Technology and the Crime-Terror Nexus: Threat Convergence in a Digital Age

Abstract

Over the past three decades, scholars and national security authorities have devoted  increasing attention to threats involving the so-called “crime-terror nexus,” which describes varying levels of interaction and overlap between criminal and terrorist entities. Despite  widespread acknowledgement that information technology has played a significant role in  expanding the crime-terror nexus, details of this phenomenon remain unexplored. To fill this gap, this article explores how communications technology, and the Internet in particular,  impacts the crime-terror nexus by opening additional pathways for interaction and acquisition  of novel resources and capabilities among criminal and terrorist organizations. To that end, it presents both objective evidence of crime-terror cooperation and hybridization in cyberspace,  as well as analysis of likely current and future uses of the Internet that may be impacting the  nexus. This article concludes with policy recommendations that security authorities should consider among efforts to address the risks associated with technology and the crime-terror nexus.

The views expressed herein are those of the author alone and do not reflect the views of the U.S. Government  or any other organization with which the author has been associated, past or present.


Introduction 

In July 2007, a U.K. court found al-Qaida’s “god-father of cyberterrorism” and two co defendants guilty of using the Internet to incite murder through terrorism.1 Younis Tsouli and his  accomplices employed computer viruses and phishing scams to steal 37,000 credit card numbers,  which in turn financed online bomb-making tutorials, videos of beheadings, and operational  resources for proposed terrorist attacks in the United States, Europe, and the Middle East.2 This  anecdote demonstrates how criminal means can be employed for terrorist ends, and is indicative of  an emerging relationship between crime and terrorism that has been observed in academic and  government circles in recent decades.  

The “crime-terror nexus,” as this phenomenon has come to be called, refers to overlapping  criminal and terrorist activities, both through cooperation in quid pro quo arrangements and  through hybridization, wherein terrorists adopt the methods of criminals to further their goals, or  vice versa. Although these phenomena have been well documented in existing academic literature,  the above example lends credence to the existing notion that technology is playing a significant role  in widening the crime-terror nexus.  

This article is intended to fill a significant void in research on this topic by presenting the  first in-depth look at how technology, and information technology in particular, is “blurring the  lines” between crime and terrorism. The article begins with a conceptual definition of the crime terror nexus, followed by a literature review that demonstrates the extent of the threat and the need  for additional research on this subject. It then analyzes both real and theoretical manners in which  cyberspace enables cooperation between criminal and terrorist actors and the hybridization of  terrorist and criminal groups. After assessing the likely implications for U.S. national and  transnational security, the article sets forth several policy recommendations that decision makers  may consider to mitigate the risks posed by this threat. The findings herein confirm suspicions  posed in previous research—that technology plays a significant role in widening the crime-terror  nexus—but also suggest that cyberspace is a major and under-acknowledged environment in which  criminals and terrorists can exchange goods and services, learn from one another, and employ the  “other’s” methods to accomplish their malicious objectives.  

Defining the Crime-Terror Nexus 

Scholars have traditionally distinguished criminals from terrorists by contrasting their motives. Criminals are said to be driven primarily by the prospect of economic gain, while terrorists  seek to realize some political or ideological ideal.3 Notwithstanding these delineations, scholars posit  that criminal and terrorist organizations have each changed considerably as a result of post-Cold  War trends, including the spread of diaspora communities around the globe, the rise of weak and  failed states, a decrease in state sponsorship of terrorism, and the growing interconnectedness of  global financial markets.4 This evolution has affected both the methods and motives that each  categorical group employs to further its goals, and is blurring the lines that have previously  distinguished crime from terror.5 The crime-terror nexus represents a conceptual framework that  attempts to describe these dynamic phenomena. Accordingly, it is an umbrella term used to describe  several degrees and directions of interplay between crime and terror, individual criminals and  terrorists, and criminal organizations and terrorist groups.  

