Building Afghan Civil Society “From The Outside”: The Role of Global Civil Society Actors and the Impacts on Perceived Local Legitimacy
Abstract
This paper addresses the issue of “building” civil society in post-conflict societies through external forces, analyzing the effectiveness of such initiatives and the impacts on the perceived legitimacy of the global civil society actors that are fundamental in shaping the national society in question. Using the case study of post-2001 Afghanistan, the author finds that opportunities for modern Afghan NGOs and traditional civil society organizations to contribute positively to peacebuilding and reconstruction efforts were largely squandered as a result of the international community’s focus on a Western neoliberal definition of civil society that did not necessarily fit the Afghan context, resulting in a circumscribed application that limited the breadth of local actors involved. Global civil society actors came to dominate the landscape of Afghan civil society, limiting the perceived legitimacy of civil society in Afghanistan, and raising fundamental questions in terms of representation and legitimacy when considering the effectiveness of externally fostered civil society in post-conflict reconstruction efforts.
INTRODUCTION
In a post-conflict society, neo-liberal interventionist models see “building civil society from the outside” as an effective way to rebuild the social and communal cohesion necessary for wider peacebuilding, reconstruction, and democratization. When considering the effectiveness of such initiatives, it is critical to analyze the perceived legitimacy of global civil society actors, which are fundamental in shaping the national civil society in question. In the context of post-2001 Afghanistan, the international community played a major role in shaping the future of Afghan civil society (ACS). For instance, international actors and donors decided which actors and interests were to be represented at the civil society forum parallel to the political negotiations at the Bonn conference of 2001. Further, the international community provided a massive influx of funding opportunities for non-governmental organizations (NGOs) and civil society organizations (CSOs).
However, the international community’s focus on a Western neoliberal definition of civil society, incompatible with the Afghan context, squandered opportunities for modern Afghan NGOs and traditional CSOs to contribute positively to peacebuilding and reconstruction efforts. Further, this narrow focus resulted in a circumscribed application that limited the breadth of local actors involved. This narrowly applied definition, coupled with security priorities that favored quick-impact aid delivery rather than long-term reconciliation and community building initiatives, sidelined traditional Afghan CSOs. Instead, service delivery NGOs, and particularly international non-governmental organizations (INGOs), became the focus of international donor funds, neglecting the other critical functions of civil society in a post-conflict environment. Global civil society actors, in the form of INGOs, came to dominate the landscape of Afghan civil society, while Afghan NGOs and traditional CSOs, such as shuras and jirgas, reoriented their agendas and priorities to fit Western agendas and funding opportunities. The dominant role of global civil society actors limited the perceived legitimacy of civil society in Afghanistan. This has raised fundamental questions concerning the effectiveness – in terms of representation and legitimacy – of external influences on local civil society development in post-conflict reconstruction efforts.
DEFINING CIVIL SOCIETY: CAN WESTERN CONSTRUCTS FIT WITHIN THE AFGHAN CONTEXT?
The dominant presence of international NGOs in Afghanistan has in- fluenced the organizational structure, priorities and roles of ACS following 2001. Before arriving at this understanding, however, it is necessary to have a clear picture of how civil society has been traditionally conceived within the nation. Further, it is salient to consider how this national understanding of civil society fits with the Western neoliberal model of civil society that is used by the international community and is embodied by global civil society actors.
