Space Power: A Unique Military Asset

Abstract

The utilization of space has become an important military asset in recent years. Although often compared with air and sea power, space is its own unique venue for the military. The use of space assets, namely satellite communication and GPS navigation, during the Gulf War provided coalition forces with substantial advantages. This paper investigates the concept of space power and its impact on US forces. The paper looks at space separate from air and sea and discusses future implications of the use of space power in aiding military operations.


The United States’ space power capabilities are used to protect the nation from threats against its national security. Political and military theorists define power in various ways. The definition of power by Joseph Nye, political scientist and former dean of the Harvard Kennedy School of Government, provides a building block for the conceptualization of space power. He defines power as, “the ability to achieve one’s purposes or goals.”1 This definition postulates that military power is the ability to defeat one’s enemy in battle, whatever the arena may be. Outer space has emerged as a new arena for military applications. While the definitions of space are numerous, the Fédération Aéronautique Internationale, the World Air Sports Federation, in Lausanne, France has defined a generally accepted concept of outer space. The Federation defines activities in space as those that occur at or above the Karman line, or 100km above the surface of the Earth.2 Combining these two concepts, space power constitutes military assets located at or above the Karman line used for dominance over land-based enemies. Professor Robert Pfaltzgraff, Jr., of the Fletcher School, Tufts University, describes this idea stating, “Space power is a multifaceted concept that, like power in international relations theory, is ‘complex, indeterminate, and intangible,’ as Peter L. Hays put it.”3 

This paper analyzes the nature of US space power. First, the paper defines space power’s role during the Gulf War. The next two sections compare and contrast power in space with air and sea power. Finally, the paper closes with a discussion of the importance of space power over the next 15-20 years and future policy implications.

PART 1: SPACE POWER’S ROLE IN THE GULF WAR

Space power became a key element of precision warfare for United States forces during the 1990-1991 Gulf War. By enhancing existing forces on land, air, and sea, space capabilities provided coalition forces with a substantial advantage in the war. Satellite technologies enabled precision bombing, GPS navigation, and unparalleled communicative abilities. As noted by Michael O’Hanlon, senior fellow at the Brookings Institute, “space systems, notably the global positioning system satellite constellation, were used to help American soldiers navigate in the featureless desert starting most notably in the 1991 war against Iraq.”4 Other advantages American forces employed as a result of space technologies included “intelligence preparation of the battlefield, warning, battle space awareness, operational timing and tempo, synchronization, maneuver, targeting, the integrated application of firepower, and battle damage assessment.”5 Through the use of these military systems, operation in space proved to be an effective military asset.

The Persian Gulf War was the first war where knowledge and operations from space yielded a strong strategic advantage. This war was “the first time missiles were used to shoot down ballistic missiles in combat,” a technique enabled through space-based technologies.6 The space-based advantages in this war, however, were not fully understood on the ground at the time. General Charles Horner, the Commander of United States Central Command Air Forces during the Gulf War, stated, “Many of us in Desert Storm were ignorant of what space could do.”7 Furthermore, General Donald J Kutyna, the Commander of US Space Command during the Gulf War, wrote in July 1991,

“Space forces were there when required, but significant effort was needed to optimize their effectiveness…the capabilities of these systems must be thoroughly ingrained in our peacetime planning and training if we hope to exploit them fully in crisis or combat.”8

The importance of integrating space power assets into normal United States military operations was thus acknowledged after the Gulf War. Previously, because of historical evolution, engineering physics, international cooperation, and other factors, space power was considered merely a supplement to air and sea power. The Gulf War showed the world that power was gained by utilizing space-based operations. Analogies between air and space and sea and space, therefore, do not fully define space as its own medium.

PART 2: FROM AIR TO SPACE

The United States’ development of military space applications began at the end of World War II.9 Technologies such as advanced radar and jet propulsion led to the development of satellites and rockets. The rise of the Cold War between the United States and the Soviet Union opened up space as a new theater for the military. As described by Professor James Clay Moltz from the National Security Affairs department of the Naval Postgraduate School,

“From the perspective of military planners at the height of the Cold War in the 1950s, the extension of human activity into orbital space presented unprecedented threats and offensive opportunities, suggesting the need for a range of military responses.”10

Reconnaissance satellites in the Cold War “preserved strategic stability,” and satellites have evolved since then to become “competitive military instruments.”11 As the United States furthered its space systems, “analogies to more familiar forms of military competition have been a recurring point of departure for thinking about the military use of near earth space.”12

Although airpower tactics do not fully encompass the details central to operating in space, the lessons the United States military has garnered from operating in the air apply to operating in space in many ways. Strategic bombing in World War II and during the Berlin Airlift demonstrated American air superiority. Operations in the Gulf War further established American dominance as exerted from above. History led many Air Force leaders after World War II to see air and space as a continuum, a single environment for military tactics. Air Force Chief of Staff General Thomas White declared in testimony to the House Appropriations Subcommittee in 1957, “I want to stress that there is no division, per se, between air and space. Air and space is an indivisible field of operations.”13 The Air Force’s use of the term aerospace, air and space combined, helped to solidify the organization’s role in space operations. The US Air Force Basic Doctrine of 1959 stated, “The forces of the Air Force comprise a family of operating systems – air systems, ballistic missiles, and space vehicle systems.”14 In addition, both air and space provide a high-ground vantage point over Earth, allowing operators to see more than from the ground or sea. The boundaries between air and space are only defined insomuch as the Karman line. Air operations occur within the atmosphere, but the atmosphere extends into space. As space capabilities gradually developed, the uniformity of the sky granted the Air Force developmental and operations jurisdiction over both air and space operations.

