Stopping Online Terrorism: Pulling the Plug on the Russian Imperial Movement
From November 2016 to January 2017, Gothenburg’s citizens lived in fear. Explosions tore through the Swedish city’s streets, maiming a civilian and destroying a migrant center and a left-wing bookstore. When the Swedish Security Service finally apprehended the bombers, their identities as members of the neo-fascist Nordic Resistance Movement shocked nobody due to the group’s public willingness to employ violence against their ideological enemies. But even with these connections to domestic radicals, the explosive schematics’ foreign origin and clear connections to extremist rallying calls across cyberspace affirmed this plot’s true mastermind: The Russian Imperial Movement.
The Russian Imperial Movement is a far-right terrorist organization first organized in the wake of the Soviet Union’s collapse. It champions ultranationalist monarchism, Orthodox Christian supremacy, and the Russian Empire’s return. The group’s online tactical guidance and propaganda facilitate attacks and take advantage of law enforcement’s limited capacity to regulate these terrorists’ enduring presence. A better public-private partnership is necessary to stop this online threat before further attacks are conducted across Western states. The United States would eliminate the Russian Imperial Movement’s strongholds in the virtual world by formally engaging alternative social media platforms' parent companies in dialogue.
The Russian Imperial Movement actively threatens the security of the United States and its allies because, unlike its far-right predecessors and contemporaries, the Russian Imperial Movement perfects long-standing trends in right-wing tendencies. Far-right extremists are infamous for both their early adoption of social media and decentralized terrorist cells numbering in the hundreds. But the Russian Imperial Movement’s core membership of hardened fighters, estimated in the thousands, is fervently supported by over 50,000 online followers. Their prolific Internet usage also establishes transnational connections to other more disorganized far-right organizations, like the Nordic Resistance Movement or The Base, which the Russian Imperial Movement trains and inspires to commit attacks in friendly states. Finally, the Russian Federation tacitly grants the Russian Imperial Movement freedom to act so long as its operations address mutual objectives, like destabilizing its enemies.
Unfortunately, current policy only addresses the Russian Imperial Movement’s physical presence. In 2020, the Departments of State (DOS) and the Treasury (USDT) designated the organization as a Specially Designated Global Terrorist Group— organizations or individuals whose devastating potential for terrorist activity requires financial restrictions based on Executive Order 13224— because of its grey-zone activity in Central Africa, Libya, Syria, and Ukraine. Along these lines, the USDT identified high-level members, such as Stanislav Shevchuk and Alexander Zhuchkovsky, as Specially Designated Global Terrorists subject to sanctions. However, a spree of letter bombings across Spain in 2022 shows that the Russian Imperial Movement remains capable of exerting its will abroad despite U.S. policy actions. These limitations in levying such constraints point to a neglected cyber frontier where oversight is needed most: the Internet.
The United States faces constraints in the digital space, as it must uphold freedom of speech when prosecuting transnational terrorist activities online. Private social media companies that enforce terms of service are far more successful in decreasing such groups' online presence. However, restrictions on mainstream Western platforms only push the Russian Imperial Movement onto alternative social media, like Telegram and VKontakte (VK). Its operations continue in relative safety online, so integrating these companies into broader anti-terrorism initiatives is necessary.
A key reason the United States should work with alternative social media companies is to address the blind spots in technological regulation that terrorists commonly exploit. Applications with encryption technology and limited community guidelines are attractive terrorist havens, allowing these groups to operate with impunity. Pressing these companies to join broader initiatives, like the Global Internet Forum to Counter Terrorism (GIFCT), would compel them to demonstrate self-regulatory efforts before attaining membership. This move would significantly reduce the Russian Imperial Movement’s online scope.
Alternative social media companies are also an excellent pathway toward effective regulation since private companies do not face the same legal hurdles as federal authorities. The First Amendment prevents government regulation of extremist activities that do not constitute explicit threats or imminent violence, as ruled in Brandenburg v. Ohio. In contrast, Section 230 of the Communications Decency Act allows private companies far greater scope to remove violent or offensive content from their platforms.
Finally, engaging alternative social media services encourages companies of all sizes to act responsibly. Large companies like Amazon, Facebook, and Twitter often significantly contribute to initiatives challenging terrorist operations online. This overreliance on major businesses potentially minimizes the role of smaller corporate entities. Intentionally diversifying involvement would rectify imbalances and unify all actors behind the common goal of enhanced regulatory efforts. The United States can achieve this incorporation by mediating conversations surrounding coordination and leadership between diverse companies. It can also make formal suggestions for the membership composition of particular projects within organizations like GIFCT. Overall, policymakers must treat these initiatives as partnerships, which require leadership through mediation and compromise rather than delegation.
As with VK and its Russian government shareholders, alternative social media controlled by unyielding organizations will reject U.S. government proposals. Yet outlining the benefits of public-private partnerships may entice more amenable alternative platforms in the United States, Canada, and the United Arab Emirates. For companies struggling to regulate their sites independently, further integration facilitates sharing helpful software and expertise that would rapidly improve enterprises’ regulation capabilities. For companies needing additional funding, the United States’ vocal desire to enhance standardization indicates that it would be open to assisting cooperative firms. All ventures have a price, and these perks would win support from groups inclined to listen.
The Russian Imperial Movement thrives in the virtual world. It utilizes social media to coordinate future attacks across the United States as it did in Gothenburg. However, this digital reliance is also the organization’s greatest vulnerability. Formally engaging alternative social media platforms’ parent companies would enable the United States to improve and diversify existing public-private partnerships and pull the plug on the Russian Imperial Movement. It would remain in darkness, and our security’s future would brighten.
Author: Ethan Ingram
Managing Editor: Sebastian Reyes
Web Editor: Kate Maughan