In its most general form, the Western perspective envisions civil society as the public realm of voluntary collective action around shared interests and values that lie between the state, the market, and family.1 Although civil society is independent from the state, it is oriented towards and interacts closely with the political sphere, with each actor often shaping the other.2 The concept is based within the cultural and historical context of modern Western democracies, influenced by the ideals associated with the political emancipation of citizens from feudalistic ties, monarchies, and states during the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries.3
The Western neoliberal perspective of civil society continues to be influential in theory and practice. This perspective forms the basis of the idea that fostering a strong civil society is particularly crucial in post- conflict societies in order to ensure social cohesion, stability, economic growth, and civic participation inside and outside of official democratic forums.4 In the absence of a global state, this model embraces the idea of “an army of NGOs” performing the necessary functions to “smooth the path of economic globalization.”5 Global civil society organizations, particularly INGOs, are increasingly influential in this regard due to their capacity to impact economic and political development within individual states.6
Despite civil society’s widespread acceptance amongst scholars and practitioners as a critical institutional pillar within externally driven nation building initiatives, it is entirely unclear whether Western concepts of civil society can be transferred effectively to non-Western societies with different cultural ideals, notions of democracy, and economic structures.7 As noted by Glasius et al. in their analysis of whether civil society can be translated to different cultural contexts, there is “little support for the idea that the civil society concept is culturally alien to non-western societies.”8 Nevertheless, non-Western notions of civil society have barely surfaced within academic discussions of civil society’s role in emerging democracies.9
In the Afghan case, it is particularly difficult to define civil society according to the Western neo-liberal definition. The term, translated as Jama-e-Madani, did not gain widespread acceptance in Afghanistan until the external intervention in 2001; however, there is still no accepted understanding or practical working definition of civil society. This is particularly true in rural areas, where contention between local and foreign versions of the term has arisen.10 Traditional and modern manifestations of civil society in Afghanistan have vacillated according to the relative liberalism of different political regimes. Under various governments following WWII, this diversity included modern liberal organizations, such as NGOs, voluntary associations, and interest groups.11 These modern elements emerged alongside what will be referred to as traditional civil society organizations, which include community councils, such as jirgas and shuras, as well as religious networks.12 Social relations within civil society, however, are much more complex than suggested by the traditional and modern dichotomy. Indeed, individual identities and communal associations often merge and intersect.13 Regardless, the salient point to recognize is that throughout Afghan history, CSOs have existed as foundational structures within society.
Following the intervention in 2001, global and local civil society actors, as well as politicians, lacked consensus on what groups to include within the definition of Afghan civil society. For instance, if one considers civil society as transcending family ties, the predominance of tribal, kin, and clan identities and associations within Afghanistan is neglected. A weak central authority, protracted bouts of insecurity, a primarily rural and non- industrialized socio-economy, and extreme variance in the extent, scope, and role of CSOs depending on the geographic and tribal context have created further obstacles to mapping Afghan civil society through a Western lens.14 Further questions are raised by the apparent incompatibility of Islamic collectivism and the individualism touted by Western ideals.15 Finally, the concept of “civility” inherent in the Western neoliberal concept of civil society may not comply with the Afghan context. For instance, the initial Taliban movement is often argued to have arisen as an overwhelmingly spontaneous reaction against misrule, and thus it can conceivably be considered as “civil society at its most powerful.”16 For the purpose of this analysis, however, it is assumed that post-2001 attempts to strengthen Afghan civil society refer only to those elements that generally support peaceful nation-building initiatives.
BUILDING ACS AFTER 2001: THE ROLE OF EXTERNAL ACTORS
The Western perspective of civil society framed the international community’s decisions in 2001. This led to the application of an extremely narrow definition of civil society, with external actors failing to recognize the full breadth of ACS.17 Indeed, NGOs were seen by the international community as representing civil society as a whole because they were the easiest to understand and were the most bureaucratically amenable to international donors. Further, international funds favored INGOs, which had mandates particularly compatible with donor perceptions and extensive communication networks in donor nations. INGOs accordingly came to dominate the civil society landscape, limiting the perceived legitimacy of efforts to rebuild Afghan civil society. The dominance of global civil society actors and the ambiguity regarding the applicability of the Western definition in the Afghan context has resulted in civil society often being seen as a Western-imposed concept, severely limiting the perceived legitimacy of efforts to rebuild Afghan civil society.
