COUNTERPOINT: Ratify New START

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The New Strategic Arms Reduction Treaty (START) should be ratified because it advances American security. The terms of the treaty promote cooperation between the U.S. and Russia, and limit the number of deployed strategic nuclear weapons to 1,550 each. It also guarantees the “strategic stability” sought by the U.S.’ top military leaders. Twenty years ago, the treaty would have passed easily with bipartisan support; indeed, the provisions of the treaty are not controversial on their merits. Rather the critics of the New START treaty quibble with it more for political gain and less for policy concern. To adequately defend the new treaty, the claims of the opposing side must be addressed.Many critics fail when they claim START is outdated or that American parity with Russia is unbecoming of the world’s only superpower. This logic is disposable because the American and Russian arsenals represent 95% of the world’s total nuclear weapons and represent an equal danger to the other. Simply stated: limitations must be mutual or they may prove suicidal. The U.S. also has no serious leverage in this case, as some claim, because all arms reduction treaties depend on goodwill and mutual concessions. Ronald Reagan’s maxim—“Trust, but verify”—rings true today and New START showcases that simple wisdom.And yet some are convinced the limits are extreme and that 1,550 strategic nuclear warheads is too few. Such conclusions are absurd. While proliferation will expand the number of threats to American interests in the coming years, not all threats will be equal. Small but antagonistic countries are not dangerous enough to warrant oversized and expensive stockpiles and stronger states will most likely avoid competition. Iran and North Korea, for example, do not enjoy the resources necessary for a massive nuclear build-up. And countries like China, which have the technical competency and capital, will not challenge the U.S. arsenal any time soon because it would compromise economic ties.It should also be noted that with 1,550 strategic nuclear weapons, the United States could drop one bomb every week on an adversary for nearly 30 years before exhausting its stockpile. A scenario in which the U.S. must deploy several nuclear weapons to defend against a weak rogue state is unrealistic. And there is no nuclear rival analogous to the Soviet Union, either in terms of ideology or aggressiveness. Maintaining a massive arsenal anyway is politically costly because it gives the impression that the U.S. prefers a nuclear monopoly rather than global security. The terms of the treaty stipulate that it will expire in ten years, thus allowing U.S. leaders to reassess the strategic landscape and change their approach accordingly at the end of the decade. There is no nuclear threat, present or foreseeable, that even by the most cautious standards would require the U.S. to abstain from the treaty.Other arguments lack appeal because they suggest Russia will enjoy an advantage (see Mitt Romney’s July 6, 2010 op-ed “Obama’s Worst Foreign Policy Mistake” in the Washington Post). It is true that shorter-range tactical nuclear weapons are not addressed by New START. But the issue is not as urgent as some claim. Even if Russia enjoys an advantage in tactical warheads, this does not mean the U.S.’ nuclear umbrella will evaporate overnight. Strategic weapons (i.e. those with an explosive yield sufficient to vaporize a city or industrial center) will remain numerous enough to deter aggression and protect any ally in danger. Tactical weapons, as their name implies, do not possess the same magnitude of destructive force.By ratifying START the U.S. will confirm its commitment to the contractual, legalistic framework that has defined responsible nuclear custodianship for decades. Most importantly, it will restart serious inspections within Russia, which were discontinued last December after the previous agreement expired. The new treaty might also produce momentum for broader, more inclusive reduction commitments in the future (related to tactical weapons) and encourage better relations between Washington and Moscow. This combination of consistency, control, and potential makes START particularly appealing.New START should be ratified because it will preserve American primacy, limit expensive nuclear stockpiles, reinforce American commitments to transparent nuclear standards, and prove the U.S. is serious about non-proliferation. If the arguments above do not compel you, consider this list of Americans who have all declared their support for the treaty: Defense Secretary Robert Gates; Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff Mike Mullen; STRATCOM Commander General Kevin Chilton (who is responsible for managing America’s arsenal and response capabilities); Director of the U.S. Missile Defense Agency Lt. General Patrick O’Reilly; former Defense Secretary James R. Schlesinger; former National Security Advisor Brent Scowcroft; former Secretaries of State James Baker, Colin Powell, and Henry Kissinger. This image is being used under Creative Commons licensing. The original source can be found here.

Miranda Sieg, Former Staff Writer

Miranda Sieg is a second-year Masters Student at the George Washington University Elliott School of International Affairs studying Security, Development and Conflict Resolution. She is primarily focused on education and cross-cultural violence issues in East and Southeast Asia, but has recently developed an interest in post-conflict development and the integration of refugees and at risk migrants. Miranda spent two and a half years studying and working in Japan and traveling extensively in East and Southeast Asia. She currently works for the International Education Program at GW and is a Presidential Management Fellow Finalist and GW UNESCO Fellow.

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COUNTERPOINT: Do Not Ratify New START; Renegotiate