NSA and Terrorist Networks: A Game of Catch

Since it is highly unlikely that terrorist networks can be completely eliminated, counterterrorism efforts can only aim to minimize risk. Domestic surveillance systems represent a risk minimization method of countering terrorist threats. However, the recent Edward Snowden revelations have brought the extent of domestic surveillance systems under scrutiny. While proponents state that the surveillance systems represent a vital part in ensuring U.S. national security, the intelligence community should employ alternate methods in order to best achieve U.S. national security interests.For one, since terrorist networks can adapt within the framework of counterterrorism efforts and undergo structural changes, it is possible that current surveillance systems will prove ineffective in the long term. Organized networks might favor looser organization and an uneven separate node structure. Critics might point out that becoming individualized will decrease the effectiveness of terrorists, as isolated entities would have less information and fewer resources at their disposal. However, terrorists know the vulnerability of hierarchal structure, and have recently opted for smaller organizations and distributed operations. For instance, Operation Hemorrhage was a 2010 plan by al Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula (AQAP) to use low-signature attacks to force costly changes to U.S. security infrastructure. A question then arises of how effective domestic surveillance systems can be in negating risks associated with these types of distributed operations.Furthermore, even if there are no structural changes, international terrorist networks have demonstrated a strong propensity to adapt to globalization and utilize technological innovations to their advantage. Implementing deeper surveillance methods does not guarantee success. Assuming so would overlook the ability of terrorist networks to respond to challenges. Some would counter that the system can be perfected. Yet from the same logic, so can the efforts of terrorist entities to circumvent and evade the system. According to reports, backdoors - “hidden flaws that help outsiders to eavesdrop” - have been developed and implemented. However, these embedded access points can be accessed by actors other than the intelligence community. Therefore, systems put into place to monitor information can enable cyber crime and can also serve to undermine cyber security, which would in turn harm U.S. national security.While U.S. national security interests encompass far more than counterterrorism efforts, these efforts represent one of the more common reasons employed in favor of extensive domestic surveillance systems. As threats to U.S. national security evolve, so should the efforts of the United States to combat these new risks. However, the United States should be wary of compromising too much freedom for perceived notions of security.Instead of maintaining an extensive domestic surveillance system, U.S. authorities should focus on improving cyber security, especially in critical infrastructure areas. For instance, resources should be allocated to strengthen public sector electrical grids. Furthermore, it is surprising that many of the comprehensive privacy laws governing current policy date back to before the advent of the World Wide Web. Privacy laws need to be updated to take into account evolving technological innovations. While current systems might not necessarily infringe on privacy, they still far outstrip the original scope envisaged by authorizing legislation. In today’s globalized environment, it is unreasonable to assume that an individual can function without making use of third party data, something which is still unprotected by privacy laws. Therefore, instead of indiscriminately gathering metadata, the intelligence community could then carry out a more targeted surveillance under the structure of new privacy laws. Finally, given the importance of key private sector companies to U.S. national security, public-private collaboration could strengthen overall U.S. cyber security. This collaboration could take the form of awareness programs and technical assistance. Instead of undermining the security of private firms, the intelligence community should encourage it.Combating terrorism is an adaptive game of catch where counterterrorism efforts evolve as a response to new threats and new threats emerge as a response to improved counterterrorism efforts. It is very likely that these emergent new threats will render current surveillance systems inadequate. Thus, the marginal cost of increased security is disproportionate. In the long term, ensuring small gains in security requires proportionally far more resources. Even putting aside the individual privacy issue, since the risk of terrorism cannot be completely eliminated, such surveillance systems do not provide sufficient security returns on investment.While the issue of surveillance merits a far more detailed analysis, the basic tenet of privacy still remains: there are some boundaries that authorities should refrain from crossing. Risk represents an inherent part of society, which, while minimized, cannot be altogether eradicated. This is why individual freedoms of privacy should not be compromised under the guise of security. The world can never be 100 percent secure, and the limited resources of the intelligence community should not be used to attempt to reach this unachievable goal. Resources should rather be allocated to strengthening cyber security in key infrastructure areas, implementing programs to facilitate the effectiveness of cyber security in the private sector, and, if need be, carrying out more targeted domestic surveillance through a framework of new privacy laws.

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