The international community based their broadly conceived objectives of nation-building and democracy promotion on the principles of stability and neoliberal economic development. ACS had the potential to make significant contributions to these initiatives, including supporting the reconstruction of the latent, yet undeniably complex, elements of Afghan civil society. To promote a sense of communal stake and local ownership of externally driven initiatives, domestic actors should have been fundamental within the projects of external actors; nevertheless, ACS received little consistent or substantive international support. This dearth of support was due in part to the lack of consensus on the scope of civil society, the lack of a comprehensive understanding of traditional civil society activities, and scarce information regarding the support required by ACS actors.18 As noted by Kristian Berg Harpviken, “The ability of external actors to work constructively within Afghan civil society hinges on its ability to understand the actors, activities, and processes within it.”19
Following the Taliban’s fall in 2001, there was an ostensible political effort to include Afghan civil society in consultations to determine the shape and structure of the new democratic landscape. While international donors and political actors met at Bonn to shape the future political arena, a parallel civil society consultation in Bad Honnef in November 2001 led to the formation of the Afghan Civil Society Forum. This forum was designed to broaden the inclusivity of the arenas of political and public life, to discuss issues relevant to civil society, and to give recommendations to the political peace negotiations in Bonn. Emphasizing the significance of bringing issues pertinent to civil society to the political table, some commentators viewed this externally driven involvement of civil society as having meaningful influence on the processes and outcomes of the post-settlement era.20 However, as noted by Thania Paffenholz, the legitimacy and influence of a civil society forum is dependent on the selection of the civil society representatives invited to the table.21 At Bad Honnef, external actors, who viewed civil society through a Western neoliberal lens, made decisions regarding repre- sentation while clearly failing to understand the complexities of ACS. This failure had repercussions for ACS, namely, in the creation of divisions between Dari and Pashtu speakers, with each group posturing for a dominant symbolic position of national representation.22
Further, the external actors making decisions of representation focused their priorities on national political interests rather than the development of Afghan civil society.23 After the initial fall of the Taliban, the international community, influenced by the US agenda, maintained the capture of Osama bin Laden as its top priority, which came at the detriment to wider state building objectives.24 The international donors behind INGOs have thus been widely perceived to favor quick-impact aid delivery projects that provide immediate, if short-lived, benefits for military and security objectives, rather than focusing on reconciliation or community-building initiatives that would benefit peacebuilding and reconstruction in the long-term.25 In this regard, some INGOs have been seen as “force multipliers” for their home governments. Indeed, Colin Powell pronounced that humanitarian organizations have expanded the reach of the US government and helped it to achieve the political goals of intervention.26 Even though INGOs may seek to distance themselves from the political realm, “in operational terms humanitarian actors have played a key role in the war on terrorism’s major theatres.”27 The underlying priority of security has therefore undermined substantive moves to foster the local CSOs necessary to support peace, reconstruction, and democracy initiatives.
The issues of representation and dominant donor priorities have led local Afghan CSOs to conclude that the inclusion of civil society voices astride the post-conflict negotiations in Bonn was largely “an afterthought,” reflecting the marginal role that local civil society was given by international actors in shaping reconstruction efforts.28 For instance, Elizabeth Winter, in her comprehensive study of Afghan CSOs, notes that the outcomes of civil society conferences and consultation forums have disappointingly seemed like “box ticking exercises,” compromised by lead times too short to allow for proper consultation and a lack of a follow-up or accountability process.29 Afghans interviewed by Winter summarized the general sentiment by declaring that neither the international community nor the Afghan government had engaged with Afghan civil society on more than a superficial level, to the detriment of peace negotiations and nation building efforts.30
While civil society may have gained a foothold in popular and political discourse as a result of the Bad Honnef forum, its inclusivity was limited, and it lacked local legitimacy. Applying a narrow lens, the international community essentially built upon the assumption that the Taliban had eradicated ACS, despite local commentators arguing that a “vibrant and diverse” civil society lay in waiting.31 The application of civil society to the Afghan context has been myopic, with NGOs, as the most visible and externally accepted component of civil society, often thought of as synonymous with civil society itself.32 Some scholars, such as Stephen Orvis, argue that for this concept to retain its value, it needs to be broadened to cater to other types of communal association.33
In the absence of a well-functioning state, international donors preferred to channel development aid through modern international NGOs, which have headquarters in donor countries and enjoy more accessible global communication networks.34 Accordingly, there was an explosion in the number of INGOs active in Afghanistan in 2001.35 This was due to a lack of state capacity, as well as a fundamental shift in external donor strategy to one that prioritizes external accountability rather than local legitimacy and increasingly relies on private transnational groups as contractors and intermediaries.36 The international community’s reliance on service delivery INGOs undermined the potential for the inclusion of traditional Afghan CSOs in the peacebuilding landscape. Furthermore, the critical functions of Afghan civil society in peacebuilding and reconstruction have been restricted. This has also led Afghan CSOs to mold their agendas to fit Western constructs, which has been a limiting factor both in the rebuilding of ACS and in wider state building efforts. This highlights the importance of understanding Afghan civil society in its own historical, cultural and political context rather than applying “a template based on the experience of modern Western democracies.”37 Finally, the lack of legitimacy of INGOs in the Afghan context further constrained efforts to strengthen ACS. Fundamentally, this hampered the perceived legitimacy of efforts to rebuild Afghan civil society, and it stressed the widespread view that INGOs are not legitimate actors within local civil society frameworks.
