Rethinking Iran, Part II: Explaining the Iranian Nuclear Crisis

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The West’s confrontation with Iran is fundamentally about mistrust and misperception.Last week I argued that Iran most likely does not want to build nuclear weapons (defined as deliverable warheads) for a variety of reasons, particularly because the weapons would not enhance Tehran’s security or influence. In this article, I will argue that the Islamic Republic probably did begin its nuclear program for civilian purposes, but it has turned into a defiant argument about Iran’s rights and a bargaining tool against the West, due to mutual misperception and mistrust.Iran and the West do not have the capacity to judge each other’s intentions as a result of limited contact with each other. Both sides form their own ideas about each other’s intentions and act upon them, moving events further away from the actors’ original intentions. With mutual hostility and mistrust added to the mix, the situation seemingly heads towards one which both sides envision as the worst case scenario.The popular perception in the West has become that Iran’s nuclear program is of military nature, but if one assumes that my arguments from the last week are valid, the only other logical possibility must be that the program is for civilian purposes. An argument against Iran having a civilian nuclear program is that there is no reason for an energy-rich country to have such a program. Yet, energy-based economies are highly vulnerable to shifts in global demand and cannot develop into diverse, modern economies. Hydrocarbons are also finite resources. Indeed, Saudi Arabia has plans to build 16 nuclear reactors by 2030 to become less dependent on its own resources.Moreover, as controversial as this might seem, Iran has not violated international law, as applied equally to every UN member. Under the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT), every country has the right to have a peaceful nuclear program under the International Atomic Energy Agency’s (IAEA) safeguards. So far, Tehran has allowed basic, required IAEA inspections, and there have not been any reports of diversions of its nuclear materials for military purposes.The Iranians, however, are in violation of UN Security Council Resolutions, most importantly the Security Council Resolution 1696, which demands suspension of the Islamic Republic’s enrichment program, on the basis of suspicion of the country’s military intentions. The resolutions are technically international law, but whether such suspicion is justified is up for debate.From Iran’s perspective, the UN resolutions are in violation of the NPT and are politicized, illegitimate rulings. For Iranians, who consider themselves to be proud descendants of the ancient Persian Empires, such resolutions targeted specifically at the Islamic Republic without any concrete evidence of military intention are seen as humiliating. They perceive the resolutions, sanctions, and military threats as attempts by the great powers to isolate and constrain the country (or even cause regime change), instead of as safeguard measures. Greek general and historian Thucydides pointed to honor (pride) as one of the three primary causes of conflict and war in addition to fear (need for security) and interests (greed). For Iran, the nuclear conflict has indeed become a spiteful, defiant standoff to protect its self-esteem. As such, Iran’s number one nonnegotiable demand to the West has been recognition of the country’s right to have its own nuclear program, for which the Islamic Republic is clearly willing to take a lot of pain, if not risk destruction, to protect.The Western countries on their part do not trust Iran to have a strictly civilian nuclear program and misperceive the country’s intention as being aggressive. Although the program is technically legal, the West feels it cannot take the risk of potentially letting what is considered a rogue state and a state sponsor of terrorism acquire nuclear weapons, given its hostility to the West. Furthermore, Iran acquiring nuclear weapons would set a precedent for further proliferation worldwide. If a country friendly to the West started its own nuclear program, there would not be a problem of trust, but Iran is anything but a friend of the West. The West wants the maximum amount of transparency beyond the basic IAEA requirements and sees Tehran’s refusal to comply with UN resolutions as proof that the regime is aiming for nuclear weapons, not as an act of spiteful defiance.As the conflict with the West has progressed, the Islamic Republic has added another key demand, which is the lifting of sanctions. It is clear that Tehran has come to see its nuclear program as a bargaining tool as well. Not only are the sanctions weakening the Tehran regime, but they also constrain Iran’s ambition to become the dominant power in the Persian Gulf region.Given that many people consider 2013 to be the year of decision regarding the Iranian nuclear crisis, it is critical that the West enter into talks with Iran understanding the true basis of the conflict. Legal and technical arguments are thrown about by both sides, but the conflict is fundamentally about mistrust and misperception and is, above all, political in nature.

This image is being used under Creative Commons licensing. The original source can be found here.

Sungtae "Jacky" Park, Former Staff Writer

Sungtae “Jacky” Park is a M.A. Security Policy Studies student at the George Washington University’s Elliott School of International Affairs. He has previously published for CSIS (Center for Strategic and International Studies), The Diplomat, and France 24.

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Rethinking Iran: Does the Islamic Republic Really Want Nuclear Weapons?