Based on an extensive review of existing academic literature and accounting for the wide  array of activities that the nexus represents, the crime-terror nexus can be said to comprise two  component phenomena: crime-terror cooperation and crime-terror hybridization. Crime-terror cooperation  occurs when criminals and terrorists interact for mutual gain, and involves the quid pro quo  exchange of money, goods, services, or knowledge. It includes one-time transactions, as when  Mansour Arbabsiar, a member of the Iranian Revolutionary Guard Corps, attempted in 2011 to pay  $1.5 million to hire a purported member of the Los Zetas drug cartel to assassinate the Saudi  Arabian Ambassador to the United States.6 Yet cooperation involving certain activities may also  become routine and habitual. The Department of Justice reported in 2010 that 29 of the 63  organizations on its Consolidated Priority Organization Targets (CPOT) list, which designates drug  trafficking organizations (DTOs) that threaten the United States, were associated with terrorist  groups.7 

Crime-terror hybridization describes a nexus between terrorist and criminal activities, but  not necessarily between organizations. Hybridization occurs when a terrorist network undertakes  criminal acts and schemes to further its goals; both al Qaeda and the Islamic State, for example, are  said to have acquired significant wealth from direct participation in the lucrative Afghan heroin  trade.8 Hybridization also occurs when a criminal organization engages in terrorist-style attacks to incite public fear, create public doubt in government institutions, or weaken a local regime.9 Historical examples include the Medellin Drug Cartel’s 1989 bombing of Avianca Flight 203, which  was intended to derail forthcoming presidential elections.10 

The crime-terror nexus, therefore, describes several convergent activities and connects a  wide array of nefarious actors, all toward ends that involve the exploitation of tenuous security  environments to their benefit. The nexus has, by its nature, expanded to serve both transnational  organized crime and terrorism, and therefore broadens the power, scope, and influence of both  traditional categorical groups. 

Literature Review 

The United States law enforcement and intelligence communities, as well as international  security bodies, have publicly acknowledged the threats posed by the crime-terror nexus. In 2010,  for the first time, the U.S. National Security Strategy characterized the crime-terror nexus as a  “serious concern as terrorists use criminal networks for logistical support and funding.”11 Former  Director of National Intelligence James Clapper stated in a January 2012 congressional hearing that  transnational organized crime and its connections with international terrorism were among the  nation’s “most pressing national security concerns.”12 Department of Defense officials told the  Senate in March 2012 that “the two missions of fighting terrorism and combating global organized  crime are increasingly linked.”13 In April 2015, U.N. Secretary General Ban Ki-moon observed that,  “Like never before, terrorists and criminals around the world are coming together and feeding off  each other.”14 In short, U.S. and international policy circles have acknowledged the emergence of the  crime-terror nexus and have incorporated the term into the lexicon of international security. While academics have conducted substantial research on the relationship between crime and  terrorism, most simply acknowledge the importance of technology in the emergence of the crime terror nexus without adding further analysis. Hesterman (2004) notes that technology and  globalization are primary factors that contribute to the growth of transnational crime and further  terrorist agendas.15 Makarenko (2004) states that organized crime and terrorism have taken advantage of post-Cold War access to technological advancements, which have blurred the lines  between politically and criminally motivated violence.16 Wang (2010) cautions that the crime-terror  nexus could leverage communications technology and advanced equipment to evade law  enforcement and intelligence.17 Forest (2012) warns of the “vast unregulated space of the Internet,  where various kinds of crime-terror collaboration can be facilitated.”18 The Congressional Research  Service (2013) calls cyberspace one of the “key nodes” where crime-terror interaction is most likely  to occur.19 Unfortunately, while these scholars unanimously draw attention to the role of technology  in enabling the crime-terror nexus, they do not explain in greater detail how technology interacts  with the nexus.  