IMPACT OF EXTERNAL ACTORS ON ACS: TRADITIONAL CSOS SIDELINED
In post-conflict societies, traditional communal structures can be important building blocks within the reconstruction process. Indeed, they are amenable to the establishment of a sense of identity, affiliation, community, continuity, and refuge as people seek the familiar in the face of upheaval.38 In certain contexts, ties and forms of associations along communal, kin, or clan identities may be far more meaningful than formal, modern organizations. As explained by Wachira Maina, “Civil society is contextual, and the forces both of class and kinship can animate its capacity to fight for and help root democracy. There can be no a priori assumption that only civil society based on non-kin ties can serve democracy.”39
It seems likely that traditional institutions and individuals – such as shuras, jirgas, khans, maliks, village elders, and mosques – could have contributed positively to peacebuilding and reconstruction efforts.40 In particular, shuras and jirgas – male-dominated community-level decision making organizations varying in organization and significance according to tribe or region – have traditionally served as reactive conflict resolution mechanisms amongst families, tribes, and clans. They have accordingly played important roles in strengthening social cohesion.41 As the inter- national community moved in, however, its focus on utilizing INGOs precluded the inclusion of traditional actors and organizations that have broader communal representative membership.42 International actors viewed such traditional associations as embodying illiberal – that is, non- Western – values, and perceived them to be more difficult to operate with than formal, registered NGOs.43 A Western perspective of civil society prevented “the recognition of local forms of civil society,” precluding traditional CSOs from partaking within peacebuilding efforts.44
Recently, the international community and INGOs have increasingly utilized these forms of traditional CSOs as vehicles to deliver aid. Rather than strengthening ACS, this resulted in shuras reorienting their traditional focus to one recognized as necessary by Western donors. As explained by Berg, “Taking the traditional shura as a starting point [for delivering development aid] makes entry easier, but also leaves [external] agencies with the challenge of encouraging a substantial reorientation of the shura.”45 The fundamental question – often unrecognized by intervening actors – is what this reorientation implies for the civil society function of shuras.
