What the Scottish Vote Means for European Separatism

In his concession speech the morning after the vote, Alex Salmond left the door open for further referendums despite previous claims that this was a “once in a generation” opportunity. Salmond, chairman of the Scottish Nationalist Party and First Minister of the Scottish Parliament, might have shifted his timeframes after coalition and opposition leaders came together on expansive promises in the face of polls indicating a race too close to call. Tory Prime Minister David Cameron, Labour leader Ed Miliband, and Liberal Democrat Nick Clegg vowed to grant further devolved powers in a plan known as "Devo Max" while maintaining the Barnett formula’s complicated public funds allocations. Now, they are facing considerable blowback from their parties in the Westminster (United Kingdom) parliament.On the day of the referendum, the polling service Dods found 63% of MPs were unhappy with continued application of the Barnett formula, which disproportionately benefits Scotland. One MP has openly stated that the vow “was done in a panic when the polls narrowed.” Other MPs say that party leaders ought to have gotten the support of their parties first and should not be funding Scotland on the back of English constituents. Gordon Brown, Scottish Labour MP and former British Prime Minister, has been charged with implementing Devo Max, but will need unified support from the major parties to introduce legislation on his promised timetable. Conversely, the Scots might view any delay in detailing and implementing Devo Max as Westminster reneging on a critical premise of the referendum. Not only would party splintering derail the 2015 general election, it might also reignite Scottish demands for a referendum.Devo Max, as proposed by Brown and accepted by party leaders, would grant significant powers to the Scottish Parliament beyond those enjoyed by Wales or Northern Ireland. Such a discrepancy would strengthen Plaid Cymru (the Welsh party with independence on its manifesto) and independent-minded Ulstermen. The Northern Ireland Assembly, reformed in 2007, has only just achieved a measure of stability. The National Assembly for Wales was allowed to legislate without consulting Westminster for the first time in 2011. Brown’s Scotland Act is only slated to cover Scottish Devo Max, but its passage would encourage regional unrest if Wales and Northern Ireland were not granted their own additional devolved powers—whether or not they had the political infrastructure to handle them.Further, Devo Max again raises the West Lothian question: is it fair for Scottish MPs to vote on England-only matters in Westminster while English MPs are ineligible to vote on Scotland-only matters in the Scottish parliament? Cameron espoused a logical solution in his post-referendum speech: implement an English-only legislative unit with devolved powers and restrict the rights of the non-English MPs on English-only questions at Westminster. Still, Cameron’s declaration that such a change must occur “in tandem with” Scottish devolution oversimplifies the process of arranging a permanent solution to the West Lothian question. Incorporating Wales and Northern Ireland complicates the issue. For instance, can a Scottish MP vote on a transportation bill that improves English-Welsh rail lines when transportation issues are devolved to the Welsh Assembly but reserved for Westminster on the English side? No matter the timeline or the settlement details, the United Kingdom is headed towards a federal solution that inherently rewards separatism.Outside of the UK, the Scottish “No” vote did not dampen the will of Catalans to engage in their own referendum on November 9th.1 Catalan First Minister Artur Mas claimed the Scottish referendum “opens the way for us because what happened there is that they voted” [emphasis added]. The Catalan parliament, which has identified five legal routes to a referendum, overwhelmingly passed an authorization for a public consultation only a day after the Scottish vote.2 In response, Spain vowed to bring the law to the Spanish Constitutional Court, a legal technique previously used to block the Catalan parliament’s January 2013 declaration of sovereignty. Then, on September 27th, Mas signed a decree that scheduled the consultation and allowed campaigning to begin; Rajoy is expected to appeal that, too, in the Constitutional Court.The Catalan independence movement is prepared to systematically exhaust its legal options to discredit Madrid’s uncompromising opposition as only “a matter of political will” and a basic failure to recognize a people’s right to self-determination. While EU political leaders studiously refrain from comment on the domestic Spanish issue, locals have been vocal. Recent polls show support for Catalonia’s independence hovering just below 60%, and 40% of Spaniards and over 80% of the Catalan electorate believe that Catalans should be allowed to vote on the region’s future. Barring actual negotiation—something PM Mariano Rajoy has thus far refused to engage in—nothing the Spanish government does is likely to deter Mas from calling Catalans to the polls, even if it takes the form of a plebiscite regional election.The combination of resilient devolution and independence movements and the unprecedented success of separatist and regionalist parties in May’s European Parliament elections strikes many commenters as an existential threat to the EU. Realistically, the Westphalian principle of stable borders might be in danger, but the EU will continue to shape European norms. The Scots remain understandably wary of the Eurozone, but firmly believe in the economic opportunities offered by the EU. Both potential states already meet the vast majority of the EU’s acquis communauitaire, needing merely to resolve negotiated exceptions that only the parent countries, as legal successors, could keep. The only question is whether the EU would let them stay.Smaller states might rely on the EU External Action Service for their diplomatic needs. They might find themselves without the necessary leverage for bilateral treaties and therefore depend on the European Commission. They might also develop niche military capabilities and prioritize interoperability, a key element of the Common Security and Defense Policy. Thus, secession from a member country but not the EU is unlikely to cause lasting damage to the European project. With more micro-states needing mutual support to accomplish diplomatic, economic, and defense priorities, the EU might actually become more integrated.

1. August 2014, p. 28, q. 39: 58.8% in favor of independenceNovember 2013, p. 64, q. 39: 54.7% in favorJune 2013: 57.8% in favorJune 2013: 55.6% in favorFebruary 2013: 54.7% in favorNovember 2012: 57% in favor↩2. The legal methods identified are: (1) Holding a referendum under the power of Catalan law 4/2010 (Public Consultations by Way of Referendum). (2) Devolving referendum powers to the Catalan government in accordance with Article 150.2 of the Spanish constitution. (3) Exercising referendum powers to hold a referendum on Catalonia, through Article 92.1 of the Spanish constitution and its successor, “Organic” Law 2/1980. (4) The Catalan Parliament’s passing of a law on public consultations outside the legal definition of a referendum. (5) Amending the Spanish constitution to allow referendums in autonomous communities (like Catalonia). Note that Spain has a legal distinction between the terms “referendum” and “public consultation,” but Catalonia would need to significantly differentiate its public consultations by means of “electoral roll, instruments and bodies to guarantee and control security and transparency in voting and, especially, …who is convened to vote…[for Madrid] to accept that they are not undercover referendums.” See: The Public Diplomacy Council of Catalonia, “The legal basis for a referendum or other public consultation on the political future of Catalonia.” See also: Generalitat de Catalunya, “The Consultation on the Political Future of Catalonia,” pp. 50-57. ↩