Only two analyses broach the impact of technology on crime and terror generally, but  neither explicitly addresses crime-terror interactions. Shelley (2003) examines a thematic overview of  how criminals and terrorists use cyberspace, and Holt (2012) outlines how the Internet and  computer-mediated communications affect crime, terrorism, and the definitions thereof. Beyond  these studies, there has been no specific academic research into how information technology  expands the crime-terror nexus, making this topic ripe for academic inquiry. 

Trends in Technology Impacting Crime and Terrorism 

The information revolution has introduced trends in the use of technology that impact the  way organized criminals and terrorists operate. The expansion of air travel in the late 20th century,  along with the globalization of business, have made it easier for terrorists and organized criminals to  move goods, money, and people across borders.20 Enhanced, anonymous communications  capabilities via cell phone and the Internet further facilitate the coordination of malicious activities.  Shelley and Picarelli argue that chief among commonalities between terrorists and transnational  criminals is their regular use of information technology to plan and execute operations.21 Logically  then, interaction between the two sets of actors becomes more likely as technology shrinks the time  and space required to communicate and exchange ideas, goods, and services. 

The potential for increased crime-terror interaction is especially augmented in cyberspace,  where the ease of communication and number of targets available to both criminals and terrorists is  expanding dramatically. Given the rapid rate at which people and devices are connecting to the  Internet in the 21st century, the potential vulnerabilities inherent to information technology (IT) risk,  defined as the associated risks that come with tying any resource to some type of information technology (i.e. a database, bank account, or personally identifiable information), are multiplying,  perhaps at an exponential rate. Intel co-founder Gordon Moore famously predicted in 1965 what  came to be known as Moore’s Law—the idea that computer speed per unit cost would rise  exponentially over time.22 Moore’s Law has since been applied to describe technological change  more broadly, and its implications for security are immense.23 In this sense, the proliferation of new  technologies will significantly increase the number of security vulnerabilities that permit nefarious  actors to attack individuals, organizations, and nation-states.  

These developments yield new challenges for law enforcement and intelligence authorities.  As Stewart Baker, former NSA general counsel, claims, “Moore’s Law is working more for the bad  guys than the good guys […] It’s really ‘Moore’s outlaws who are winning this fight.”24 Baker’s  assessment is correct in at least one manner, as the remaining sections of this article demonstrate— the enhanced ability to interact online, coupled with a dramatic rise in the number of targets  available via the Internet to both criminals and terrorists, makes it logical to expect that each set of  actors will more frequently use online environments to exchange knowledge and expertise as well as  adopt one another’s tactics to achieve their illicit goals.  

  

Technology and Crime-Terror Cooperation 

At least three prominent trends are enabling crime-terror cooperation in cyberspace: the rise  of anonymity tools, the ease of information exchange, and the rise of crime-as-a-service (CaaS) and  underground marketplaces in online environments. 

 

Anonymity Tools 

The emergence of online anonymity tools helps to remove preexisting disincentives for  cooperation between criminals and terrorists, including distrust, competition, ideological resistance,  and the higher likelihood of law enforcement detection that exists offline.25 Within the so-called  deep web, or the portion of the World Wide Web that is unindexed by standard search engines, are  darknets including Tor (“The Onion Router”) that provide almost complete anonymity in  cyberspace. This technology was created with good intentions—to protect civil liberties, for  example—but provides malicious actors with an alternative to potentially dangerous or suspect in person interaction. The anonymity of cyberspace provides a more “comfortable” environment in  which illicit deals can be struck, expertise can be exchanged, and services can be rendered without  the dangers associated with real life contact. Of equal importance, senders and recipients of illicit  goods and services may have no idea with whom they are interacting—a deep web arms dealer who would otherwise be ideologically opposed to supporting terrorism, for example, might be entirely  unaware that a given buyer is a member of a Jihadi extremist group. This example, while  hypothetical, seems likely given the acknowledged existence of arms dealers on the deep web.26 