Engaging traditional CSOs merely as counterparts for delivering aid risks weakening their potential to promote critical peacebuilding tasks such as socialization and social cohesion.46 These organizations embody traditional Afghan values – such as voluntary action on behalf of other citizens – that have been fundamental to Afghan civil society and are now at risk of being overshadowed by Western ideals, such as democracy and individualism. Recent field studies illustrate that only a small minority of Afghans – and largely the educated urban class – feel that “it is only democratic values and institutions that should be valued and introduced countrywide.”47 The perspective of external actors therefore can be seen to reflect an “ethnocentrism and a disregard of local traditions,” with significant impacts for the perceived legitimacy of external efforts to strengthen civil society.48 It appears that global civil society actors and international donors have given little thought to the fundamental dilemma of externally manufactured civil society. Chirstopher Spurk has encapsulated this dilemma as “attempting to modernize a state which has been based on traditional societies without compromising the very values and relationships which will be relevant to the development of the future state.”49
IMPACT OF EXTERNAL ACTORS ON ACS: CRITICAL FUNCTIONS OF CIVIL SOCIETY COMPROMISED
Several authors have recently emphasized the potential role of civil society in post-conflict societies as a basis for peacebuilding and reconstruction.50 For instance, Spurk offers a model of civil society in post-conflict societies that highlights seven functions critical to peacebuilding initiatives. These functions are: 1) the protection of citizens against attacks of despotism by the state and other authorities; 2) monitoring for accountability, including but not limited to the tracking of human rights, public spending and corruption; 3) advocacy and public communication, through the articulation of public interests and the facilitation of debate; 4) socialization, through the formation and practice of democratic attitudes amongst citizens; 5) building community, through engagement and participation in voluntary associations as a method of building social capital; 6) intermediation and facilitation between citizens and the state at different levels; and 7) service delivery.51 Significantly, however, Spurk emphasizes that the function of service delivery should be considered only as an entry point into a community to allow for the expansion of the other civil society functions; it is not a foundational function in its own right.52 On a normative basis, civil society functions to improve the interplay amongst citizens, to establish regular, representative and sustained participation of the citizenry with the state, and to provide the social capital necessary to ensure a greater level of effectiveness and responsiveness of state institutions.53
In the fragile, post-Bad Honnef context, the international community and global civil society actors failed to improve the enabling environment for civil society. They have instead nurtured a “rentier civil society” of INGOs and externally-funded Afghan NGOs within a framework prioritizing service delivery over the other critical deliberative functions of civil society highlighted by Spurk.54 Significantly, the service provision role of civil society is not perceived in the literature to be directly related to peacebuilding or democratization.55 Further, projects designed to create entry points with local authorities in order to expand to include the other critical functions of peacebuilding have been limited.56 Nonetheless, service delivery NGOs have received the vast majority of external funding.
Global civil society actors had a fundamental role in this process. INGOs have been central in establishing modern Afghan NGOs, with close material and informational links existing between Afghan entities and NGO coordination bodies around the world.57 Theoretically, global civil society actors can foster a re-emerging civil society through knowledge transfer and the provision of funding, as well as offering protection for local CSOs through the creation of international awareness.58 However, while having some positive impacts on capacity building, this relationship with global civil society actors has largely resulted in emerging Afghan NGOs adapting quickly to Western “NGO-speak,” engaging mostly in aid delivery and becoming driven by external funding opportunities.59 Jude Howell, a preeminent scholar of Afghan civil society, explains that as most NGOs are creations of donor agencies lacking a distinct social constituency of support, donors “face the dilemma of creating entities ‘from the outside’ which are supposed to be ‘of the inside.’”60 Consequently, international donors have essentially been adopted as NGOs’ main constituency,61 raising major questions regarding the local legitimacy of such entities and their capacity to represent local populations.
Indeed, the partnerships between INGOs and Afghan NGOs have created “virtual clones” of Western NGOs, “whose priorities, interests and structures are externally shaped.”62 INGOs and the donors that fund them shape priorities, promote certain values, and cultivate particular institutional forms. Critically, NGOs formulate funding proposals around the perceived interests of donor agencies.63 As explained by Howell, “Through capacity-building, financial auditing requirements, reporting procedures, and proposal preparation, donors play a powerful role in shaping not just the developmental agenda, but also the direction and raison d’être of civil society.”64 This raises fundamental questions as to whom civil society is representing and to whom it is accountable.
