Russian Soft Power Influence in Africa

On 24 February 2022, Russia invaded Ukraine and immediately curbed any dissent against the Kremlin’s “special military operation.” However, the disastrous invasion of Ukraine has exposed the deep facade of Russia’s superpower pretensions, due to its reassertion as a regional and global power akin to the Soviet Union during the Cold War. The Kremlin’s foreign policy, in many respects, is described as the critical building block of Russia’s strategic culture. This cultural framing doesn’t exclusively apply to (Central/Eastern) Europe. It also applies outside the European continent and has been utilized to great effect by the Kremlin. This framing is especially true in areas where historically, Russia has played less of a role than its European counterparts, such as acquiring colonies. In Africa, Putin has picked the anti-colonial narrative, mobilizing countries that supposedly have nothing in common with the West, and can be expected to try following their own “special path.” 

The Kremlin hopes its anti-colonial agenda should not suffer from Russia’s military defeats in Ukraine. The plan is to say something akin to, “This country perseveres and holds its ground.” This framework paints the Kremlin as the antithesis of the West, as a power worth doing business with as a trading partner. This relationship is highlighted in UN resolutions on Russia’s recent behavior, where a notable number of abstentions were from African countries, such as South Africa. Africa’s voting pattern, however, is not uniform and reflects that the continent is not a monolith when viewing Russia as an actor in international affairs, but it also considers that the continent is not unconditionally supportive of Russia. The liberal-international order, be it frameworks such as the G7 or G20, must work in tandem with the continent via the African Union to continue to provide a solid alternative to influence from the Kremlin as it seeks to advance its interests on the continent. 

Supporting democracy and human-rights movements on the continent and continuing its cultural centers (Goethe-Institut, the British Council, and Institut Français, to name a few), are vital interests to counter the Kremlin’s messaging. One option to change the current framework can include expanding the G20 to include the African Union, which would give more African voices in international dialogue, where only South Africa participates in this framework. 

From the Russo-Africa perspective, one key aspect of Moscow’s efforts on the continent is spreading its culture outside of its traditional sphere of influence, an example such as its culture houses, which operate in more than 80 countries, such as South Africa, Tanzania, and Ethiopia, among others. This forum provides Russian language courses and shares classical literature in Russian and the target language. Russia’s strategy of language/cultural promotion is a way that the Kremlin conducts its soft power abroad, as a way to connect with societies worldwide that have few connections with Russia. However, these efforts are not as effective as during the Cold War, when Russia appealed to a specific ideology (Communism), while today, it mainly acts defensively. 

It is a stated goal for the Kremlin to continue to develop its relations on the continent, as highlighted by Russian Foreign Minister Sergei Lavrov, “Russia highly appreciates its African friends, who just as a vast majority of members of the world community defied unprecedented, brutal pressure. Such an independent policy focused on national interests deserves deep respect.” Dialogue such as this indicates from the Kremlin to African nations that they are both being coerced by the same source, the West. Messaging is disseminated this way to deny any involvement that could constrain future Russian involvement on the continent by tapping into the Soviet-era messaging of non-interfering, anti-colonial, and independence support as a counter to the West while it pursues its own interests in Africa.

Utilizing soft power to achieve a country’s ends is not unique to Moscow. However, its efforts abroad can undermine Western sanctions for its invasion of Ukraine by continuing to trade with other regions to skirt sanctions efforts. So far, there has been a vast divide among scholars and observers. While some are optimistic about the leverage of Moscow’s soft power in Africa, others deem it limited or non-existent, such as Cold War historian Maxim Matusevich and the Jamestown Foundation Senior Fellow Sergey Sukhankin. 

From the point of view of some elites/social groups in Africa that oppose the West, Russia’s African dimension in its foreign policy toolkit is a potentially attractive factor. This strategy by Moscow to increase its cultural footprint abroad has proven to be a challenge for the West in light of its sanctions due to Russia’s war in Ukraine. Despite this, Moscow’s strategy in Africa is not without flaws. Its efforts are perceived as less effective than those of former colonial powers. In contrast, its focus on hard power instruments, such as private security companies like the Wagner Group, has caused difficulties in establishing itself as a soft power. 

As the ongoing conflict in Ukraine has been a force multiplier for energy and food crises, Africa has been disproportionately affected; the continent is heavily reliant on Ukrainian grain and other foodstuffs. The U.S. Institute for Peace referred to Russia as a “three-headed hydra” that has caused food, energy, and financial shortages, which could cause African countries to default on payments to Russia. By strengthening democratic institutions in the region as well as having continued engagement with the West, the West can effectively counter Russia’s anti-Western narrative, albeit the effect that Russia can play is insignificant compared to other Western powers, and the actual challenge to the West for regional influence in the future may be China. 

Through involvement on the continent, the West must continue to be transparent about its atrocities in the Scramble for Africa, which is still felt today and may cause some to look to work with other actors. African elites will gladly join in condemning neocolonialism, ignoring the colonial nature of the war in Ukraine, but are unlikely to risk their relations with the EU and the US over a potentially renewed relationship with Russia. How broad the sanctions regime against Moscow will last as the war drags on remains to be seen. Moscow’s soft power efforts are asymmetric when comparing its hard power efforts in Africa, specifically the Kremlin’s relationship with the Wagner Group and the company’s role in supporting autocratic regimes. Its recent failed rebellion led by its leader Yevgeny Prigozhin may both change how it conducts itself in Ukraine and also cause the private military company to refocus its efforts back on Africa. This strategy has been much more effective from the Kremlin’s point of view and can indicate that Moscow will continue along this line for the foreseeable future in Africa.

Author: Patrick Kornegay, Jr.

Managing Editor: Sebastian Reyes

Web Editor: Shreya Lad