Exchange of Expertise 

The exchange of technical know-how has been a prominent component of crime-terror  cooperation in recent decades. In 2001, for example, U.S. and Colombian investigators discovered  that the Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia (FARC), itself a hybrid crime-terror organization,  paid $2 million to the Irish Republican Army to have members of its engineering department  demonstrate techniques for bomb and mortar making.27 Similar arrangements online are becoming  more likely as the number of terrorist and criminal Internet users rises. Cybercrime expert Marc  Goodman writes that in digital environments, illicit actors will “often learn from and imitate the  operational success of one another.”28 Likewise, the FBI reports that terrorists are demonstrating an  increased interest in cyberattacks.29 Given that analysts have observed a gap between the cyberattack  capabilities of terrorist groups and the hacker community at large, it follows that terrorists seeking to  exploit cyber capabilities will turn to cyber criminals for online know-how.30 Along those lines,  Goodman claims that portions of the Internet are becoming something of a “criminal university,”  where terrorists can learn how to run a phishing scam, defeat firewalls, steal credit card data, and  hack various devices.31 

Crime-as-a-Service and Underground Marketplaces 

Perhaps more ominous and impactful to the crime-terror nexus are burgeoning “Crime-as-a Service” (CaaS) offerings and underground marketplaces that allow terrorists to easily purchase an  array of criminal services, both online and offline. CaaS marketplaces offer a variety of products,  including pay-per-install malware, money laundering services, anonymity tools, and botnets for  rent.32 Acknowledging this threat, the FBI observes that “botnets run by criminals could be used by  cyberterrorists … to steal sensitive data, raise funds, limit attribution of cyberattacks, or disrupt  access to critical national infrastructure.”33 Similarly, Assistant Attorney General John Carlin of the U.S. Department of Justice’s National Security Division reported in June 2016 that “blended  threats” are emerging as criminals begin to offer their tools for a profit.34 

Underground marketplaces in the deep web also offer goods and services that may facilitate  offline crime and terror. Several of these services may be used to facilitate acts of terrorism and  include the sale of counterfeit and fraudulently obtained identification documents, murder-for-hire,  weapons and explosives, counterfeit currency, and human trafficking services.35 Recent news reports  suggest that ISIS and other designated terrorist organizations can buy U.K. passports on the deep  web.36 Furthermore, bitcoin and other cryptocurrencies facilitate clandestine dealings by enabling  rapid purchases and, in comparison with traditional finance, relatively untraceable transactions. 

Technology and Crime-Terror Hybridization 

Evidence of the hybridization of transnational organized crime and terrorist groups also  exists online. One of the most prevalent characteristics of technology’s influence on the crime-terror  nexus is the newly acquired ability of terrorist organizations to engage in criminal schemes for  financial gain. Identity theft, wire fraud, stock fraud, credit card fraud, intellectual property theft, and  auction fraud represent just a small sample of the potential criminal acts that terrorist networks will  undertake for profit. Similar to the case of Younis Tsouli outlined at the beginning of this article, in  2011, Filipino and U.S. agents uncovered a $2 million hacking scam against AT&T that funded  Lashkar-e-Taiba, the terrorist group responsible for the 2008 bombings in Mumbai, India.37 Notably,  the size of the cybercrime market is enormous, costing the global economy up to $575 billion  annually.38 Facilitated in large part by the opportunities generated through crime-terror cooperation  described in the preceding section, terrorist networks will likely seek to obtain an ever larger portion  of that money over time, and will do so more frequently through “in-house” capabilities. Although less prevalent, crime-terror hybridization also takes place when organized criminals  attempt to launch cyberattacks resembling acts of terror. The Economist has gone as far as to  contend that organized crime groups “are the true threat to American infrastructure,” citing the  possibility that cyber criminals pose greater risks to national infrastructure than foreign  governments.39 The extortion of utilities through cyberattacks is a logical next step for organized cybercrime groups searching for new business, though cyber criminals may also occasionally join in  the fight to combat, discredit, or weaken trust in sitting governments.40 To date, evidence of such  activities is sparse, in part due to difficulties in attributing cyberattacks, but examples exist. In 2008,  the Russian Business Network (RBN) allegedly attacked and hijacked many of Georgia’s Internet  servers during the Russo-Georgian conflict. Although the RBN is a recognized criminal gang, its  2008 attack appeared politically motivated and targeted public infrastructure, suggesting that the  group engages not only in crime but also in terrorism through the World Wide Web.41 