IMPACT OF EXTERNAL ACTORS ON ACS: THE LOCAL LEGITIMACY OF ACS UNDERMINED
As noted, after 2001 there was a massive influx of INGOs into Kabul, each with an inherently political and value-laden agenda.65 The dominant presence of foreign NGOs may complicate the creation of domestic civil society; indeed, the presence of INGOs in Afghanistan has had major implications for the perceived legitimacy of ACS.66 Illustrative of this fact, global civil society actors have faced a backlash in Afghanistan due to their perceived illegitimacy within the broader development agenda, as well as within the development of local ACS.67 A local Afghan interviewed in a field study succinctly confirmed this by declaring, “International NGOs are not part of Afghan civil society.”68 The lack of legitimacy stems largely from INGOs being perceived as less independent from their home governments, with weak accountability to and representation of local populations.69 INGOs have been widely seen to be driven by international donors who follow their own global agendas and promote Western values rather than those important to Afghan society.70 Indeed, there appears to be “little evidence” of links being built with local civil society or local voices, despite the fact that a “relatively small amount of money and support could act as a catalyst for locally driven development.”71
INGOs have recently come under severe criticisms from the Afghan population. These criticisms stem largely from the lifestyles of expatriate NGO staff, who are perceived to be segregated from local populations by walls of “elitism.” Indeed, they enjoy relatively high standards of living, eliciting profound jealousy, frustration, and propaganda against INGO operations.72 The extreme wage disparities between foreign and local staff of INGOs solidify such divisions. Further, the disparity between the salaries of Afghan NGO employees relative to civil servants – often a twentyfold difference – serves to fuel popular resentment.73
Additionally, INGO partnerships with local Afghan organizations or individuals are often seen as superficial, with most foreigners reluctant to relinquish the “driver’s seat” to Afghans.74 Criticisms of INGOs include accusations of corruption and a general lack of accountability.75 Illustrating the general sentiment, an Afghan female parliamentarian declared:
“[INGOs] do ‘flagship’ projects, meaning they put up a big sign saying ‘gift of the American people’ but there is nothing else. The money goes back to the donors’ countries. A large portion of funds goes to foreign experts. The money is spent on bodyguards, chauffeurs, holidays. When they come here, they demand per diems, holidays, high fees and they don’t pay tax.”76
The independence of international NGOs from their home donor governments has also been questioned. As donor countries increasingly move towards outsourcing development projects, official and non- governmental aid becomes closely intertwined. This calls into question the ability of INGOs to separate their priorities and agendas from those of their donors.77 For example, many large US NGOs that work in Afghanistan, such as Atlanta-based CARE International, receive over half their budgets from the US government with uncertain implications for INGO agendas.78 Local populations often see international NGOs as puppets of foreign governments, which has become increasingly problematic given the increasingly blurred lines between the traditionally discrete spheres of security and development operations.79 Addressing the complexities of the “militarization of aid,” the diminishing of humanitarian space in unstable regions, and the implications of the broadening role of military Provincial Reconstruction Teams is beyond the scope of this analysis. Nevertheless, the implications of rural populations being unable “to differentiate among NGOs, UN agencies and PRT workers, referring to all of them as muzzesi [organizations]”80 are critical.
This association of INGO actors with military operations has placed an increasing strain on INGOs and local populations. This tension climaxed in May 2006 after American forces shot into a crowd protesting the killing of civilians in a car accident involving US troops in Kabul. The protests quickly intensified and the offices of international NGOs were attacked, illustrating the lack of distinction made between global civil society actors and military operations. Notably, the offices of CARE International were burned down, and the Kabul office of Oxfam was pillaged.81 In response, many INGOs tightened their security arrangements, further distancing themselves from local populations. This is indicative of a more general “suspicion about [INGOs’] purpose” on the part of the Afghan population.82 Overall, therefore, the role of INGOs in Afghanistan after 2001 has been a limiting factor in strengthening a sense of local ownership, representation and legitimacy of Afghan civil society.
CONCLUSION
As has been illustrated, utilizing global civil society actors to foster Afghan civil society “from the outside” after 2001 has resulted in a limited role for ACS within peacebuilding and reconstruction efforts. Furthermore, it has inhibited the legitimacy of efforts to strengthen civil society organizations. The international community has had unrealistically high expectations of the possibility for non-Afghan actors to build domestic civil society. This draws attention to the need to be realistic about the limitations of externally manufacturing civil society. Global civil society actors can have a role in fostering a vibrant civil society, but success hinges on a deep understanding of the national context and long- term relationships with local actors.83 Global civil society actors and the international donor community must seriously reflect on their roles and impacts, as well as on the lens through which they view external interventions.
