompting the Iraqi military action.

Following the referendum, Iran-backed Popular Mobilization Forces (PMF) units participated in Baghdad’s campaign to retake disputed territories from Kurdish security forces. Consequently, these Shi’a militias consolidated their security footprint and expanded their influence in the region to the detriment of ethnic harmony and security cooperation. Recent events highlight the danger of Iran-backed Shi’a militia entrenchment in these territories. According to an Iraqi security official, Iran-backed proxies launched eight rockets on Peshmerga positions near Kirkuk just days before the parliament’s first post-election session on January 9th. Iran-backed Shi’a political parties suffered a disastrous defeat in the recent October 10th parliamentary elections, severely reducing their political leverage in future government formation negotiations. However, despite this newfound political decline, the militias still wield considerable military capabilities to pressure political rivals. The rocket attack was an apparent effort to dissuade Kurdish political parties from excluding Iran-backed Shi’a political parties in the government formation process. The attack demonstrated the Shi’a militias’ willingness to subordinate immediate Iraqi national security interests (counter-ISIS) in pursuit of parochial, self-serving political objectives.

The Peshmerga shouldn’t have to face attacks by ostensible arms of the Iraqi state, especially given the Peshmerga’s central role in fighting ISIS remnants in the disputed territories. Additionally, Iran-backed PMF units, along with the Iraqi Armed Forces, conduct counterterrorism operations against ISIS in the Hamrin mountains of Diyala province. Fighting between security forces diverts much needed resources, degrades the capabilities of potential partners, and perpetuates the instability ISIS needs to thrive and resurge. Counterterrorism efforts would be better supported through close cooperation between the various security organs. However, political differences between Baghdad and Erbil, along with decades of mistrust, have stifled any efforts to conduct joint operations or delineate respective security outposts. 

In addition to the competition between Iraq’s myriad security institutions, the presence of Iran-backed, Shi’a militia groups in these multi-ethnic, multi-sectarian areas has the potential to reignite sectarian grievances and tensions, key factors in ISIS’ initial rise to power. On October 27, Islamic State fighters ambushed and massacred 11 Shi’a civilians in al-Rashad village of Diyala province, galvanizing local Shi’a populations to retaliate against unaffiliated Sunni villagers in neighboring Nahr al-Imam village. Shi’a tribesmen and fighters associated with Iran-backed PMF militias allegedly participated in the attack, raising fears of a potential escalatory cycle of violence. Many Sunni populations experienced violence at the hands of Iran-backed Shi’a militias during the war against ISIS. Continued targeting, intimidation, and forced displacement of Sunni populations by these groups will only revive the grievances that bolstered the Islamic State in the first place. Therefore, the United States must address the underlying issues that foster terrorism and avoid the ad-hoc counterterrorism policies of previous administrations.

The United States and international bodies such as the United Nations Assistance Mission to Iraq (UNAMI) should play a mediating role to resolve these disputes. First, the United States and UNAMI can facilitate negotiations and encourage Kurdish and Iraqi parties to establish mutually agreed-upon security outposts. The absence of significant Kurdish and ISF outposts gives ISIS free reign to terrorize local populations and conduct attacks against security forces. This would also require the establishment of joint operation centers that could communicate intentions, minimize distrust, and ensure one security institution does not perceive the other’s movements as inherently threatening or encroaching. The Iraqi government and Peshmerga have entertained similar initiatives before, but have not realized them. The United States and UNAMI should also encourage political negotiations in parallel with security talks, especially since the dispute is fundamentally rooted in the legal status of the disputed territories. The potential formation of a new Iraqi government with reduced Iranian influence provides the opportune time to scale back Shi’a militia footprint in the disputed areas, deploy professionalized Iraqi Armed Forces divisions, and engage in serious negotiations with Erbil. While the United States is rightfully focused on Shi’a militia activities in Iraq, counterterrorism vis-à-vis ISIS is still a core national security interest and Baghdad-Erbil reconciliation will serve this interest.