Implications for U.S. National and Transnational Security 

What do the above trends in online cooperation and hybridization among criminal and  terrorist groups signify for U.S. national and international security in the 21st century? Several  preliminary conclusions can be drawn. First, digital environments are undoubtedly presenting new  opportunities for quid pro quo exchanges and the hybridization of illicit actors, thereby making  certain groups more dynamic and difficult to counter using traditional law enforcement and security  measures. Criminals and terrorists have expanded access to information, tools, goods, and services  that may be used to accomplish their goals, and more targets than ever before to attack. Law  enforcement and national security authorities would do well to take note of these trends and  monitor how illicit actors are evolving amid this reality. 

Second, terrorists may particularly benefit from the crime-terror nexus in cyberspace. These  groups now have new opportunities to gain knowledge and purchase resources for use toward their  ideological goals, massive new opportunities for financing, and untold millions of various online  targets for cyberterrorism, from individuals, to financial institutions and corporations, to national  governments. International security authorities will need to closely monitor how terrorists  increasingly use the Internet for operational purposes, and explore the extent to which criminals  enable associated activities.  

Third, these trends could present serious risks for nation-states around the world, especially  to weak and developing states that are already at odds with major criminal, terrorist, or narcoterrorist  organizations active within their borders. In many countries, the number of users with Internet  connectivity (and thereby the number of would-be cyber criminals and terrorists) is likely to rise  faster than sovereign law enforcement and judicial institutions can mature to monitor and act on  illegal online activity.  

Consider the case of Nigeria, where Boko Haram benefits significantly from a form of  Internet fraud that entirely bypasses existing Nigerian regulatory and legal frameworks.42 As the  Nigerian case illustrates, these troubles run deep for weak and failing states, where cybercrime flourishes but legal restrictions remain undeveloped or poorly enforced.43 Meanwhile, there has been  explosive growth in cybercrime cases reported in recent years—India, for example, witnessed a 70  percent increase in 2014 alone—and certain nation-states may find themselves already ill-equipped  to combat emerging cyber threats.44 Governments that are unable to adequately deter these threats  are at risk of losing the trust of their respective populations, weakening their legitimacy and ability to  contend with illicit actors. Weak and collapsed states can further become the “breeding grounds” for those who seek to attack the United States and its allies, as home bases from which groups plan  more traditional physical attacks, or outposts from which to conduct cyber-attacks or safely generate  revenue online.  

Policy Considerations 

Further Research on the Crime-Terror Nexus in Cyberspace 

To better inform policy-makers conducting threat assessments and risk mitigation strategies,  scholars and security authorities alike should examine in greater depth the various components of  the nexus described herein, including: (1) how terrorists derive financial, material, and operational  support through online cooperation with criminals; (2) how and whether criminals seeking financial  gain may tailor their online products and services to extremists as a new profitable market; (3) how  terrorist organizations hybridize by regularly employing criminal tactics for ideological objectives  through cybercrime and cyberattacks; and (4) how transnational organized crime groups may  hybridize by carrying out major cyberattacks to aim, for instance, at destabilizing a political regime.  This article is intended as an introduction to these possibilities; more in depth studies of these topics  should be carried out to better inform decision makers in conducting threat assessments and risk  mitigation strategies. 