Endnotes
1 Kristian Berg Harpviken, Arne Strand and Karin Ask, Afghanistan and Civil Society (Peshawar/Bergen: Norwegian Ministry of Foreign Affairs and Chr. Michelsen Institute, 2002), 2; Christoph Spurk, “Understanding Civil Society,” in Civil Society and Peacebuilding: A Critical Assessment, ed. Thania Paffenholz (Boulder, CO: Lynne Rienner, 2010), 7-8; Jude Howell and Jeremy Lind, “Manufacturing Civil Society and the Limits of Legitimacy: Aid, Security and Civil Society after 9/11 in Afghanistan,” European Journal of Development Research 21 (2009): 719.
2 Spurk, “Understanding Civil Society,” 8-9; Kjell Erling Kjellman and Kristian Berg Harpviken, “Civil Society and the State,” in Civil Society and Peacebuilding: A Critical Assessment, ed. Thania Paffenholz (Boulder, CO: Lynne Rienner, 2010), 30; Berg Harpviken et al., Afghanistan and Civil Society, 2.
3 Spurk, “Understanding Civil Society,” 9; Berg Harpviken et al., Afghanistan and Civil Society, 3; Jude Howell, “Making Civil Society from the Outside – Challenges for Donors,” The European Journal of Development Research 12, no. 1 (2000): 18.
4 Berg Harpviken et al., Afghanistan and Civil Society, 3-4.
5 Kaldor, “Five Meanings of Global Civil Society,” 9.
6 Berg Harpviken et al., Afghanistan and Civil Society, 4.
7 Spurk, “Understanding Civil Society,” 9.
8 Marlies Glasius et al., Exploring Civil Society: Political and Cultural Contexts
(London: Routledge, 2004), 51.
9 Kwadwo Appiagyei-Atua, “Civil Society, Human Rights, and Development in Africa: A Critical Analysis,” Peace, Conflict, and Development: An Interdisciplinary Journal 2 (2002): 2–3; Béatrice Pouligny, “Civil Society and Post-conflict Peacebuilding: Ambiguities of International Programmes Aimed at Building ‘New’ Societies,” Security Dialogue 36, no.4 (2005): 498.
10 Elizabeth Winter, Civil Society Development in Afghanistan (London, UK: London School of Economics, Non-Governmental Public Action Programme, and Economic and Social Research Council, 2010), 7.
11 Jude Howell and Jeremy Lind, Civil Society with Guns is Not Civil Society: Aid, Security and Civil Society in Afghanistan. Non-Governmental Public Action Working Paper Series 24. (London: London School of Economics and Economic and Social Research Council, 2008), 8; Borchgrevink and Berg Harpviken, “Afghanistan: Civil Society Between Modernity and Tradition,” 241; Barnett Rubin, The Fragmentation of Afghanistan (New Haven, CT: Yale University Press, 2002), 58; Amin Saikal, Modern Afghanistan: A History of Struggle and Survival (New York: IB Tauris, 2006): 159.
12 Borchgrevink and Berg Harpviken. “Afghanistan: Civil Society Between Modernity and Tradition,” 241.
13 Howell and Lind, “Manufacturing Civil Society and the Limits of Legitimacy,” 723. 14 Howell and Lind, Civil Society with Guns is Not Civil Society, 8; Howell and Lind, “Manufacturing Civil Society and the Limits of Legitimacy,” 723.
15 Howell and Lind, Civil Society with Guns is Not Civil Society, 8; Borchgrevink and Berg Harpviken, “Afghanistan: Civil Society Between Modernity and Tradition”; Howell, “Making Civil Society from the Outside – Challenges for Donors,” 15; Winter, “Civil Society Development in Afghanistan,” 16.
