Rethinking Iran: Does the Islamic Republic Really Want Nuclear Weapons?

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The international community should consider carefully whether Iran’s nuclear program is really for military purposes.A key assumption that the international community has regarding Iran’s nuclear program is that it is for military, not civilian, purposes. However, it is illogical to make such a case, whether one assumes that the Tehran regime makes decisions based on ideology and religion or based on what it considers to be in the interest of its national security.Assume that Iranians are fanatically religious—irrationally and recklessly so. If so, they must absolutely not want nuclear weapons, since the Islamic republic’s founder Khomeini considered all weapons of mass destruction to be sinful. Even as Saddam Hussein was using chemical weapons during the Iran-Iraq War, Khomeini refused his generals’ plea to retaliate in kind. Moreover, the current Supreme Leader Khamenei issued a fatwa (religious decree) banning nuclear weapons. If the Iranian regime is irrationally religious, it cannot disobey its supreme leaders and their decrees about nuclear weapons.Then, assume that the Iranians are not blindly religious, but rather make decisions based on what they consider to be national interests. In this case, building nuclear weapons does not make sense because it is not strategic. Many argue that the Islamic Republic wants nuclear weapons for deterrence, but Iran is in its most secure position since the heydays of its ancient empires, as the Bush administration toppled both Saddam Hussein and the Taliban, two of Tehran’s mortal enemies.Turkey and Russia, the other powerful regional players, have a complex relationship of competition and cooperation with Iran but are not security threats. Turkey is more concerned with Syria and Kurdish militants and would also have immense difficulty projecting its military force over its very mountainous border with Iran. Russia is more concerned with consolidating its influence in the former Soviet Republics than with threatening Iran. Saudi Arabia, while a major player, is actually on the defensive when it comes to Iran.Israel, despite its saber rattling, does not present a significant threat to Iran. The Israeli military may be able to launch airstrikes against Iran, an immensely large country, but such attacks could not be sustained for a long period of time. The Israeli military also cannot mobilize all of its air assets against Iran because reserve units are needed to fend off any potential retaliation that might originate from Lebanon or Gaza.In addition, since Israel does not border Iran, a ground offensive would be nearly impossible. Not only would the supply line have to be extended undisturbed over a significant distance, it would have to cross (with or without permission) Syria, Turkey, Iraq, Jordan, or some combination of them—a highly unlikely prospect. Even if these unlikely conditions were met, Israel would be fighting a war of attrition, which would, in an impossibly optimistic case, paralyze the country’s economy for a prolonged time, since it would have to mobilize nearly all of its able-bodied men to fight such a war.The only way Israel becomes a serious threat to Iran is if it decides to introduce nuclear weapons. This is highly unlikely, unless Tel Aviv senses an imminent catastrophe, which it has not since 1973 during the Yom Kippur War. In sum, Israel is a problem for Iran but not a significant threat.This leaves the United States as the only significant threat. But Iran cannot expect to achieve deterrence by building a few rudimentary nuclear devices (as opposed to deliverable nuclear weapons), which cannot be delivered against the world’s only superpower with its thousands of accurate, multi-warhead nuclear missiles. In an actual nuclear showdown, the United States would easily annihilate Iran and its nuclear weapons in less than half an hour.Then, there is the argument that Iran wants nuclear weapons to increase its clout in the region. Yet, much of the region is under the U.S. nuclear umbrella. Moreover, countries, such as Saudi Arabia, have hinted they would also acquire nuclear weapons (from Pakistan) if Iran acquires nuclear weapons. Any short-term advantage gained by building a few rudimentary nuclear devices would soon be negated by a regional nuclear arms race.In fact, having nuclear weapons could affect Iran’s interests negatively. The international community would be united more than ever and implement tougher measures against the Islamic Republic. Moreover, given that the Obama administration’s policy with regards to Iran is prevention, not containment, it might decide to launch air strikes to destroy Iran’s nascent arsenal and a significant portion of the Iranian military. Such a scenario would only weaken Iran’s influence in the region, not strengthen it. Overall, nuclear weapons serve no strategic purpose for Iran.Those who argue that Iran wants nuclear weapons for security or influence assume that Iranians cannot think strategically—that they are simpletons who do not have complex thoughts or know how to weigh risks and benefits. The reality is that Iranian academics, politicians, and generals debate their policies as rigorously as their American counterparts. They are certainly not naïve enough to think that a few rudimentary nuclear devices would give them a decisive political and military advantage.Before the international community enters into talks with Iran, it is worth thinking outside the box and contemplating whether Iran’s nuclear program is for military purposes or if it truly is for civilian programs.

This image is being used under Creative Commons licensing. The original source can be found here.

Sungtae "Jacky" Park, Former Staff Writer

Sungtae “Jacky” Park is a M.A. Security Policy Studies student at the George Washington University’s Elliott School of International Affairs. He has previously published for CSIS (Center for Strategic and International Studies), The Diplomat, and France 24.

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