Featured Commentary: Challenges and Prospects in Post-Gaddafi Libya

Gaddafi’s death was a victory for Libya, but the transition to democracy is fraught with risks.
There can be no doubt that the October death of Muammar Gaddafi, along with several prominent leaders of his regime, has symbolic meanings that cannot be overlooked in assessing the future of the Libyan state. The symbolism of his killing shuts the door to the collective feeling of the Libyan people (and the rebel fighters in particular) that a threat, of some nebulous kind, remains. The brutal way in which Gaddafi ruled coupled with the careful attention he paid to constructing a certain image in the popular psyche and collective imagination of Libyans is closely linked to this situation. His efforts—pursued over more than four decades—led to a kind of belief that Gaddafi possessed extraordinary capacities (for some “supranatural”) that transcended the ordinary. Hence, there existed among the majority of Libyans a fear that he may have been somehow able to undertake action that would jeopardize the revolution or at least delay the complete liberalization process and the liquidation of his regime.But in the midst of the revolution and the decisive fight against the remnants of Gaddafi’s loyalists in the cities of Bani Walid and Sirte, Libyans of all orientations became aware that, quite suddenly, Gaddafi no longer represented anything more than symbolic meanings. In fact, many political observers were able to identify this shift in public opinion as the euphoria mounting against Gaddafi since the outbreak of the February Revolution advanced into new territory. Therefore, it is safe to conclude that Gaddafi's death seals the final chapter of his long reign and issues, once and for all, its death certificate. Although a lively debate on his demise is still thriving in Libya and around the world, such discussions are fundamentally concerned with the circumstances of how he was murdered and its ethical (or rather, unethical) implications; what can be concluded is that the controversy in Libya about Gaddafi won't easily die out as quickly as hoped. This is, of course, not to suggest that Gaddafi still occupies any significant position within the “political space” in the Libyan conception of their present and future. Yet memories of Gaddafi are inextricably linked to what has been happening—and what may very well happen now after his death—in areas such as Sirte or the western mountains of Jabal Nafusa.This goes beyond the huge destruction witnessed in these areas or the vast number of casualties and displaced people they suffered during the fighting; it exceeds the heavy repercussions facing some tribes suspected of loyalty to Gaddafi in the western mountains and on the coastal strip. This is unfolding at a time when forces of specific political orientations—namely, Islamists—are seeking to exploit popular sentiments vis-a-vis Gaddafi’s regime and all his wrongdoings in order to foment particular attitudes or to advocate for policies that would lead to domination by a single political color—their own. Real danger may be seen in the silence of the National Transitional Council (NTC) toward these attempts and the Council’s lack of any clear policy for dealing with matters related to the legacy of the previous regime. Other observers have underlined the confusion and inconsistencies that characterize the NTC leadership’s positions on such issues.We have already seen instances in which certain factions, primarily Islamists, have sought to define and control the scope of the present political context and impose its views in an effort to shape Libyan politics for the next decade. This has been evidently clear in their public call—not to mention the pressure they’ve exerted behind the scenes—for the NTC to deprive all Libyans who previously occupied any leading or managerial position in any governmental or quasi-governmental capacity under Gaddafi from political participation and deny them political rights for a ten year term. Obviously, such an attitude reflects a blurring of vision and some degree of political immaturity or expediency. They consider this ban—where we have seen such disastrous repercussions in an analogous situation in Iraq—instrumental and indispensable for imposing their hegemony, which they would not otherwise be able to attain without excluding anyone well-equipped with experience and expertise who might oppose their scheme.There is no doubt that such an attempt, when added to the social rifts caused by the revolution across much of the country, would lead to sharp polarization with risky consequences at the socio-political level. This, in turn, may very well pose a threat to an extremely fragile national unity and social peace. Elements of their demands seem particularly intended to trigger potentially explosive tribal, regional, and, in some areas, ethnic identities and loyalties. There is real danger inherent in a sustained and systematic strategy by Islamist political forces, supported by military force or external support, to dictate the rules of the political game in Libya’s new era without being subject to any democratic process. These