The Gulf War demonstrated the gains of utilizing space power and established that power in air and in space are two separate arenas, requiring separate policy provisions for development and operations. Although lessons have been learned from the progression of air power into its current position of military power, space is unique. For example, the Air Force was able to bomb buildings from the air and direct airplanes to targets from space in the Gulf War. USSPACECOM’s Vision for 2020 further established the progression of space into its own medium of warfare. It stated,

“As air power developed, its primary purpose was to support and enhance land and sea operations. However, over time, air power evolved into a separate and equal medium of warfare…during the early portion of the 21st century, space power will also evolve into a separate and equal medium of warfare.”15

Applying lessons from air strategy, therefore, could have significant negative impacts upon space operations. Maneuverability of spacecraft and unrestricted flight over territory are just two distinctions between air and space. Although comparisons with airpower help to define space as its own medium, operation on the sea constitutes a stronger analogy with space.

PART 3: HARNESSING LESSONS FROM THE SEA

Many scholars apply theories established through sea exploration and military conquests, to space. In his book, The Influence of Sea Power Upon History, Alfred Thayer Mahan’s argues that “operations in direct support of land forces could be of decisive importance,” “naval supremacy…in defense of a multinational system of free trade,” and “study of history should be the basis of naval office education.”16 Scholars align Mahan’s concepts with “the likely ability of a small number of space-faring states to control upper orbits and keep out adversaries because of their greater technological prowess.”17 The economic value of space, according to this theory, is just as significant as Great Britain’s 19th century maritime dominance. Other key elements in naval operations include international cooperation and defense of free trade. The Outer Space Treaty, signed by the United Nations in 1967, mirrored the “maritime legal principle of ‘freedom of the seas,’ where ships of all nations have free passage on the high seas outside territorial waters,” enabling satellites to orbit without airspace restrictions.18 Additionally, Professor Peter Hays has stated that, “Mahan and [Julian] Corbett’s ideas about having lines of communication, common routes, and choke points have been applied quite directly onto the space medium.”19

Despite many parallels between space and sea power, operations in the two arenas are not always comparable. For instance, space power scholar, Barry Watts, points out that United States anti-satellite operations do not have the same direct force applications of the United States Navy. He stated,

“The historical American approach to orbital space in general, and to space control in particular, diverges substantially from traditional approaches to sea control involving offensive force application into and within the maritime medium.”20

Moreover, the laws and treaties governing space are different from those for the sea. The Navy has the “capacity [and] legal power to research, develop, [and] test weapons” while the Air Force is currently unable to do the same actions for space.21 In addition, economic theories do not apply equally to the two venues. Mahan’s economic concepts are based on imperialist states’ mercantilism, not multinational commerce, as is the case today in space. For instance, satellite communications systems are now an important part of global commerce. Space has had its own significant impact upon the United States military, and it should be valued primarily for its force enhancement capabilities as in conflicts like the 1990-1991 Gulf War.

PART 4: FUTURE SPACE POWER USAGE AND POLICY IMPLICATIONS

Space power has now become part of daily military operations. Space power already provides technologies for battle, intelligence, and communications across continents. The United States is already very reliant on space, and “a widespread loss of space capabilities would prove disastrous for both its military security and its civilian welfare.”22 Space power enables other branches of the military to operate with precision. The Navy and Air Force rely upon space-based systems for daily maneuvers. Space power, however, does not deploy missiles, sink ships, or put men on the ground. Assets from space currently aid the United States military by providing intelligent systems for use during combat. Space power does, on the other hand, give the United States military an advantage over its competition.

Systems from space helped the United States win the Gulf War, and they are a key factor in how America will defend itself in the future. Defense policy should multiply space-based military systems to better enable force enhancement. Policy architects must learn from the history of air and sea operations; new and better technologies create advantages in battle.  Space, unlike air and sea, is more than an operational zone; space’s vast potential has yet to be reached. The Air Force should spend research and development funding on systems to defend against satellite jamming techniques and anti-satellite systems. The Department of Defense (DOD) should evaluate the Air Force and USSPACECOM yearly to evaluate whether space should have its own dedicated military branch. As more countries develop satellites and space systems, the United States must determine whether it will uphold treaties banning weapons systems in space. The nation must develop contingency plans for a war in space, and the DOD should allow for the development of space based weapons systems to be launched at any time. Only then will the United States be prepared to face a potential threat, either on the ground or, eventually, from above.

