The Aftermath of Intervention in Afghanistan: What Comes Next?

The collapse of Afghanistan’s government has marked the sudden culmination of a 20-year-long foreign invasion and occupation. The abrupt and unconditional withdrawal of U.S. forces was subsequently followed by the Taliban seizure of capital city Kabul. The ensuing widespread public panic signaled to the world the prospect of a large-scale humanitarian crisis. 

The Taliban’s quick establishment of dubious de facto control in Afghanistan reflected yet another failure of U.S. foreign policy. While the initial military intervention was conducted under the pretense of preventing Al-Qua’ida from using the country as a stronghold, the long-term U.S. presence in Afghanistan has elicited skepticism as to the intentions of the Western powers that have occupied the region. A long history of U.S. intervention in Afghan affairs can be observed, notably in the rise of religious extremism in the country and increase in internal conflict.

Special Inspector General for Afghanistan Reconstruction (SIGAR) reports over 7 years have noted the growing influence of the Taliban. In their 52nd quarterly report, SIGAR reported numerous offensives and increased incidents of enemy-initiated attacks by the Taliban against Afghan National Defense and Security forces. In early August, reports revealed 58 civilian casualties within the first five days of the month with over 400-odd districts having been taken. 

Despite indications that the Taliban would continue to conquer Afghanistan following the exit, the United States proceeded as planned. Given that U.S. investments in Afghanistan’s security have been insufficient in achieving the expected results, the resurgence of Taliban activity across Afghanistan should have signaled the possibility of failure. Overwhelming evidence and intelligence signaled an imminent takeover; however, U.S. representatives insist that this outcome could not have been predicted nor could it have been avoided.

Although President Biden and the NATO Secretary General pointed the blame at Afghan leadership for the fall of the state to the Taliban, an internal division has emerged within Biden’s administration regarding the burden of responsibility. It was President Trump’s administration however, that bypassed the existing Afghan government to openly negotiate with the Taliban in February 2020. The public blame game persisted when President Biden and former President Trump criticized one other for the aftermath of the withdrawal. NATO’s “enduring partnership” with Afghanistan after their respective withdrawal raises additional questions of accountability. 

Accusing Afghanistan’s leadership of simply not caring enough to defend their country, particularly when NATO and the U.S. have undertaken capacity-building and security-oriented missions within Afghanistan, is a thinly-veiled attempt to absolve themselves of responsibility for the government’s collapse. 

Contrary to the numerous declarations made that nation-building was never a facet of the U.S. mission in Afghanistan, the pledge made by President Bush to reconstruct the country post-destabilization suggests otherwise. Reconstruction is understood as a tenet of post-intervention efforts, though its application is not prescriptive under the Responsibility to Protect. Now, a dilemma arises concerning how much of a burden the United States should bear in what has largely been denounced as a botched withdrawal from Afghanistan.

Mishaps by the United States were frequently observed by SIGAR, including but not limited to: the United States negotiating with the Taliban prior to the collapse of the government, non-implementation of a nationwide ceasefire, insufficient data collection and monitoring, mismanagement of resources resulting in large-scale waste and fraud, impractical training for law enforcement, inadequate oversight and misuse of funds appropriated for reconstruction, all of which are exacerbated by the drastic reduction of reconstruction funding. 

The report additionally questioned “whether the level of foreign assistance during this uncertain period is sufficient to prevent state collapse,” while spotlighting that the reconstruction mission was at greater risk in 2021 than it ever had been before. 

The threats posed to women’s rights were highlighted by the SIGAR high-risk list, namely with regard to how the Taliban interpret “Islamic values” as they pertain to women. The progress that Afghan women and girls made is in jeopardy; for girls seeking an education, employment, or simply to remain single, the future is especially uncertain. The Taliban’s use of force when women took to the streets in protest of the interim government indicates the urgency of the situation and the need for a timely response. Concerns about women’s rights appear to have been well-founded as girls were excluded from school reopening plans and the Ministry of Women’s Affairs was replaced by an institution dubbed a “moral police.”

As Afghans attempt to flee the country in droves, U.S. evacuation efforts are falling short with extensive vetting procedures and multi-step processes preventing Afghans from being able to leave. Many world leaders have either outright rejected or imposed extreme limitations on accepting asylum seekers. As an exodus appears inevitable, the United States cannot wash its hands clean of its controversial tenure in Afghanistan. The violence perpetrated has arguably been disproportionate to the results yielded from the occupation, and reconstruction efforts have failed in establishing the security that was promised upon intervening in the region. The Pentagon acknowledged the August 29 drone strike as a “tragic mistake,” backtracking on previous statements about the attack that resulted in the deaths of 10 citizens. Yet, it remains doubtful that the United States will fully be held accountable for this significant error.

It is clear that the United States must now act in a non-military capacity; refunding and reevaluating the approach to reconstruction is the minimum required to uphold the 19-year-old American pledge to ensure “a future of progress and stability for the Afghan people.”

In terms of immediate action, U.S. policymakers must commit to evacuating and resettling Afghan refugees at a higher rate and with fewer restrictions. There is a distinct moral obligation that the United States has to Afghan refugees and internally displaced persons still within Afghanistan, among whom are women, girls, and civilians who assisted U.S. and government endeavors under the impression that they would be protected against retaliation. 

Additionally, the United States and the international community must impose sanctions on the Taliban and refrain from acknowledging their government as legitimate. Sanctions have been called for by numerous Afghan groups and representatives. There is justification under Articles 39 and 41 of the UN Charter for coercive measures to be put into place when faced with a threat to peace. These circumstances would qualify as such a threat both to nationals and the global community as a whole. Discretion must be used to ensure that sanctions are not extended to aid organizations and local NGOs providing humanitarian services. 

In the long term, a localized approach must be taken to international assistance and engagement. The way in which funding is used is key to ensuring that an international presence in the country has a positive impact. The contributions of local organizations and partners must not be overlooked in the global response. Listening to the needs of people on the ground is crucial to the development of effective frameworks for reconstruction and accountability. Enhancing localization would shift the existing approach into an international effort to prevent the Taliban from scaling back fundamental rights. 

A prompt and collective response is necessary to prevent this situation from devolving further, taking into consideration the unique risks posed to Afghan women and girls. Inaction, however, is unacceptable.