elements seem to be seeking to exploit their influence during the transition period in order to control the processes that will define the political identity of the country in the near future. They are likely to employ all means at their disposal to either maintain, consolidate and enshrine, or else denounce, undermine and do away with, whatever they desire of Libya’s political processes. The Libyan people have proven their courage while displaying a longing for freedom that is only matched by the thousands of casualties since the dawn of the February revolution. Obviously and unfortunately, Gaddafi’s downfall does not imply the completion of the revolution that brought him down. The revolution, given its magnitude and disparate underlying causes, will only be fully accomplished once objectives of freedom, democracy, development, human rights, equality before the law, and the rule of law are the rights of all Libyan nationals on an equal footing.Libya will surely need a long time before it can adequately address the consequences and effects of Gaddafi’s noxious rule that destructively weighed upon literally every Libyan. During his reign, Gaddafi demolished ideas of state, institutionalism, and any sense of community, and did anything necessary to quash any incipient political and civil organizations. Sadly, however, the worst acts of Gaddafi were not only those related to oppression and murder, or the wasteful ways he squandered our national wealth. The crimes of Gaddafi go dangerously beyond this material harm, extending deeply enough to shake the foundations of the value system of Libyan society; he disrupted the culture of political community and undermined the potential for growth of the cultural components required for development. Furthermore, Gaddafi damaged and distorted the perception that the Libyans have about themselves and the world around them. These searing effects of his misrule highlight the enormous challenges ahead and the patience that will be required; they demonstrate the need for Libya to employ all energies to ensure its recovery and to embark on the formidable task of reconstruction with confidence.The February revolution, particularly in its early stages, unfolded without a centralized leadership and reflected no political or ideological orientation. This was an enormous asset at first, liberating it from the constraints and vulnerabilities associated with strict adherence to an ideological or partisan dogma. Nevertheless, it now seems possible that this amorphousness could effectively transform into a weakness if it inhibits the emergence of political organizations and a mobile civil society. Such institutions are necessary for Libya’s proper political development, as well as to counter the very real threat that the revolution and the blood of martyred Libyans will be appropriated for the purposes of a single political group.This has clear ramifications for the weakness of Libyan institutions and leadership. Conventional wisdom affirms that among the most important components for successful transition from an authoritarian regime to democracy-building is the availability of individuals or groups who can fill leadership roles and pledge themselves to democracy as a strategic choice and national commitment. Our leadership, diluted as it has been over the years of Gaddafi’s repression, has a serious challenge ahead, and it is currently unclear whether our leaders will be able to guide Libya toward democracy as the founding fathers were able to do in the United States of America.It is not a matter of dispute that the revolution in Libya was a genuine popular uprising. Libyans embarked on their revolution without much in the way of political experience or an established political culture to guide their movement and preserve its integrity; Libyans had to accept NATO’s involvement to counter the brutality of Gaddafi’s killing machine. Unarmed, largely poor Libyans had no illusion that they were up against anything but a vicious war of extermination and had no resort but to appeal to the conscience of humanity to intervene.The international community responded to this appeal for a variety of reasons. One was clearly humanitarian in nature, as the world was not prepared to, once again, witness a tragedy on the scale of the Rwandan genocide played out on Libyan soil or stand by while the horrors of another Srebrenica unfolded in Benghazi. Libyans had no other viable option but to appeal to NATO and accept its role. Other Arab nations assisted with money and gave some “required” cover for legitimizing NATO’s operations. Nevertheless, Libyans from all walks of life expressed a strong aversion to the presence of foreign troops on the ground. From the outset, Libyans, and the rebels in particular, were eager to avoid direct foreign occupation, fearing that a boots-on-the ground intervention would spoil their efforts and be counterproductive. Despite the difficult circumstances, the continued atrocities perpetrated by the Gaddafi killing machine, and the staggering number of victims and martyrs, the people of Libya voiced no call for foreign troops on Libya’s territory. The absence of such