Historian Brian Sullivan sees space power in the future as more of a question of Earth-based power. He calls this power “Earth power,” defined as “the power exercised over our planet and its inhabitants from orbital space.”23 Instead of seeing “Earth power” as a revolution in military affairs, he sees it as a military technical revolution.24 As such, the application of this power is actually a “major technological innovation in how battles and campaigns are waged, as well as the doctrinal, operational, and tactical innovations adopted in order to employ the new technology effectively.”25

Space exploration today is only 54 years old. In this span of time, men have walked on the moon, developed systems like Google Earth that allow humans to see high resolution photos of almost anything, and have satellite television projected into our homes each night. Yesterday’s technology is quickly becoming obsolete and tomorrow’s space advancements are still unknown. Within 15-20 years, the United States could be waging wars in space or it could be further developing force enhancement capabilities. Policy should, therefore, look to the future with the goal of advancing technological innovation in space.


Endnotes

1 Joseph Nye, “The Changing Nature of World Power,” Political Science Quarterly, Vol.105, No. 2. (Summer 1990) 177.

2 Fédération Aéronautique Internationale, “2011 FAI Statutes,” Lausanne, (France: Fédération Aéronautique Internationale, 2011), i.

3 Robert L. Pfaltzgraff, Jr., “International Relations Theory and Space power” in Toward a Theory of Space power: Selected Essays, ed. Charles D. Lutes, Peter L. Hays, et. al., (Washington, D.C.: National Defense University Press, 2011), 41.

4 Michael O’Hanlon, Neither Star Wars Nor Sanctuary: Constraining the Military Uses of Space, (Washington, D.C.: The Brookings Institute, 2004), 3.

5 Mark Berkowitz, “National Space Policy and National Defense,” in Space power for a New Millennium, ed. Peter L. Hays, James M. Smith, Allan R. Van Tassel, Guy M. Walsh, (New York, NY: McGraw-Hill, 2000), 53.

6 Lester L. Lyles, “Space and Ballistic Missile Defense Programs,” in Space power for a New Millennium, ed. Peter L. Hays, James M. Smith, Allan R. Van Tassel, Guy M. Walsh, (New York, NY: McGraw-Hill, 2000), 107-108.

7 Gary R. Dylewski, “The USAF Space Warfare Center,” in Space power for a New Millennium, ed. Peter L. Hays, James M. Smith, Allan R. Van Tassel, Guy M. Walsh, (New York, NY: McGraw-Hill, 2000), 92.

8 Ibid, 92.

9 Curtis Peebles, High Frontier: The United States Air Force and the Military Space Program, (Washington, D.C.: Government Printing Office, 1997), i.

10 James Clay Moltz, The Politics of Space Security: Strategic Restraint and the Pursuit of National Interests, (Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press, 2008), 47.

11 O’Hanlon, Neither Star Wars Nor Sanctuary, 1.

12 Barry Watts, The Military Use of Space: A Diagnostic Assessment, Washington, D.C.: Center for Strategic and Budgetary Assessments, 2001, 25.

13 Benjamin S. Lambeth, Mastering the Ultimate High Ground – Next Steps in the Military Uses of Space, Santa Monica, CA: RAND Corporation, 2003, 39-40.

14 Ibid, 42.

15 Watts, The Military Use of Space, 25.

16 Jon T. Sumida, “Old Thoughts, New Problems: Mahan and the Consideration of Space power,” NDU Space power Theory Study, Washington, D.C.: National Defense University Press, 2011.

17 Moltz, The Politics of Space Security, 18.

18 Peebles, High Frontier, 8.

19 Peter L. Hays, United States Military Space: Into the 21st Century, Maxwell AFB, AL: Air University Press, 2002, 18.

20 Watts, The Military Use of Space, 30.

21 Everett C. Dolman and Henry F. Cooper, Jr., “Increasing the Military Uses of Space,” in Toward a Theory of Space power: Selected Essays, ed. Charles D. Lutes, Peter L. Hays, et. al., Washington, D.C.: National Defense University Press, 2011, 97.

22 Dolman and Cooper, “Increasing the Military Uses of Space,” 97.

23 Brian R. Sullivan, “Space power and America’s Future,” in Space power for a New Millennium, ed. Peter L. Hays, James M. Smith, Allan R. Van Tassel, Guy M. Walsh, New York, NY: McGraw-Hill, 2000, 266.

24 Ibid, 272.

25 Ibid, 273.

Samantha Marquart, Former Contributor

Samantha Marquart is a first-year graduate student in the International Science and Technology Policy program at The George Washington University’s Elliott School of International Affairs. A recent graduate of MIT, Samantha is part of the Space Policy Institute at GW where she focuses on the impact of the commercial spaceflight industry on civil and military space exploration. Samantha is from Dallas, Pennsylvania.

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