Africa: The Quiet Battlefield for Global Power

On June 30, 2023, the UN Security Council unanimously voted to terminate the United Nations Multidimensional Integrated Stabilization Mission mandate in Mali (MINUSMA). This resolution followed a request earlier in the month for the withdrawal of UN forces by Mali’s foreign minister, Abdoulaye Diop. The dissolution of MINUSMA follows years of rising tensions between the West and Malian officials, which the latter exacerbated considerably after signing a contract in 2021 with the Wagner Group, a Russian state-funded private military company (PMC). Washington officials have even alleged that Wagner employees conspired to engineer MINUSMA’s withdrawal. A month later, in August 2023, Niger’s military leaders took a page from Mali’s book when Niger’s coup generals met with Wagner employees in Mali to ask for help remaining in power. 

While many view the war in Ukraine or the disputed sovereignty of Taiwan as the frontlines of global power competition between the United States, Russia, and China, this fight for global power rages on a quieter yet decisive battlefield—the Global South—with aid being the weapon of choice and Africa the primary target. MINUSMA’s failure and Niger’s turn towards Russia are examples of this concerning trend.

As the competition for global power expands to the Global South, historical and contemporary legacies of Western intervention have complicated cooperation between the West and African states. China and Russia have successfully taken advantage of anti-Western sentiments in Africa. Russia has consistently cast itself as a contrasting security partner to the West’s record of colonial oppression and present-day failures, and the Sahel and Mali, in particular, are stark examples of this strategy. Meanwhile, China presents itself as a financial alternative to traditional organizations like the World Bank and IMF, whose loan conditionalities are often deterrents for developing countries. These strategies position China and Russia to profit from African developing countries’ crises at the expense of stability and sustainable development in these states.

China

Today, China is the world’s largest creditor, and African countries are some of the largest recipients of Chinese loans, signing up for an estimated $160 billion between 2000 and 2020. Many of these countries are now struggling to pay back their enormous debts, with 2022 marking the highest number of sovereign defaults in 40 years and the world’s 91 poorest countries spending on average more than 16 percent of government revenues on debt servicing alone—almost three times higher than in 2011. Some cases are astonishing: Nigeria spends 96 percent of its tax revenue on debt servicing.

Extreme debt is fueling poverty. With so much government revenue directed toward debt repayment, there is often little remaining for services like education or healthcare. In fact, since 2020, African countries have spent more on debt payments than on healthcare. Yet China continues to increase its financial hold on the developing world, with several developing countries, including Kenya, owing more than 30 percent of their external debt to China. 

Compounding factors like widespread poverty, weak rule of law, and insolvent governments make many African countries vulnerable to China’s lending practices, which often seek to maximize return and influence with little concern for the effect on these countries’ populations. A study of Chinese loans to developing countries found that more than 90 percent of the loan contracts examined contained clauses allowing the creditor to “terminate the contract and demand immediate repayment in the case of significant law or policy changes in the debtor or creditor country.” These “policy change” clauses could allow the lender to leverage the debt to influence the borrowing government in political disagreements by using the threat of causing a domino effect of defaults through accelerating repayment. 

Russia

In the security realm, Russia has also sought to displace the United States and the West in Africa. Russia’s PMCs have been active in as many as 19 African countries, with the Wagner Group currently operating in Sudan, Mali, Libya, Mozambique, Madagascar, and the Central African Republic. From a strategic perspective, Russia’s aims in Africa are to assert itself as a global power in directly challenging the United States and NATO and to increase Russian investment activities, particularly in extractive and military industries. In some cases, Russia does this by linking military and commercial agreements, such as offering low-cost security services in exchange for contracts in the energy and extractive industries. In one such case, Wagner’s 2019 deployment to Mozambique for counterterrorism support coincided with a lucrative energy deal for the Russian entity Rosneft, port access for the Russian navy, and debt forgiveness. 

While these arrangements allow Russia to profit from insecurity in Africa, they devastate human rights, and reports of abuses and atrocities follow Wagner forces wherever they deploy. A UN investigation concluded that Malian troops and Wagner forces massacred at least 500 people in the Malian town of Moura in March 2022. Further, there are disturbing reports of Wagner troops committing other atrocities like torture, rape, and targeted civilian killings in countries like Sudan and the Central African Republic.

Potential U.S. Strategy

Suppose the United States hopes to combat growing Chinese and Russian influence in Africa. In that case, it must prove to be an effective aid partner that values sovereignty, stability, and human rights over profit. Embodying these principles will require a fundamental strategic shift to better integrate political aid, civil society aid, and security aid, as well as policy and structural adjustments within the agencies responsible for these forms of assistance, such as the Department of State, USAID, and the Department of Defense, respectively. Institutionalizing comprehensive coordination at every level is critical for success in the complex African environments in need of aid. U.S. involvement in Africa should also be characterized by a localized, cooperative approach that prioritizes the needs of African populations by including African perspectives in policy and program development. The strategic focus of U.S. agencies’ efforts in Africa should be addressing the root causes of fragility and poverty while supporting state and security capacity. Providing practical solutions to the complicated issues many African countries face will by no means be an easy endeavor, but it is a crucial one. China and Russia have demonstrated their willingness to step in when African leaders look to the international community for assistance, now the United States must do so once again or it risks pushing African countries further towards these global power competitors.

Author: Mackenzie Wenig

Managing Editor: Sebastian Reyes

Web Editor: Kate Maughan