Strong, Cyber-Oriented, and Innovative Leadership 

Forward-thinking leaders who encourage collaboration, promote awareness of threat  convergence, and emphasize the broad importance of cybersecurity in law enforcement and  intelligence matters are essential among today’s security authorities. There are fears that some leaders  in high positions within the law enforcement and intelligence communities are not technologically  savvy, or even technologically disinterested. In 2012, Janet Napolitano, then head of Homeland  Security and therefore all cybersecurity matters in the Department, was asked about her own  cybersecurity practices. In response, she referred to herself as a Luddite and noted that she uses few online services and does not use e-mail “at all.”45 Today, law enforcement and intelligence agencies  require leaders that, at the very least, are aware of commonly used technologies and the rapid pace of  chance that they introduce to the world. Ideally, leaders who recognize the important implications of  threat convergence in cyberspace can direct resources toward developing a clear organizational  picture of the threat, a structured strategy to confront it, and the ability to lead analysts and agents in  executing that strategy. These leaders must be prepared to strongly advocate their views on emerging  threats and resist opposition from legacy institutional structures and organizational habits that  adhere to outdated ways of thinking about the threats posed by criminals and terrorists in the 21st century. 

International Cooperation and Capacity-Building 

As terrorists and criminals can operate in cyberspace anywhere an Internet connection is  available, international cooperation is essential. The United States will be decreasingly able to  unilaterally monitor communications and activities in cyberspace as the number of Internet users  increases overseas. In recognizing this trend, U.S. policy-makers must accept that bolstering the law  enforcement and intelligence efforts of foreign counterparts will become a primary deterrent against  transnational organized crime, terrorism, and the online convergence of related groups. The U.S.  government should work with international partners, through foreign assistance programs that help  to train and advise law enforcement agents, fortify laws and judicial institutions, and share  intelligence gathering and analytical techniques in the countries that need them most. The U.S.  Department of Justice’s Office of Overseas Prosecutorial Development and Training (OPDAT) and  International Criminal Investigative Training Assistance Program (ICITAP) should incorporate  significant cybersecurity and cyber investigative components. Analogous offices in other federal  investigative and foreign assistance offices, such as the State Department’s Bureau of International  Narcotics and Law Enforcement (INL), should follow suit.  

In addition to foreign assistance programs, the U.S. government should continue to station  more military, intelligence, and law enforcement attachés—especially those with cybersecurity  expertise—in U.S. embassies. Attachés help build informal law enforcement and intelligence  relationships that can prove tremendously useful for rapid information sharing and informal  evidence exchanges. They provide the notable side benefit of promoting long-term diplomatic ties  and can build the scaffolding for future, broader collaboration programs to counter illicit activities.  

Mutual Legal Assistance Treaty Process Reform 

Closely intertwined with legal and judicial capacity building abroad is the importance of an  improved evidence-sharing framework across jurisdictions. Mutual legal assistance treaties (MLATs)  govern the formal evidence-sharing process between governments, but are slow and inadequate in  the digital age. MLATs are essential to the prosecution of terrorists and criminals insofar as they involve overseas activity and the need for evidence that is only available in a foreign jurisdiction.  These agreements are especially relevant to the United States’ relationships with foreign  governments, as more crimes and terrorist acts than ever before are facilitated through Internet  service providers and technology corporations like Google, Microsoft, and Yahoo, whose servers are  located in the United States.46 Significant U.S. legal protections governing access to stored  communications, as well as inadequate U.S. government resources devoted to processing foreign  requests for legal assistance, make popular U.S. online services even more attractive to terrorists and  criminals. Foreign authorities attempting to prosecute malicious actors who have committed or  facilitated criminal and/or terrorist attacks online regularly request electronic evidence from these  companies, but must endure waiting periods of months to years before evidence is furnished. This is  a problem that will over time impact U.S. authorities as much as their foreign counterparts; as  Internet services develop abroad, the U.S. government will require ever more evidence from foreign  Internet service providers to effectuate prosecutions of criminals and terrorists who target the  United States and its citizens. 