16 Kaja Borchgrevink and Kristian Berg Harpviken. “Afghanistan: Civil Society Between Modernity and Tradition,” in Civil Society and Peacebuilding: A Critical Assessment, ed. Thania Paffenholz (Boulder, CO: Lynne Rienner, 2010): 242. For the concept of civility, see: Helmut K. Anheier, “Reflections on the Concept and Measurement of Global Civil Society, Voluntas: International Journal of Voluntary and Non-profit Organizations 18, no. 1(2007): 1-15.
17 Winter, “Civil Society Development in Afghanistan,” 11.
18 Ibid., 7.
19 Berg Harpviken et al., Afghanistan and Civil Society, 17.
20 Thania Paffenholz,“Civil Society and Peacebuilding,” in Civil Society and Peacebuilding: A Critical Assessment, ed. Thania Paffenholz (Boulder, CO: Lynne Rienner, 2010): 57 and 63.
21 Paffenholz,“Civil Society and Peacebuilding,” 57.
22 Howell and Lind, “Civil Society with Guns is not Civil Society,” 17-8.
23 Ibid.
24 Borchgrevink and Berg Harpviken. “Afghanistan: Civil Society Between Modernity and Tradition,” 239; Howell and Lind, “Manufacturing Civil Society and the Limits of Legitimacy,” 728.
25 Winter, “Civil Society Development in Afghanistan,” 27; Ahmed Rashid, Descent into Chaos: The United States and the Failure of Nation Building in Pakistan, Afghanistan and Central Asia (New York: Penguin Group, 2008); Howell and Lind, “Manufacturing Civil Society and the Limits of Legitimacy,” 721.
26 Sarah Kenyon Lischer, “Military Intervention and the Humanitarian ‘Force Multiplier,’” Global Governance 13 (2007): 99.
27 Ibid., 108.
28 Similar sentiments were expressed of the civil society forum that ran parallel to the London Compact of international donor countries in 2005. Howell and Lind, “Manufacturing Civil Society and the Limits of Legitimacy,” 725.
29 Winter, “Civil Society Development in Afghanistan,” 10.
30 Ibid., 8.
31 Berg Harpviken et al., Afghanistan and Civil Society, 1; Winter, “Civil Society Development in Afghanistan,” 14 and 17; Glasius et al., Exploring Civil Society: Political and Cultural Contexts (London: Routedge, 2004).
32 Berg Harpviken et al., Afghanistan and Civil Society, 3; Paffenholz, “Conclusion,” 429; Winter, “Civil Society Development in Afghanistan,” 11 and 19.
33 Stephen Orvis, “Civil Society in Africa or African Civil Society?” Journal of Asian and African Studies 36, no. 1 (2001): 17-38.
34 Channeling aid in this matter has also had major implications for state building, as development aid has largely circumvented government channels. It is beyond the scope of this analysis to assess the consequences of this mechanism for governmental institutions; however, it is important to keep in mind given the connection between civil society and a strong state. Ashraf Ghani and Clare Lockhart, Fixing Failed States: A framework for rebuilding a fractured world (New York: Oxford University Press, 2008): 12; Michael Carnahan et al., “Closing the Sovereignty Gap: An Approach to State- building,” (London: Overseas Development Institute, 2005): 10-11.
35 The number of registered NGOs jumped from 46 in 1999 to more than 2000 by 2003. Howell and Lind, “Manufacturing Civil Society and the Limits of Legitimacy,” 725.
36 Alexander Cooley and James Ron, “The NGO Scramble: Organizational Insecurity and the Political Economy of Transnational Action,” International Organizations 27, no. 1 (2002): 10; Rubin Berrios, Contracting for Development: The Role of For-Profit Contractors in U.S. Foreign Development Assistance (Westport, Conn.: Praeger, 2000). 37 Berg Harpviken et al., Afghanistan and Civil Society, 1.
38 Kjellman and Harpviken, “Civil Society and the State,” 40.
39 Wachira Maina qtd. in Howell, “Making Civil Society from the Outside,” 16.
40 Kjellman and Harpviken, “Civil Society and the State,” 40.