A Clash of Civilizations in Ukraine? Not Quite.

Since the outbreak of the crisis in Ukraine, analysts have looked to the late academic Samuel Huntington’s theory of the “clash of civilizations” for explanations.1 Over the years, this viewpoint has yielded valuable insight into conflicts over national identity. At first glance, the theory seems applicable to the case of Ukraine: the country's European-inclined west and Russian-oriented east have been at loggerheads since Ukraine’s independence in 1991. However, in this particular circumstance, over-reliance on cultural explanations risks losing sight of the political aspirations of both local and international actors.In his seminal 1993 essay, Huntington stated that cultural fault lines would be a constant source of conflict.2 The essay, later expanded into a book, identified Ukraine as a prototypical cleft country, with coexistence between Ukrainian- and Russian-speaking communities destined to be tortuous. He predicted that Moscow’s foreign policy would tend toward consolidation of an Orthodox sphere with Russia as its core. This theory underscored a missional commitment to the incorporation of ethnic Russians scattered throughout the former Soviet republics.3,4 In light of recent events, commentators have noted that stoking separatism and threatening annexation—as Huntington expected—are pages out of the Kremlin playbook.5Explanations of foreign policy grounded in culture focus extensively on abstract entities such as “civilizations,” neglecting state and individual actors, which are considered mere foot soldiers for cultural forces. Analysts who follow this train of thought tend to assume that Putin’s main priority in the Ukrainian crisis is the uniting of ethnic Russians under a common Orthodox sphere.6 Consequently, they take for granted that Moscow is exercising a civilizational pull towards the insurgents of the Donetsk and Luhansk People’s Republics, signaling that the Crimean path is wide open, should they choose it.7Though convincing, this perspective is incorrect. Putin’s main allegiance is not to an entity called the “Orthodox civilization,” but to a sovereign state—the Russian Federation – that he has governed since 1999. While he justified forceful action in Crimea on the grounds that Moscow is responsible for the welfare of ethnic Russians threatened by “ultra-nationalists,” the motives behind his involvement in the Ukraine imbroglio are more nuanced.8Consider the “republics” of Donetsk and Luhansk. Huntington’s take on these events would have predicted Putin annexing these territories after Crimea.9 The insurgents— members of the Orthodox civilization—have been petitioning for annexation since April. Yet contrary to expectations and the pleas of insurgents, Russia has shown no intention of proceeding as it did in Crimea.The reason behind Moscow’s sudden prudence is that its policymakers follow Russian national interests as their paramount guide for foreign policy. Consequently, ethnic solidarity takes a backseat. Russia’s main stake in this crisis is in preventing Ukraine’s entry into NATO. This is far from an abnormal aspiration. Great powers do not look kindly on the presence of rival militaries in their adjacent territories. The Russian 2008 National Security Strategy identified the perimeter running through Kazakhstan, Ukraine, Georgia, and Azerbaijan as a vital security interest.10 The document called for conflict resolution and crisis management without participation of non-regional powers, explicitly naming NATO.The Kremlin is also aware that forceful tactics like the threat of invasion undermine diplomatic and much subtler procedures. Russia has influenced the levers of power in Kiev over the years by playing the game of national-level politics. Russian-speaking voters in eastern Ukraine were crucial for the election of pro-Kremlin presidents in three of the last five polls. Annexing Donetsk and Luhansk while permanently losing leverage over Ukraine’s political landscape is the surest way to turn Ukraine completely toward NATO and the EU.This explains why Putin’s support for the insurgency has been less eager than initially expected.11 A relentless civil war would severely curtail the Kremlin's sway in Kiev. So far, his approach has stopped just short of full-scale invasion. He intentionally seeks to maintain a stalemate on the ground to eventually force a truce. Putin welcomed the Minsk truce between president Poroshenko and the leaders of Donetsk and Luhansk.12 The agreement included provisions for early elections and self-government. This aligns well with Russia’s interest in establishing a legitimate formula for influencing decision-making in Kiev.In response, analysts have pondered what exactly Russia seeks to achieve through the Ukraine crisis. Does Moscow favor regime change? Putin was satisfied with pro-Russian president Yanukovych prior to his overthrow in February 2014, and he showed displeasure with the pro-Western government ushered in by the Orange Revolution of 2004-05. A “clash of civilizations” analysis would conclude that Russia’s annexation of Russian-speaking regions is then imminent. On the contrary, Russia is not interested in overcoming Ukraine’s cleft country condition. The Kremlin seems more intent on playing the country’s cultural fault lines off to its advantage. Since hostilities began, Russian officials have made it clear they encourage the implementation of power-sharing mechanisms between the central government and Ukraine’s eastern regions.13 They hope such provisions will check Kiev’s drive toward NATO and the EU. The question now is whether the fighting parties will maintain such provisions in a definitive post-conflict settlement.Given Ukraine´s unfamiliarity with federalism, it lacks the necessary knowledge for agreed-upon post-conflict reforms. This is where the international community can and should contribute in an advisory capacity. Unfortunately, few international organizations with the necessary experience register as viable mediating parties. The best candidate is the Venice Commission, a body comprised of international experts in constitutional law. Created in 1990 by the Council of Europe—an organization entirely independent from the EU—the Vienna Commission's main mission is assisting post-communist countries in drafting their constitutions. Russia, a full member of the Commission, has asked for its legal opinion in several instances during the current crisis.14,15 As for the United States, which joined in 2013, the Venice Commission represents a unique platform for sharing its rich experience in federalism. Policymakers in Washington must be ready to contribute resources and specialists to ensure that the fragile negotiated solution actually works.

1. Ukraine and the Clash of Civilizations, by Michael Hirsch ↩2. The Clash of Civilizations, by Samuel Huntington ↩3. Putin's Empire of the Mind, by Mark Galeotti and Andrew S. Bowen ↩4. Transcript: Putin says Russia will protect the rights of Russians abroad ↩5. Russia stoking Bosnian Serb separatism in echo of Crimea: Ashdown, by Daria Sito-Sucic ↩6. Putin’s global ambitions could destabilize Europe, by Molly K. McKew and Gregory A. Maniatis ↩7. “Cautious” or not, Putin may still annex eastern Ukraine ↩8. Vladimir Putin's New Axis of Evil: Liberal Russians, Ukrainian 'Fascists,' and America, by Andrew Ryvkin ↩9. Why Donetsk Will Be Next, by Zane Larwood ↩10. Russia's National Security Strategy to 2020 ↩11. Ukraine Rebels Call Putin a Coward After Russian Inaction, by Simon Shuster ↩12. Putin: Outline of Cease-Fire Is Reached With Ukraine, by Gregory L. White ↩13. Interview with Russian Foreign Minister Sergey Lavrov ↩14. Russia asks Venice Commission to assess Ukrainian parliament legitimacy ↩15. Venice Commission ↩