Pipelines and Progress: Laying Down Energy Security in the Heart of Europe

The arrest of Russian dissident Alexei Navalny following his return to Moscow has once again brought the Nord Stream 2 pipeline’s viability into question. Critics claim the pipeline is geopolitically motivated; the German government insists it is a mere commercial venture. Berlin’s stance has received its fair share of scrutiny, yet objections to the Russian-German venture in the European Parliament have been fruitless, if not a distraction from other countries’ complacency in its completion. The near-completion of the project is indicative of the EU’s inability to address Russian influence in the region. As such, the pipeline has become a symbol of European weakness regarding Russian belligerency. However, staking European security on one project is shortsighted and undermines the ability of individual member states to protect their interests. In light of the EU’s unwillingness and inability to kill Nord Stream 2, the Visegrad 4 (V4), composed of Poland, Hungary, Slovakia and the Czech Republic, has an opportunity to prove the alliance’s influence and cohesion. By rallying around the development of the region’s natural gas capacity, the alliance will gain leverage vis-a-vis Russia, allowing it to take a legitimate and unified stance against unwanted Russian influence. 

Despite divisions within the EU on the project and various American sanctions, Nord Stream 2 is expected to be operable as soon as June 2021. Half a decade of deliberation in Brussels to block the pipeline has done little more than to delay the project, which is at 95 percent completion. More importantly, Russia appears to have no intention of changing its behavior, given its continued aggression in the face of sanctions and European aversion to the project. The shameless poisoning and arrest of Alexei Navalny makes that clear. The pipeline is therefore problematic for the EU, but a supranational solution has proven untenable. Beyond expressions of grave concern, the situation begets coalitions that operate outside of the traditional framework of the EU to take action.

In 2015, the V4 countries started in a position of unified objection to Nord Stream 2, along with three other European countries. However, the declaration hardly reveals the true positions of the V4 member states, which are much more fragmented. Poland holds the harshest views of Russia as a security threat and has spearheaded efforts to seek natural gas sources aside from Russian-owned gas company Gazprom through EU and regional channels. The remaining V4 members have demonstrated tacit consent to Nord Stream 2, albeit for varying reasons. The Czech Republic and Slovakia would benefit from the pipeline, expanding their roles as natural gas transit states by allowing for increased distribution to the Balkans. Meanwhile, Hungary is not directly affected by Nord Stream 2, but benefits from another Gazprom project, the southern TurkStream pipeline, incentivizing their cause to stay in Russia’s good graces. 

A 2010 Atlantic Council report noted, “a Russia that sells sensibly in the market can be a valuable partner; a Russia that dominates the market is not a partner but rather a continued source of concern.” 11 years later, this statement remains true. Indeed, a unified effort to challenge Gazprom’s domination of the European gas market could invite backlash from Moscow, which may be a factor in the hesitancy displayed by Bratislava, Budapest, and Prague. However, the long-term benefits of reduced reliance on Russian gas include enhanced Central European energy security, economic strength, and diplomatic clout. For V4 leadership, then, the marginal benefit of diversifying energy supply far outweighs the marginal cost of maintaining or increasing dependency on Russia for natural gas supplies.

The V4’s current lip service to unity is costly. The irregular and uncoordinated support for a regional alternative to Russian gas has produced general skepticism to new non-Russian projects, particularly when they gain the backing of the United States. This skepticism, however, only strengthens the need for synchronized action from the V4 countries. If the V4 recognizes the potential security threat that lies in Nord Stream 2 and TurkStream, but cannot adequately address it politically and economically, strength in unity may be difficult to find against other threats. Regional efforts may not eliminate Russia as a gas supplier for Europe, but incubating competition through the exploitation of foreign liquified natural gas (LNG) imports and Black Sea and Caspian Sea reserves will limit Russia’s overall EU energy market share. To sufficiently challenge Russian market-share, the V4 must proceed in lock step to ensure the success of planned projects like the Three Seas Initiative (TSI). Capitalizing on these opportunities promotes better cohesion between the V4 members while weakening Russia’s position relative to the group.

The Three Seas Initiative (TSI) provides substantial context for Central European energy collaboration outside of the EU framework. A primary project within the initiative is the North-South gas corridor, which offers Poland the opportunity to stop importing Russian gas completely as early as 2022. To the north, Norwegian LNG from the Baltic Pipe project combines with LNG from various suppliers accepted at the Gdansk and Świnoujście terminals for an aggregate annual supply of 22 billion cubic meters. The corridor ends at the Croatian LNG terminal at Krk Island, which has the capacity to intake 1.6 billion cubic meters of natural gas annually. The corridor runs through all four countries in the V4 as well as many other Southeastern European countries, making it a net positive for the coalition and region at-large. 

As a regional gas hub, the V4 would wield greater influence in dictating new pipeline projects. Potential remains to connect veteran pipelines such as the South Caucasus pipeline and the newly online Trans-Anatolian Natural Gas pipeline to the Central European states directly through interlocutors in Southeastern Europe, further diversifying European natural gas imports. To that end, phase one of the BRUA project was recently completed, building on the 4.5 billion cubic meter annual flow offered by the Arad-Szeged pipeline between Romania and Hungary and strengthening the former’s role in the regional energy market.

Investing in Caucasus and Central Asian gas maintains Ukraine’s role as a natural gas transit state, as pipelines connecting these sources to Ukrainian pipelines through the Black Sea are a cheap alternative to Nord Stream 2 and TurkStream. This would complement the planned cross-border interconnections that will connect Polish LNG imports to the Ukrainian energy market, as well as existing backflows from Slovakia and Hungary to Ukraine.  

The steps taken by the V4 countries foreshadow a future in which regional coalitions exercise greater power when the EU framework is inefficient and ineffective. The V4 might not be able to change Berlin’s commitment to the completion of Nord Stream 2, but it is more than willing to invest in energy projects that are the best counter to Russian gas dominance of the EU energy market at this time. While the coalition is on the right track with the Three Seas Initiative, collaboration with non-TSI states in the near future will strengthen the region’s energy security and contest Russian diplomatic influence in the region.