One Year After Iraq’s October Revolution - A Look Back and a Look Ahead
While 2020 has proven to be a tumultuous year across the globe, it has been a particularly turbulent time for Iraq. In what is now known as the October Revolution, thousands of Iraqis first took to the streets in October 2019, demanding an overhaul of Iraq’s corrupt ruling elite and an end to sectarian politics. As the movement continued to strengthen and spread across the country, former Prime Minister Adil Abdul-Mahdi resigned in November 2019. Following six months of chaotic political infighting, former National Intelligence Director Mustafa al-Kadhimi took office as Iraq’s interim prime minister in May 2020, amid continued protests and the COVID-19 pandemic.
In response to protester demands, al-Kadhimi’s platform has centered on the restoration of Iraq’s sovereignty through anti-corruption, anti-sectarianism, and security reforms. As an appointed transitional prime minister lacking a political backing of his own, al-Kadhimi has needed to take incremental steps to enforce his agenda since taking office. Though his progress has been somewhat promising, his continuous attempts at reform incite aggressive resistance from Iran-backed Shia opposition.
Al-Kadhimi’s pledge to uproot corruption and dismantle sectarian-based political decision making poses a significant threat to Iraq’s Shia political establishment. In fact, al-Kadhimi faced strong pushback from one of the most powerful Shia blocs in Iraq’s parliament during his bid for the prime minister appointment. Many members of the Iran-backed Fateh Coalition initially vetoed al-Kadhimi’s candidacy for prime minister, accusing him of operating as a U.S. agent.
In order to placate Shia opposition and secure his ministerial appointment, al-Kadhimi was forced to walk back his initial campaign promises before even taking office. In direct response to protester demands, al-Kadhimi initially pledged to disband Iraq’s sectarian-based power sharing system, known by Iraqis as the muhasasa. According to the 2003-era quota-based political system, Iraq’s key positions of leadership are designated along strictly ethno-sectarian lines. Most notably, the muhasasa ascribes the most powerful position of prime minister to a representative of Iraq’s Shia majority.
Signifying both citizen grievances and oppositional strength, the muhasasa is a central symbol of the October Revolution. Over the course of the protest movement, Iraqis fervently called for an end to the muhasasa, denouncing the system for further entrenching sectarian conflict and perpetuating corruption. By effectively rejecting protestor demands and thwarting al-Kadhimi’s plans for reform, the Shia political establishment has demonstrated its signature adversarial strategy and overarching goal: continued domination of Iraqi politics.
Though al-Kadhimi was not able to overturn the muhasasa, in recent months he has made progress on another one of his central campaign promises. In an effort to dismantle the traditional influence of sectarian politics on Iraq’s institutions, al-Kadhimi has prioritized Iraq’s security sector reform. Since taking office, al-Kadhimi has replaced Iraq’s top security officials who were originally appointed along sectarian lines, including the director of counterterrorism, national security advisor, and manager of intelligence, among others. Unfortunately, similar to al-Kadhimi’s battle against the Shia political establishment, his security reforms take place against a backdrop of Iran-backed Shia resistance.
Ultimately, al-Kadhimi’s ability to reform Iraq’s security sector hinges on the disproportionate power of Iraq’s central umbrella militia organization, the Hashd al-Shaabi, also known as the Popular Mobilization Forces (PMF). Originally designed to serve as a unified state-sanctioned security organization, the PMF has been fractured and strategically co-opted by Iran-backed Shia militias. By weaponizing the PMF militias and bolstering obstructive political blocs, Iran continues to employ a dual enforcement strategy to maintain the status quo in Iraq. If left unchallenged, Iranian influence will continue to thwart reformative momentum from the October Revolution and undermine Iraqi sovereignty.
Al-Kadhimi has demonstrated an acute understanding of the dual threat of Iranian influence. In an unprecedented act of boldness from Iraqi leadership, the prime minister has aimed to reassert control over Iraq’s security sector by directly confronting Iran-backed Shia militias. In late June, al-Kadhimi ordered a counter-terrorism operation against Kata’ib Hezbollah, one of the strongest Iran-backed Shia militias operating in Iraq.
Though 14 members of the paramilitary group were arrested, they were reportedly detained by their own forces within the PMF and eventually released. This handling of the arrest underscores just how deeply entrenched Iranian influence over Iraqi security institutions has become. As al-Kadhimi continues in his fight to reform, Iran’s grip on power remains difficult to extinguish. Moreover, al-Kadhimi’s provocation of Iran-backed actors continues to be extremely costly, exposing the limitations of the prime minister’s power.
In the aftermath of al-Kadhimi’s raid on Kata’ib Hezbollah, one of the prime minister’s top security advisors, Hisham al-Hashemi, was assassinated outside of his home in Baghdad. This signified a direct blow to al-Kadhimi’s fight against corruption—and the principles of the October Revolution more broadly—as al-Hashemi was a well-known and outspoken opponent of corruption and sectarian politics in Iraq. Although unconfirmed to date, it has been widely agreed by political analysts both inside and outside Iraq that his death likely happened at the hands of Iran-backed Shia militants, in retaliation against al-Kadhimi’s arrests.
Following al-Hashemi’s assassination, Prime Minister al-Kadhimi flew to Washington, D.C. to discuss the strategic partnership between the United States and Iraq. In meetings with President Trump and Secretary of State Pompeo, the United States government (USG) committed to continue supporting Iraq’s security forces in order to curb the power of malign militias and protect Iraq’s national sovereignty. Pompeo underscored the importance of combating groups such as Kata’ib Hezbollah, and Trump reassured the Prime Minister directly, stating “…if Iran should do anything, we will be there to help the Iraqi people.”
In the face of mounting sectarian violence in Iraq, al-Kadhimi’s need for continued US support is now particularly crucial. In September alone, there were over two dozen Iran-backed Shia militia attacks, including strikes on U.S. and coalition forces. As the United States continues to withdraw American troops, attacks have intensified in severity, posing an increasing threat to Iraq’s stability. In an unexpected reversal of U.S. policy, Pompeo has recently threatened to close the American embassy in Baghdad unless Iraqi leadership effectively quells the militia attacks.
The Trump administration has not provided an explicit explanation for the shift in U.S. policy in Iraq. However, the potential embassy closure reportedly could be connected to U.S. intelligence reports of pre-election threats against American forces in Iraq. In fact, Trump’s re-election concerns could potentially be influencing the pending embassy decision in more ways than one. In the final month of his first term as president, Trump is likely hoping to maintain his claim of restoring deterrence against Iran while also following through on his campaign promise to withdraw U.S. troops from Iraq.
Looking beyond the U.S. election timeline, it is becoming increasingly clear that Iranian influence is far from deterred in Iraq. Iran’s dual enforcement strategy relies on the simultaneous attack of Iraq’s governance and security institutions, making U.S. diplomatic and security support absolutely crucial for Prime Minister al-Kadhimi. The United States’ sudden ceding of Iraq to Iran would render the last two decades of U.S. investment in Iraqi sovereignty essentially useless. For stability in Iraq, the cross-cutting consequences of an American embassy closure combined with a continued troop withdrawal would be “catastrophic.”
As protest momentum picks back up following the anniversary of Iraq’s October Revolution, U.S. support is now especially consequential in Iraq’s ongoing fight for reform. The resumption of civic activism could provide al-Kadhimi with the mobilized coalition backing he needs to win re-election in June 2021 and continue dismantling sectarian-fueled corruption in Iraq. Al-Kadhimi’s precarious fight for Iraqi sovereignty will likely implode without U.S. backing. At this critical juncture in Iraqi politics, now is not the time for American abandonment.