Employ Novel Investigative Techniques 

Offline, crime-terror interactions are often uncovered by agents posing as one half of the  nexus. In 2009, for example, Drug Enforcement Administration agents posed as Latin American  drug traffickers and captured three individuals linked to al-Qaeda seeking narcotics trafficking  protection.47 Analogous techniques will undoubtedly prove useful in cyberspace. Given the  anonymity afforded to criminal and terrorist actors in the deep web, the innovative use of  undercover cyber agents and informants may be the most efficient tool in identifying and  apprehending actors operating in the crime-terror realm online. Analysts and agents should study  and master the use of underground communications systems, cryptocurrency, and other cyber enabled tools to dupe would-be offenders into revealing criminal and terrorist schemes and ties.  

Assess and Address Interagency Challenges 

Finally, and most importantly, greater interagency collaboration is necessary to confront this  threat. The online interactions described herein further confirm the idea that the fight against  international terrorism is increasingly intertwined with efforts to combat transnational organized  crime. A law enforcement problem can increasingly become a national security problem, and vice  versa. The Congressional Research Service rightly asked in 2013 whether a specific agency or an  interagency coordinating body should be designated to lead U.S. government responses to crime terrorism threats.48 This question is increasingly relevant today considering the role technology is playing in unifying and hybridizing these actors. A task force of this kind could cut through outdated  organizational structures, informational silos, and bureaucratic policies that otherwise impede  progress in combating threat convergence on the web. Program analysts across agencies that fight  crime and terror online should compile metrics on known instances of crime-terror cooperation and  hybridization, analyze trends, and assess the utility of interagency work.  

To the extent that an interagency task force is deemed too costly or inappropriate to address  this threat, other options exist. Interagency cybersecurity liaisons could be appointed with a mandate  to study and coordinate the disruption of crime-terror activities in cyberspace. Liaisons would serve  as reliable points of contact for expertise in this subject matter and to facilitate swift information  sharing with other agencies as needed. Agencies may also consider coordinating interagency  rotational programs that ensure agents and analysts are acquiring cross-cutting experience in a  variety of departments and specialty areas. Programs of this kind would increase the number of  “generalists” in relevant security agencies, which F. Matthew Mihelic describes as “necessary to  maintain an organizational advantage of successful intelligence analysis in the increasingly complex  situations of today.”49 

Some scholars and policy-makers may prefer to view the issues posed in this analysis from a  more traditional lens—to look at cybercrime as the exclusive realm of law enforcement, for example,  or to leave anything related to terrorism to counterterrorism and intelligence officials. This line of  thinking ignores the changing realities of a globalizing world with a rapidly changing transnational  security landscape, of which the growing crime-terror nexus is just one symptom. It is becoming  increasingly important to view issues of crime and terrorism vis-à-vis one another, and the bureaucratic structures of government agencies must reflect this reality. Decision makers should pay  careful attention to whether dated, compartmentalized security structures might be interfering with  law enforcement’s ability to adapt to online threats. A general movement toward dynamic, cross cutting, and increasingly interlinked security authorities may be necessary to combat 21st-century  threats including the crime-terror nexus. 

Conclusion 

While the crime-terror nexus is at times difficult to detect online, the trend is clear. Cyberspace  enables broader interactions between crime and terrorism, both through cooperation between  criminals and terrorists and the hybridization of criminal and terrorist organizations. National and  multilateral authorities are slowly beginning to recognize these phenomena and update security  paradigms to reflect online threat convergence; the European Commission’s 2015 Agenda on  Security prioritized “terrorism, organized crime, and cybercrime as interlinked areas with a strong  cross-border dimension.”50 The findings in this article strongly reaffirm the European Commission’s report. By acknowledging this reality and exploring its intricacies in greater depth, the United States  and its international partners will be better positioned to counter criminality and terrorism across the globe. 

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