a desire may reflect a long-established patriotism and a sense of pride in Islam. It may also have roots in the negative impact the Iraqi case has had on the psyche of Libyans who disdain the idea of their country becoming a gas station for Europe or a playground for western embassies. Libyans have a long history of opposition to the presence of outsiders, particularly foreign militaries, as in the struggle against fascist Italy’s occupation. Minority voices that called for direct foreign intervention on the ground, perhaps eager to quickly accomplish the task of toppling Gaddafi, were forced to silence.Given the link between developments in Libya and the actions of foreign powers, local analysts can only speculate about the degree of manipulation occurring by outside powers, and whether international actors are playing Libyan factions against one another or outright supporting particular a faction. Although all foreign powers publicly expressed respect for the will of the Libyan people and its choices and support for the process of building democracy in Libya, it remains legitimate to question exactly what this support entails at this stage of the transition. Libyans are asking questions about the formation of a new alliance to intervene and "assist" in building post-Gaddafi Libya. Questions regarding the real goals and intentions behind this alliance have given birth to a serious and very heated debate in Libya. Many local commentators, analysts, members of social networks, politicians and average people on the street have raised eyebrows as to the real aims behind the involvement of, for example, Qatar. Moreover, the degree to which average Libyans have been consulted (or rather, ignored) also invites more doubt.Meanwhile, other serious concerns and risks are still present. These stem from the possibility of mounting extremist influence or the dangers posed by organized or ad hoc violent groups that Gaddafi could have left behind. Some "sleeper cells" may pose a real threat to the already fragile stability in the country. However, the worst of these frightening possibilities is that political competition develops into an outright struggle for power between armed groups. This struggle will likely be aggravated by the disastrous impact outside parties inflict by ill-thought desire to intervene in favor of one party or another.Yet it is worth repeating that Libyans have noticed an increase in the use by certain political factions (mainly Islamists) of tactics of exclusion and political liquidation to eliminate opponents. This subtle campaign utilizes negative popular perceptions of secularism and liberalism to dissuade people from supporting representatives of such ideals. There also exists a structured employment of popular imageries of Gaddafi and his regime to ostracize and marginalize Libyans who worked in any senior position in governmental or quasi- governmental capacities before. This opens the floodgates for a war beyond politics by advocating for the exclusion of particular elements or depriving whole geographic areas, which were cultivated by Gaddafi, from equitable participation under the pretext of loyalty to the old regime or lack of support for the revolution.Furthermore, this is occurring at a time when the inhabitants of some areas along the coast or in the western mountains, which bore the brunt of the fighting, are completely displaced. I was recently on a visit to some parts of the country where whole cities and villages have become ghost towns. This scenario is unfolding against a background of indecision about initiating a process of national reconciliation. There has been no measure in place whatsoever to implement transitional justice or at least define its basic rules and processes. Apart from the direct risks of such a deficiency, it further opens the door for the ignition of tribal or religious disputes or foreign influence, either of which would damage the development of a genuine democratic environment necessary for political competition.This transitional phase will be decisive in determining Libya’s future as a successful democracy or an unstable battleground. The policies put forward by the NTC will determine the format and rules of the game. Success is dependent on proper guidance of the transition and even more so on the ability of the Libyan people, particularly the youth, to participate in developing the country at all levels. The NTC will need to act with vigilance to preserve the people's revolution, ensuring national unity and social harmony while moving Libya toward a democratic society. Lastly, it is incumbent upon countries like the United States to understand fully the dynamics at play in the country and craft an effective Libyan policy (as was unfortunately not done in Iraq). America’s image in the Middle East will be well-served if the United States is able to formulate an inclusive Libyan policy that is divorced from political opportunism and narrow interpretations of national interest. Expediency in Libya will only help extremism and lead to an even more unstable—and anti-American—situation in the Middle East and North Africa.

Photo courtesy laurenfrohne via Flickr