COUNTERPOINT: Do Not Ratify New START; Renegotiate

Before casting his inevitable “no” vote, former Senate Foreign Relations Committee Chairman Jesse Helms would often say that he’d “never seen a treaty I liked and don’t think I will start now.” Despite his pessimism, even the late Senator Helms would find difficulty objecting to much of New START (NST). Indeed, many conservative objections to the treaty, particularly its implications for missile defense, are overblown and partisan. Yet, NST remains flawed for three major reasons:1. Its fundamental assumptions are misguided2. It is a missed opportunity to dramatically constrain Russian nuclear forces3. NST constrains burgeoning areas of U.S. conventional military superiorityLike its predecessor, START I, NST assumes that Russia and the United States should have parity in strategic nuclear weapons. The assumption of parity was necessary during the Cold War to maintain a precarious strategic stability among relatively equal adversaries. Such parity is inappropriate in the current strategic security environment. Simply, the United States should not size its strategic force structure to Russia anymore than it should to China, India, France, or the other nuclear powers. The two countries occupy fundamentally different positions in the global order. While the United States underwrites the security of NATO and democracies in East Asia – ultimately guaranteed by nuclear weapons – Russia is a declining regional power. Rather than the Cold War security context of “two scorpions in a bottle,” we see ongoing proliferation of nuclear capabilities and delivery systems technology (particularly ballistic missiles), especially among rogue states. The United States must maintain a credible extended deterrence posture – combining nuclear and conventional means – to satisfy allies’ security concerns and meet emerging threats. The instability of this new environment calls for maximum flexibility in U.S. deterrence posture, particularly given concerns about a cascade of proliferation in the Middle East should Iran master nuclear enrichment processes. In this context, parity with Russia remains a fundamentally flawed assumption.While its monitoring and verification provisions are probably adequate (if weakened from START I), we must examine what negotiators chose not to include. The absence of tactical nuclear weapons represents a glaring omission. Russia holds a 10-1 advantage over the United States in its tactical stockpile. Why parity for strategic nukes, but not tactical? The tactical exclusion is inexcusable given the strength of the U.S. negotiating position. Russia needed NST to prevent a large strategic weapons disparity from emerging. Without NST, attrition will wear down the Russian nuclear arsenal by at least a third by 2020 (well below NST’s launcher limits). A basketcase economy and incompetent military industrial base have progressively whittled away Russia’s nukes. In other words, Russia needed NST badly, while the U.S. could easily live without the treaty. Instead of pressing this advantage, the U.S. negotiating team let Russia off the hook. Once again, we are left with no insight, accounting, or monitoring of Russia’s tactical arsenal; it is not subject to any legally-binding arms control treaty with a verification regime. Indeed, the tactical-strategic distinction is misleading. A nuke is a nuke. How a state chooses to employ its nuclear weapons is strategy. Furthermore, NST does not cap the Russian strategic arsenal. While the U.S. is required to reduce, Russia is free to build-up its strategic forces and operate its tactical ones with impunity.Beyond tactical nukes exclusion, many NST critics are concerned about conventional weapons’ inclusion in the treaty. Currently, the United States is developing so-called long range prompt global strike (PGS) systems. Concepts for such systems include supersonic cruise missiles, able to strike anywhere in the world in less than one hour. These systems would deliver conventional payloads, so they should be exempt from New START, which ostensibly deals solely with strategic nuclear forces. Yet, Russia succeeded in counting some PGS system under New START’s limits. For example, any PGS system launched from a B-2 bomber – think supersonic air-launched cruise missiles (ALCMs) – would count towards the U.S. quota. Burgeoning U.S. capability in this area should not be constrained by any treaty, particularly given the immaturity of the technology. NST threatens to strangle PGS in the cradle.Despite these reservations, NST is not a terrible treaty. Even respected arms control skeptics like Sen. John Kyl (R-AZ) understand the treaty’s impact is “relatively benign.” The United States can live with lower numbers of nuclear weapons, particularly given the costs of operations and maintenance. Yet, the Senate should reject NST because it’s a bad deal. U.S. negotiators failed to press obvious American advantages and make Russia’s tactical weapons subject to a treaty. Negotiators also failed to completely exclude any reference to conventional weapons and missile defense. The bargaining positions have not changed. Russia still needs a treaty, but the U.S. can live without one. Therefore, both sides should go back to the negotiating tables. This image is being used under Creative Commons licensing. The original source can be found here.